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Mackenzie Marie Clark 
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Director: Dr. Erika Frydenlund 
 
As instances of forced displacement arise and become increasingly large and prolonged 
around the world, large influxes of humanitarian aid have become critical in assisting host 
countries with crisis response. The funding required to meet the immediate, emergency needs 
presented by a refugee situation is filled primarily by governmental humanitarian contributions, 
and more specifically, by the United States. Typically, the U.S. is integral to the structure of the 
networks of humanitarian aid being directed towards a humanitarian response as it is the largest 
donor, in most cases. However, what does this reliance on U.S. funding mean for the structural 
integrity of these networks? What happens when the U.S. cannot or will not provide relief to 
humanitarian crises? I address these questions by drawing on the theory of cascading failure in 
social network analysis by applying it to four prominent cases of forced migration requiring large 
influxes of emergency humanitarian assistance. These regional cases represent increasing 
degrees of reliance on U.S. contributions to humanitarian response for displaced Venezuelans, 
Syrians, and Rohingyas, as well as the mixed-migration into Europe. Drawing on the results of 
the network analysis from these cases, I conclude two things. Firstly, I find, largely, 
humanitarian aid networks which receive a majority of their funding from the U.S. are extremely 
prone to collapse in the unlikely circumstance that the U.S. significantly reduces or withdraws 
funding. Secondly, networks which have more diversified sources of funding are less prone to 
collapse if a major donor “fails,” or reduces/withdraws funding. Overall, this study speaks to a 
 
 
larger conversation about the importance of humanitarian aid networks becoming more resilient 
to catastrophic shocks to the system that may come as a result of shifting sources of 
governmental humanitarian assistance. As the global community, and especially the United 
States, progress through a period of uncertainty and instability, insights on how to maintain the 
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 Refugee and migrant situations have become some of the largest, most pressing 
humanitarian issues the global community must address, as more people than ever before have 
been forcibly displaced from their homes.1 Since 2010, the number of displaced persons in the 
world has more than doubled (Figure 1). In the wake of these phenomenon, host countries have 
often been ill-equipped to deal with the rapidly emergent needs presented by such large influxes 
of people, often in dire need of assistance. International humanitarian aid contributions are 
critical in bridging the gap between a host country’s domestic capabilities and the demand 
brought about in the onset of an influx of refugees and migrants. Massive governmental 
contributions, especially those from the United States, are essential for most countries coping 
with these situations. However, does this immense dependence on one, singular source of aid 
leave recipient countries hosting refugees vulnerable to another crisis? In the face of a global 
financial crisis, what would happen if the United States were to cut even a portion of their 










Figure 1 Trends of Displacement 
 
Source: Graph created from data from the UNHCR Population Data Portal (UNHCR, 2020b) 
  
This study uses social network analysis and the network phenomenon of cascading failure 
in the cases of the four largest, ongoing refugee and migrant situations in the world to explore 
these questions. The cases, which address the reliance of each individual network on United 
States’ humanitarian contributions from most to least reliant, are as follows: Venezuelans fleeing 
to surrounding South American countries; Rohingya refugees fleeing to Bangladesh; Syrian 
refugees in surrounding Middle Eastern Countries; and mixed migrants—economic and 
refugees—fleeing to European border countries.  For each case, I conduct two network analyses: 




this approach, I am able to determine how resilient the structure of each network is to a major 
systemic shock, demonstrating that reliance on a singular governmental source for aid decreases 
the robustness of these humanitarian aid networks. Though this study addresses the issue of 
cascading failure in humanitarian aid networks as they pertain to refugee and migrant situations, 
it does not address other humanitarian issues. It does, however, providing a starting point for 
understanding the implications these trends of network behavior could have on other crises.  
 The paper will proceed as follows. The first chapter reviews three areas of literature 
relevant to this study. The first area is humanitarian aid and aid effectiveness, and how these 
issues relate specifically to the United States as well as private donors; the second is social 
network analysis and network behaviors, specifically power law distributions, preferential 
attachment, and how these trends relate to cascading failure; the last is literature regarding the 
use of social network analysis in international studies, and how these areas of study contribute to 
the findings of this paper. The second chapter explains the social network analysis methodology 
of this study. The following three chapters address each individual case study by descending 
reliance on US aid contributions: the aid network for Venezuelan displacement; the aid networks 
for displaced Rohingya and Syrians; and the aid network for mixed migration to Europe’s border 
countries. The final chapter concludes and summarizes the findings of each case study, their 
policy implications on a domestic and global scale, and offers suggestions for future areas of 




SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS FOR HUMANITARIAN AID INSIGHTS 
Though the four cases identified in this study are the largest instances of forced migration to 
date, they remain some of the most chronically underfunded humanitarian crises in the world, 
along with other UNHCR humanitarian initiatives (Figure 2). Despite domestic and international 
policy initiatives directed at development goals in the four regions, they have been left severely 
underprepared for such a large influx of people with critical food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, 
healthcare, and labor market access needs. Significant levels of outside assistance from not only 
state actors, but also a wide variety of organizations, has been necessary to meet the needs 
presented by each migration situation.  
 
 
Figure 2 UNHCR Global Funding Overview, 2019 
 














Traditional policy analysis and statistical models that relate variables describing the 
donor/recipient relationship provide a lens through which to view humanitarian aid. My 
contribution in this paper is a focus on the financial transactional relationships between actors to 
provide a structural view of humanitarian aid in the four cases. In essence, I attempt to “follow 
the money” between donors to construct both their relationships and the scale of these 
connections as a picture of humanitarian aid within the country in response to these specific 
“crisis” events. This provides a unique insight into the role of the United States as a major 
provider of humanitarian aid in the four cases. As I examine the networks—both including and 
excluding the United States as a prominent network actor—issues regarding the resilience of 
their structure in the face of large shocks to a single, prominent donor become clear.  
Network analysis uses connections between entities—states, organizations, and 
individuals—to derive patterns of structure that offer an abstraction of the real-world patterns of 
behavior (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, & Montgomery, 2009). In this paper, I use Financial Tracking 
Service (FTS) data from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs 
(OCHA) to construct a network of financial humanitarian aid transactions between humanitarian 
actors including state governments, international nongovernmental organizations, local NGOs, 
and private donors. Network analysis then serves as a computational social science approach that 
allows for a deeper examination of actor-to-actor transactions, and, when used in conjunction 
with qualitative case study analysis, can infer conclusions on the significance of certain donors 
and what their absence could imply for network resiliency. In the following sections, I review the 
role of international humanitarian assistance, relevant aspects of network analysis and behavior, 




Humanitarian Aid and Aid Effectiveness 
Literature addressing the role of humanitarian aid in international studies is limited in 
comparison to studies addressing foreign aid more generally. While humanitarian aid is meant to 
serve strictly humanitarian purposes, scholars such as Morgenthau (1962) point to the actual 
nature of this subsection of aid and its growing likelihood of being used as a foreign policy tool, 
depending on the context of which the aid is granted. He notes, “While humanitarian aid is per se 
nonpolitical, it can indeed perform a political function when it operates within a political 
context” (Morgenthau, 1962). This general sentiment is reflected in various other studies which 
discuss more specifically the politicization and institutionalization of acts of humanitarianism 
(Barnett, 2005; Nachmias, 1997), the increasing involvement of national interests in 
humanitarian intervention (MacFarlane & Weiss, 2000), higher political intervention from non-
state actors (Smith, 1990), and competing levels of interest among humanitarian actors (Weiss, 
1999).  
In understanding the contemporary goals of humanitarian aid, it is important to consider 
the role of globalization and its impact on humanitarian aid/action and issues of development. 
Generally, globalization is a major challenger to the contemporary understanding of state 
autonomy. This is addressed in Clark’s (1998) discussion of the rise of globalization in 
international studies, in which he notes the erosion of the divide between international issues and 
domestic issues, and how this may contribute to the “demise of state economies” and the 
“viability of state capacity.” This, in turn, has led to a rise of international actors—IGOs or 
NGOs—in humanitarian action, rather than single state actors being the primary decision-maker 
(p. 480). Globalization has also created a form of “new humanitarianism” (Kuehlhorn Friedman, 
2019), which is characterized as having less regard for the actual recipients of aid, and instead, 




can forget to include the complexities of the populations they are aiming to assist in favor of 
fostering development to improve the operations globalization relies on to persist, such as 
production of goods for international markets and trade (Kuehlhorn Friedman, 2019). And lastly, 
for refugee response, globalization and new humanitarianism have resulted in the devolution of 
the goals and principles of refugee protection that the UNHCR has traditionally held. More 
specifically, the UNHCR has shifted its primary goal from protecting refugees and their rights 
and safety towards a more security-driven agenda, defined by the foreign policy objectives of the 
Global North (Chimni, 2000). 
According to the theory of new humanitarianism, humanitarian aid has become used 
increasingly as a tool of foreign policy. Politicization of aid shifts the focus away from objective 
assessments of the receiving country’s needs towards donor-motivated interests in the receiving 
country’s natural, social, and political landscape and dictates the way aid is handled, allocated, 
and prioritized (Apodaca, 2017). This, in turn, impacts the effectiveness of humanitarian aid in 
recipient countries. Studies have addressed the effectiveness of foreign aid and the limited 
impact this has on international policies of aid-giving (Quibria, 2014), the negative impact 
politicization of aid, such as earmarking, can have on receiving countries being able to make real 
political, social, and economic change (Bearce & Tirone, 2010); and how certain donors, 
specifically NGOs and private donors, have less political or more humanitarian interests than 
governmental donors (Büthe, Major, & de Mello e Souza, 2012). As increasingly politically-
driven aid has given rise to “new humanitarianism,” there is a growing need to understand how 
these trends impact urgent humanitarian development initiatives, such as response to emergent 




The United States’ Role in Humanitarian Aid  
 According to the Financial Tracking Service, the U.S. is the world’s largest provider of 
humanitarian assistance (Figure 3). It far surpasses the presence of other international donors, 
and in the three of the four cases of this study, the presence of the United States is clearly shown 
both in the raw humanitarian contributions and the network analysis of each case, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 3 Top Ten Global Donors, 2020 
 
Source: Graph created from data from the Financial Tracking Service Global Funding Overview 
Summary (Financial Tracking Service, 2020b) 
 
While the country plays an integral part in international networks of humanitarian aid, 
scholars suggest that its role is largely driven by political and economic interests in the recipient 
country (Bearce & Tirone, 2010). This has been shown in studies examining the driving factors 
of U.S. humanitarian aid disbursements and assistance in the later decades of the 1900s. Since 
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driver of United States’ humanitarian initiatives (Lebovic, 1988), even in the case of disaster 
assistance (Drury, Olson, & Van Belle, 2005). And, increasingly, the division between foreign 
policy action and humanitarian action has become much less clear (Blanton, 2000). Even more 
recently, in the National Security Strategy, the Trump Administration advocates the use of 
assistance programs as a device of foreign policy: 
We want to create wealth for Americans and our allies and partners. Prosperous 
states are stronger security partners who are able to share the burden of confronting 
common threats. Fair and reciprocal trade, investments, and exchanges of 
knowledge deepen our alliances and partnerships, which are necessary to succeed 
in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Trade, export promotion, targeted 
use of foreign assistance, and modernized development finance tools can promote 
stability, prosperity, and political reform, and build new partnerships based on the 
principle of reciprocity (Trump, 2017). 
 
Despite this, the United States’ role in international networks of humanitarian aid cannot 
be disregarded. It is, however, concerning in the face of a global economic crisis, especially for 
countries which are heavily reliant on primarily U.S. funds. First, the manner in which the 
United States utilizes humanitarian aid—to meet political and economic goals, rather than 
strictly humanitarian ones—is emblematic of the issues presented by new humanitarianism and 
the impact this has of aid effectiveness (Chimni, 2000).  Second, this reliance on politically-
motivated aid creates a precarious situation for humanitarian aid and its abilities to meet the 
increasingly expansive, extended, and rapidly changing needs of host countries around the world.  
As crises grow and require larger influxes of aid to pursue a proper humanitarian response, 
funding from other, non-governmental sources may become increasingly important, especially in 
the wake of potential cuts from large, governmental donors, such as the United States.  
The Growing Presence of Private Aid 
  Perhaps enabled by the same aspects of globalization that result in states feeling reduced 




politicization of aid, private, non-state donors have become ever more present in modern 
humanitarian response. These small organizations and individuals collectively make up an 
increasingly large (though still minor) proportion of assistance, but may offer insights about 
increasing the ability of diverse humanitarian aid networks to survive shocks and distribute aid 
more effectively based on need rather than political interests. According to the UNHCR, private 
donors have increased their financial support from $34 million to $400 million in the last decade, 
and now comprise 10% of all contributions to the agency (Executive Committee of the High 
Commissioner’s Program, 2018). This does not include other private contributions being made to 
smaller organizations, so the presence may actually be larger in general networks of 
humanitarian aid.  
In a stark contrast to the U.S., this aid is given for primarily humanitarian purposes, 
rather than to reach political ends (Büthe et al., 2012). And, because it is less prone to corruption 
by recipient governments and politicians (Desai & Kharas, 2008) and can be utilized more 
quickly than governmental aid because it is not subject to the same bureaucratic procedures, such 
as review and approval processes (Smith, 1990), it may also be more effective than 
governmentally sourced humanitarian funding for meeting emergent and shifting humanitarian 
needs. Though in terms of actual capacity, private donors do not match the resource capabilities 
of large, governmental donors, they are growing in importance and capability in international 
networks of humanitarian aid. Diversification of aid sources through increasing private funding 
speaks to the adaptivity of humanitarian aid networks for potential shocks in addition to more 
agile expenditures to meet changing needs in the receiving country.  
Social Network Analysis in International Studies 
Network analysis requires an understanding of network behavior and the relationship 




been used in the field of international studies to understand the dynamics between states, 
intergovernmental organizations, and non-governmental organizations. Conflict and cooperation 
studies (Faber, 1987; Kinne, 2013; Maoz, 2006), international organizations research (Cao, 
2009), and a small number of contributions ranging from development to governance (Kahler, 
2009) have relied on social network analysis. However, network analysis has the potential to 
reveal power dynamics between actors in ways that have yet to be fully realized in the literature. 
In their discussion on the role of power in international networks, Hafner-Burton et al. (2009) 
advocate for network analysis because it “Challenges conventional views of power in 
international relations” (p.559), pointing specifically to evidence that international actors 
manipulate their networks to capitalize on power dynamics and exercise that power. SNA 
provides the ability to critically examine international relationships in a computational, 
statistically-driven manner. In looking at network behaviors and characteristics such as power 
law distributions and preferential attachment, and how they relate to the potential of cascading 
network failures in the four cases observed in this study, I argue that the reliance on certain 
actors (i.e. those driving these specific behaviors, in this case, the United States) create network 
structures that are less resilient to large shocks.  
In international studies, power laws and preferential attachment have been used to 
understand the growth of trade networks over time (Maoz, 2012), but with limited other use in 
relation to humanitarian assistance. In this study, I use scale free networks, power law 
distributions, preferential attachment, and an understanding of these trends as they relate to the 
potential for cascading failure to provide a computational analysis of the humanitarian aid 
networks of four major refugee situations, and the potential implications for and fragility of their 




the Venezuelan situation, the Syrian situation, the Rohingya situation, and the European 
situation—I am able to show how certain networks have built a higher degree of resilience to 
cascading failure than others. Through these network characteristics and behaviors, I develop a 
deeper understanding about the importance of the diversification of sources of humanitarian 
funding and the potential negative impacts of a heavy reliance on a singular hub within these 
networks.  
Social Network Analysis and Network Behaviors 
In addition to theories of globalization and aid, this study rests on the use of social 
network analysis to interpret the financial relationship between humanitarian donors and 
recipients. Social network analysis (SNA) is utilized across a plethora of fields. In social 
sciences, SNA has been used to provide greater analytical depth on a variety of phenomena by 
showing the connections made between people, organizations, markets, or other actors (Barabasi, 
2013; Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, & Labianca, 2009). In this study, I rely on three network 
behaviors—power law distributions/scale-free networks, preferential attachment, and cascading 
failure—to explain the humanitarian aid financial networks and the potential shortcoming of 
reliance on a singular, major hub for humanitarian assistance in the four regions. For context, I 
provide a brief discussion of each below. 
Power Laws and Scale-Free Networks 
In networks, actors (individuals, organizations, nation states) are characterized as “nodes” 
whose connections to one another could represent any number of things (e.g. friendships, 
alliances, alma maters). In this study, “nodes” are representative of international actors such as 
state governments, NGOs, or IGOs, with the “links” they share representing financial 
transactions of humanitarian assistance. In the case of a power law distribution, which is 




regardless of the scale of the network, thus “scale-free.” The “hubs” of the network are those 
actors which share the most transactions with other nodes (actors) in the network, creating a 
scale-free network whose distribution of links follow a power law distribution. Power law 
distributions are a characteristic of scale-free networks which are observable in a wide array of 
both natural and human phenomenon (Barabasi, 2009; Barabasi & Bonabeau, 2003; Broido & 
Clauset, 2019; Aaron Clauset, Shalizi, & Newman, 2009). The characteristics of a scale-free 
network, such as the relative distribution of edges across the nodes in a network, remain the same 
when the size of the network changes.  
In network sciences, this type of distribution explains the likelihood of the occurrence of 
certain events: small-scale events occur frequently, while events of a larger scale are much rarer. 
These types of networks and distributions can be used to understand human dynamics and 
patterns of behavior (Barabasi, 2005; A. Clauset, Newman, & Moore, 2004; Vázquez et al., 
2006) to breaking down the growth and community structure of complex systems like the Web 
(Barabasi, 2013; Barabasi & Albert, 1999). Power laws and scale-free networks in the social 
sciences are predominantly observed in economic phenomenon (Gabaix, 2009; M. Newman, 
2004), such as patterns of income distributions (Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2011), firm sizes 
(Axtell, 2001), stock market trends (Mandelbrot, 1963), and international trade (Hinloopen & 
Marrewijk, 2006). In political science and international studies, the use of power law 
distributions to understand the frequency of rare, large events is most common in studies 
regarding instances of conflict. Most studies of this nature are aimed at explaining conflict size 
(Cederman, 2003; Friedman, 2015; Richardson, 1948). More recently, power law distributions 
have also been used to explain trends of terrorist attacks (Aaron Clauset & Wiegel, 2010; Aaron 




The understanding that power laws and scale free distributions are widely applicable to a 
variety of networks has been questioned frequently (Broido, 2019). Much of the classifications 
for what makes a distribution “scale free” are not universal (Goh et al., 2002), and often, the 
calculations leading to the assertion of a scale free distribution are not often not calculated with 
enough data (Stumpf & Porter, 2012), or are not accurate representations of data (Lima-Mendez 
& van Helden, 2009). Overall, there are many issues associated with accurately determining the 
existence of power law/scale free distributions. This study does not attempt to determine the 
empirical existence of scale-free networks in the relationships of humanitarian giving, but aims 
to use the general understanding of how network structure supported by a single hub—one that 
would typically create a SFD—is more fragile in nature (Zhang et al., 2015). 
In this study, I use a visual assessment to determine the existence of power laws and 
scale-free networks in the four case studies and their role in creating the potential for cascading 
failure to demonstrate a new way to analyze and infer insights about humanitarian actors through 
the structure of humanitarian aid transactions. The methods utilized in this study, though limited 
in their contribution to network science, may help expand the use of power law distributions in 
the fields of political science and international studies outside of strictly conflict-related 
phenomena by contributing a new analytical lens for evaluating humanitarian financial 
intervention.  
Preferential Attachment 
Another behavior observed in the evolution of the networks in this study is the tendency 
of nodes to create new connections through a process of preferential attachment. One of the 
methods for understanding this process of network connectivity is the Barabási-Albert Model, 
which asserts that as a network grows and new connections are made between nodes, the 




usually based on the existing node’s connectivity and linkages to other nodes in the network. 
Thus, more significant nodes (“hubs”) tend to become even more significant over time (Barabasi 
& Albert, 1999). Intuitively, we can see this in a number of real-world situations. For instance, in 
academic publishing, the more a paper is cited, the more likely others are to cite it. Similarly, the 
more people follow someone on social media, the more likely that person is to gain even more 
followers. While there is some push back against this understanding because of the difficulty in 
accurately identifying a scale-free network that stems from growth by preferential attachment, 
the vulnerability to failure that stems from the reliance on hubs in a network that is observed in 
networks that—at the very least—mimics SFNs (Zhang et al., 2015), is the focus of this study.  
Preferential attachment, and its tendency to produce scale-free networks which follow 
power law distributions, have been demonstrated consistently through investigation of network 
organization (Krapivsky & Redner, 2001), connectivity (Krapivsky, Redner, & Leyvraz, 2000), 
clustering (M. E. Newman, 2001; Vázquez, 2003), and general network structure (Dorogovtsev, 
Mendes, & Samukhin, 2000; Jeong, Néda, & Barabási, 2003; Maoz, 2012). Like power law 
distributions, preferential attachment explains the evolution and structure of the humanitarian aid 
networks of the four cases, and their susceptibility to network vulnerabilities such as cascading 
failures. Described in more detail below, the findings of this study reaffirm the findings of 
existing literature which addresses these attachment trends and the assertions of the Barabási-
Albert Model.  
Cascading Failure 
The primary theoretical framework for understanding the implications of the presence of 
a singular, large node in the observed humanitarian aid networks in this study is cascading 
failure. A cascading failure is one in which the incapacitation (diminishment or removal) of one 




often in ways that are unexpected. While this phenomenon is more extensively studied in the 
area of infrastructure and physical sciences, such as in networks relating to internet or power 
grids (Crucitti, Latora, & Marchiori, 2004; Motter & Lai, 2002), there is precedent to apply this 
theory of network science to other, real-world social networks (Albert, Jeong, & Barabási, 2000; 
Ash & Newth, 2007). Though most scale-free networks are relatively robust in the face of 
network failures, specifically, to a large number of failures of less significant or smaller nodes, 
those which rely heavily on a few nodes that play a key role in the networks are extremely 
vulnerable to cascading failure in the case that one of those key nodes collapses (Albert et al., 
2000). Networks with more clustering, leading to a collection of many more distanced 
“communities” of nodes, may result in resilience against shocks such as node failure (Ash & 
Newth, 2007).  Humanitarian aid networks, which may be vulnerable to funding changes because 
they are so chronically underfunded, may be susceptible to cascading failures. In other words, if 
the U.S. were to leave the aid network as the main node, not only would the humanitarian 
situation lose U.S. funding, but other funding organizations and countries may go bankrupt 
trying to compensate for the loss of the node. Additionally, a series of organizations that 
predominantly rely on that funding may not be able to secure enough of an operating budget to 
continue, leaving not only those services unfulfilled, but also resulting in their dependent 
organizations failing and over-taxing the organizations that are left to fill the need. 
In this study, I assert the importance of donor diversification to create the resilience via 
clustering, or the creation of more hubs that can control the flow of aid around a network, as 
proposed by Ash and Newth (2007). While this conflicts with assertions about the 
ineffectiveness of donor fragmentation (Annen & Kosempel, 2009)—the issue of too many small 




the response would remain effective (Steinwand, 2015). These coordinating actors, or a lead 
donor, as discussed by Steinwand (2015), prevent one country from having to manage all of the 
fragmented aid flows independently, which could lead to mismanagement of funds and poor aid 
allocation. Because there is already a large presence of international humanitarian 
organizations—the UNHCR and IOM—that already serve as major coordinators of aid from a 
variety of governmental, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and private donors to a concise 
and organized humanitarian response, the issue of ineffectiveness in aid presented by donor 
fragmentation is limited.  
From these insights in network science and network vulnerability as it relates to node 
failure—the failure of significant nodes, in these cases—we are offered a greater depth of 
understanding of the relationships between donors and recipients of humanitarian aid. By using 
social networks to analyze the implications of the reliance on a single governmental actor such as 
the United States for a bulk of investment, we can understand how this is potentially damaging to 
these networks and their corresponding humanitarian response. In examining the role of the U.S. 
in each case through SNA, I am able to offer a different perspective—a more computationally 
driven one—that affords a greater statistical depth to the weight of the United States’ 
relationships with other donors and recipients of aid, as well as the overall impact of its presence 
on the network. From this, I can analyze the weight the U.S. carries as a network actor, and how 
this would effect humanitarian aid flows if the country were to be removed as a major actor, 
which provides important insights on a network’s vulnerability to a shock to a major node.  
Finally, based on the understanding of the United States’ network presence in each case, I 
can draw conclusions on how the country’s position in a network—how influential it is based on 




removed, for example—may explain how influential it is in guiding the outcome of a crisis via 
its humanitarian aid contributions. This, in turn, can help draw further conclusions about the 
effectiveness of the aid being directed towards the humanitarian response, based on how interest-
driven the role of the U.S. is, which can be related to its position and influence in the network 
compared to other nodes. Much like the concept of new humanitarianism described by 
Kuehlhorn Friedman (2019), the extent of the role of the United States may be indicative of a 
more interest-driven, politically strategic context for humanitarian aid networks, rather than one 
that is driven to meet the needs of vulnerable populations. Network analysis and the 
computational, statically driven perspective it provides to relationships between donors and 
recipients of aid offers a much different perspective than previous studies of humanitarian 
contributions. The following chapter will explain the metrics this study utilizes to understand the 
attributes of the actors in the network, such as their influence, the relationships they share, and 
how important these relationships are, providing the basis for which we can begin to fully assess 







Social network analysis is the study of relationships between actors in a system by 
quantifying statistical calculations of their relationships. Each actor, or “node” has a number of 
incoming and outgoing links, called “degrees.” These degrees serve to characterize not only how 
many connections that node has, but also connections of connections; in other words, using 
SNA, we can calculate the significance of pathways between indirectly connected nodes in a 
network. Statistical analyses of these direct and indirect connections reveal larger network 
structures—preferential attachment and power law distributions—as described earlier. In the 
context of the humanitarian response to refugees and migrants in the cases identified here, this 
means that we can construct a network of financial transactions between donor states, 
organizations, individuals, and their recipients to map out the structure of an “aid network.” By 
‘following the money,’ SNA provides statistical evidence of powerful actors, both donors and 
recipients, within this aid network. From these statistics, it is possible to infer insights about the 
power relationship between actors, the vulnerability of the network to changes in actor 
preferences, and the power of globalization to shape actor contributions to distant crises.  
The network analysis in this study uses Gephi, a software platform for entering, cleaning, 
visualizing, and analyzing network structures. Network analysis requires data to be in a specific 
structure that lists each actor/node with its direct connection to an actor/node. The data source 
and limitations are discussed below, as well as the network measurements that were calculated 
within the Gephi software. This program was chosen for its ability to create visualizations which 
show network growth and change over time, and the ability to highlight the relationships 




Case Study Selection 
 In this study, four ongoing refugee and migrant situations are discussed across three 
chapters, each addressing a varying level of network reliance on the United States as a major 
network actor and international donor. The case selections, from most reliant to least reliant on 
the presence of the U.S., are discussed below.  
The Venezuelan Refugee Situation  
 The Venezuelan refugee and migrant situation, covered in chapter four, was selected 
because it represents a situation which is heavily reliant on United States’ humanitarian 
investment, with the absolute majority of aid coming from one country. The data in this set is 
reflective of aid being directed towards the refugee and migrant response in South American 
countries. The largest recipient countries include Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil, but most 
other South American countries, as well as Mexico, are also reflected in the dataset. Though the 
onset of the Venezuelan situation was in 2015, the data does not reflect humanitarian aid 
contributions until 2017, with the most robust years of data spanning from 2018-2020. While all 
the data grouped under the Venezuelan situation in the FTS dataset is presented in the network, it 
is most reflective of the years 2018-2020.  
The Syrian Refugee Situation and the Rohingya Refugee Situation  
 The Syrian and Rohingya refugee and migrant situations, both covered in chapter five, 
were selected because they both represent scenarios which rely heavily on United States’ 
funding, but also have other major network actors, rather than relying on the absolute influence 
of the U.S. to maintain network structure and aid operations. In the Syrian case, the aid is being 
directed primarily to Lebanon and Jordan, but also includes Egypt, Iraq, and Turkey. This case is 
the largest of the four discussed in the study, with data spanning from 2013 (the first year it is 




all of which are included in the network analysis. In the Rohingya case, all the aid is being 
directed to Bangladesh. Like the Venezuelan situation, aid data is not available until 2017, but is 
robust from 2017 forward. Like the Syrian case, a response plan is developed for each year, and 
each is included in the network analysis.  
The European Refugee Situation 
 The European refugee and migrant situation, discussed in chapter six, was selected 
because it is the least reliant on United States’ contributions and more reliant on different sources 
of aid, such as IGOs, NGOs, and private donors. This network is much smaller than the other 
three, with donors sending large sums of aid in fewer transactions. The primary recipient country 
is Greece, followed by North Macedonia and Serbia. The data spans from 2015 to 2019, with the 
most robust years being 2016 and 2017. Overall, these cases will show the different outcomes 
that different levels of reliance on the United States for humanitarian investment will present 
when the node is removed from the network, and the impact this could have both in real-world 
and network scenarios.  
Data Set and Limitations  
Data Set 
The network analysis in this study is based on datasets from the Financial Tracking 
Service (FTS) of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs (OCHA).2 
The data represents only international humanitarian aid, rather than general foreign aid 
contributions. In order to be reported, each individual contribution is required by UNOCHA to 
meet certain benchmarks outlined by the Criteria for inclusion of reported humanitarian 






reporting to FTS.3 The benchmarks require that the primary objective of the aid being granted is  
“… To save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of 
man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the 
occurrence of such situations” (Financial Tracking Service, 2004). According to the FTS, this 
process ensures that all documented contributions meet a standard definition of “humanitarian 
aid.”  
I filtered the datasets to capture transfers of all funds targeted specifically to each of the 
four migration situations observed here, with dates of the transactions included to account for 
change in relationships over time, and funds which are being used to support countries’ 
responses to each regions’ respective refugee and migrant situation. The FTS system categorizes 
specific funding emergencies or programs by situation which correspond with larger institutional 
responses to each scenario. In the four cases, respectively, I searched the FTS to capture 
contributions which are being directed towards:  
• “Emergency: Venezuela Outflow- Regional Refugees and Migrants” for the Venezuelan 
refugee situation  
• “Emergency: Europe: Refugees and Migrant Crisis” for the European refugee situation  
• “Plan: Joint Response Plan for Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis” for the Rohingya refugee 
situation 
• “Plan: Syria Refugee Regional Response Plan” 4 for the Syrian refugee situation. 
  
By filtering the results in this way, I can ensure that the data encompass only humanitarian aid 
transactions directed towards the response to the four refugee and migration situations, rather 
than other areas that attract significant donor contributions, such as internal displacement from 
the civil conflicts and development efforts also available in FTS.  
 





Data Limitations  
It is important to note that while the data was filtered for all years that data is available for 
each situation, there are some years which have limited or no data. However, as the networks 
grow from year to year, the data becomes much more comprehensive and robust, with at least 
100 aid transactions accounted for in a given year per case. Furthermore, there were a limited 
number of instances where the data needed to be cleaned to fit the requirements to perform a 
social network analysis, which are described further below. 
First, data entries which contained no monetary data (a blank entry) were removed from the 
set as they did not contain the information necessary to conduct a complete analysis. The filtered 
dataset after these blank transactions were filtered are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Transactions removed due to lack of monetary data 
 
Situation Total Transactions Removed Filtered Dataset (N) 
Venezuelan 1,248 16 1,232 
Syrian 5,765 3 5,762 
Rohingya 1,604 9 1,595 
European 478 3 1,604 
 
 
Data entries which had a blank entry for donating actors or receiving actors were marked 
as “Undesignated.” They were not removed entirely, because it is still necessary to account for 
the organization sending or receiving aid that was not blank. While this data was not removed 
from the set, the “Undesignated” node is not considered as an independent actor in the analysis. 






Table 2 Nodes marked as "undesignated" due to lack of donor/recipient data 
  
Situation Total Nodes Undesignated Nodes Filtered Dataset (N) 
Venezuelan 2,464  77 2,387 
Syrian 11,524 142 11,382 
Rohingya 3,190 19 3,171 
European 950 13 937 
 
 
After all limitations accounted for, the four networks examined in this study are 
constructed with the data listed in Table 3, with the “Filtered Nodes” accounting for the total 
number of network actors, and the “Filtered Transactions” accounting for the total number of 
sending transactions shared between donors and recipients of aid humanitarian aid.  
 
Table 3 Filtered nodes and edges, network totals 
 
Situation Filtered Nodes (N) Filtered Transactions (N) 
Venezuelan 136 1,233 
Syrian 278 5,762 
Rohingya 112 1,595 
European 114 475 
 
 
Another more general limitation which should be noted is the potential shortfalls of data 
reporting, especially in relation to a crisis. Some individuals and organizations may not meet the 
reporting criteria outlined by the FTS, and therefore will not be represented in this analysis. This 
could include aid transactions not being directed towards humanitarian issues, or smaller 
implementing organizations without the resources or reporting requirements of a larger 
organization. These smaller organizations are part of an ongoing study I am currently working on 
to derive the extended aid network qualitatively that is not included in the results presented here 




It is important to consider that, potentially, the networks observed in this study expand 
further than the bounds explored here. Despite searching for other sources of data, through 
subjective assessment, FTS appears to be the most complete dataset relative to coordinated 
humanitarian response to human displacement. This study therefore used the network as it is 
captured in the dataset, offering a new lens for looking at this issue. However, future studies 
should aim to identify datasets that include other actors, such as smaller organizations or 
implementing partners. They should also explore alternative complementary analyses, such as 
construction of social networks from qualitative data- news articles or big data sources such as 
social media- in order to identify smaller organizations in the aid network which are not captured 
here.  
Furthermore, though this study treats the networks as static while using dynamic 
measures, when, in their real-world construction, there are often changes in the presence of 
actors over time, the main network actors in this case remain the same, even in a year-by-year 
analysis of each network. In a study regarding the role of all network actors, it may be necessary 
to treat the network as dynamic, so the changes donor and recipients over time could be noted. 
However, in this study, I am primarily examining the role of a major state actors, like the United 
States. Because this role is not often subject to change, examining the network as static to 
analyze the influence of a single, consistently present major actor is appropriate.  
Lastly, it is important to note that this study only addresses the immediate aftermath of 
the United States withdrawing from a humanitarian aid network. It does not seek to address the 
international power dynamics that would adapt in the event that the United States were to exit 
any given network entirely. This study aims to analyze the impact that a single donor can have 




of situation would pose major implications for the reorganization of international actors to fill the 
power void that would be left by the US, this type of theorizing is out of the scope of this study, 
and should be addressed in future studies.  
Network Measurements 
In each chapter and for each case study selection, the networks will be used to analyze 
the original network, which includes the role of the United States, and the theoretical network, 
which excludes the country’s role. By comparing the network measurements of the original and 
theoretical networks, we are able to determine first, how important the U.S. is to the network, 
and secondly, the consequences of the U.S. node’s failure, and how this would impact the 
network structure of each case. In the analysis of the original and theoretical networks of the four 
case studies, I focus on two main statistics which determine a node’s overall network influence, 
degree distribution and measures of centrality, each described below. The following statistics are 
derived from algorithms built into the Gephi program. 
Degree Distribution  
Degree distribution is a statistic which is used to show how many nodes within each 
network share the same degree, with the “degree” being the number of edges/links—in this case, 
the number of humanitarian aid transactions—connected to each node. This measurement was 
selected to identify the prominent nodes within the network and how significant their 
connections are compared to the other nodes in the networks. Degree distributions indicate 
whether the network follows a power law distribution, thus providing evidence that the network 
is scale-free. Degree distributions are also used to determine if the network forms around 
preferential attachment.  
  Due to the nature of the networks being observed, many nodes often have multiple 




this, it is important to take the weight of each node into account when measuring the network’s 
degree distribution. Weight is similar to a node’s degree in that it is based on the number of 
edges a node has. However, it takes the weight of each edge into account, in this case, how many 
times the same node donates to another node. For example, if the U.S. donates to the UNHCR 
four times and the IOM four times, it will have a weighted degree of eight. Therefore, in the 
analysis, this measurement is calculated using the “Average Weighted Degree” statistic in Gephi.  
Network Centrality  
Centrality is a measure of the significance of a node within a network by scoring how 
critical the node is for maintaining the structure of the network based on its connections to other 
nodes. I use this measurement to statistically analyze how prominent or well-connected an actor 
is to other actors within the network, especially those that stand out in the power laws observed 
in the degree distributions. Gephi provides a number of centrality measures, but for this study, I 
rely on “eigenvector centrality” and its variant “Page Rank” for reasons described below. While 
betweenness centrality could have been included, it measures the number of times a node falls on 
paths between other nodes, which more so highlights the role of “broker” nodes—such as the 
UNHCR or IOM—rather than the political significance of particular donors.  
Eigenvector Centrality 
Eigenvector centrality measures the importance of a node based on how many links it 
shares in the network, how well-connected the node is, and how well-connected its connections 
are. For example, if the U.S. is a well-connected node and it shares an edge with the UNHCR 
(another well-connected node), then it will have a higher centrality score. By accounting for 
these attributes, eigenvector centrality is a statistic for how influential a node is in the observed 
network based on the node’s relationships and how far those relationships extend throughout the 




influence. Each node is given a score from 0 to 1, with 1 being the highest level of influence. 
Eigenvector centrality provides a better understanding of which actors have the most influence, 
both as a donor and as a recipient, in the observed humanitarian aid network, and how far this 
influence may extend.  
Page Rank  
Page Rank is a variation of eigenvector centrality but adds the ability to account for the 
directions of edges and the weight of each node. In terms of humanitarian aid networks, this is 
especially important for two reasons. First, it allows me to take into consideration the role that 
direction plays in aid contributions (e.g. donor to recipient). Because humanitarian aid is 
typically granted without condition of repayment, the flow of aid often only goes in one 
direction. Page Rank accounts for this in the statistical assessment of network structure. 
Secondly, the weight of each node in humanitarian aid networks is also important to take into 
account when assessing centrality. This is because many nodes, especially the most prominent, 
tend to contribute to multiple nodes multiple times. By including a statistic that accounts for the 
potential anomalies of assessing a humanitarian aid network- including the direction of aid (edge 
direction) and the number of transactions from one actor to another (weight)- we are able to 
ensure that they are accounted for when analyzing the network results. For example, a node like 
the U.S., which gives out the most aid, and a node like the IOM, which takes in a significant 
amount of aid, cannot be measured the same in terms of network significance. Though they are 
both important in the humanitarian response, the U.S. is a more significant network actor, 
because it has a higher out-degree than the IOM: it gives more aid. By accounting for the 
direction and frequency of the flow of aid by using Page Rank scoring, we can more accurately 
show the significance of certain nodes within the network. Like eigenvector centrality, Page 




connectivity throughout the network. This statistic, overall, is the most important, especially in 
terms of assessing node influence. 
 In the four cases examined in this study, these measurements will be used to characterize 
the importance of different actors in their respective humanitarian aid network, and the impact 
this has on not only network resilience, but the real-world humanitarian response. Degree 
distribution shows how many relationships a donor shared with recipients, and how frequently 
there is a transaction between the two. The measures of centrality—eigenvector centrality and 
page rank—show how influential a node is in the network compared to others. Together, they 
offer great insight when analyzing how important certain nodes are compared to others, and the 
potential impact on the overall network if these nodes collapsed. In the following chapters, I will 
use these metrics to provide an understanding of the significance of certain network actors in the 
relationships shared between donors and recipients of humanitarian aid. In addition, they provide 
a basis for underscoring how the reliance on a single hub for a majority of funding may leave 





THE VENEZUELAN REFUGEE SITUATION: A CASE OF RELIANCE AND 
VULNERABILITY 
 According to the UNHCR, the Venezuelan refugee situation is one of the largest 
instances of forced migration in the entire world, surpassed only by the Syrian refugee situation 
(Response for Venezuelans, 2020). The migration of Venezuelans to surrounding countries in 
continental South America and the Caribbean began in 2015 and peaked from 2017 to 2018. 
Presently, over 5 million Venezuelans have fled from their country (Response for Venezuelans, 
2020). As Venezuelans flee their country in search of safety and security, host countries in the 
region struggle to meet the needs of incoming refugees and migrants.  
In response, the international community has contributed hundreds of millions of dollars 
in humanitarian aid to assist host communities with humanitarian response. The largest 
contributor, by far, is the Government of the United States, which provides almost 75% of all 
funding being directed towards the Venezuela migration response, according to FTS data 
(Financial Tracking Service, 2020a). Without this funding, an already chronically underfunded 
response (Response for Venezuelans, 2020) would likely face collapse. Especially as the United 
States ventures towards economic uncertainty in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, it 
becomes increasingly important to consider the implications of such a heavy reliance on 
humanitarian aid from a singular source. 
 By analyzing humanitarian aid networks and trends of that network behavior, I am able to 
provide a computational picture of the relationships between donors and recipients. This 
perspective allows exploration of the depth of the role the United States plays in the Venezuelan 
humanitarian response and suggests the potentially catastrophic implications of changes in its 




which is heavily dependent on a singular major hub, may be susceptible to shocks--such as 
funding decreases or withdrawals--from which the network is unable to recover. The analysis 
will clearly show that, while the United States plays an absolutely essential role in the response 
to the Venezuelan situation, this reliance decreases network robustness to shocks, and would 
result in cascading failures across the network in the unlikely circumstance that the U.S. node 
partially or completely withdraws funding.  
This chapter presents the analysis of the humanitarian aid network for Venezuelan 
migrants in South America, namely Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil. I highlight three 
primary insights: 1) The Government of the United States is the most significant actor (node) in 
the network, with influence that expands across almost the entirety of the network; 2) This means 
that changes in U.S. funding would affect every other donor and recipient across the entire 
network; and 3) The expansive role of the U.S. and the earmarking of humanitarian aid to the 
Venezuelan response provides evidence of the country’s interest-driven role in the region, and 
hence, the presence of tenets of new humanitarianism. As these results relate to the possibility of 
cascading failure—or one node’s failure leading to another’s and another’s throughout the 
system—they will provide support for the main argument of this study, which asserts the 
importance of diversifying sources of funding in an effort to make more clustered network 
communities, with a higher degree of robustness against changes in network structure. Overall, 
this network is the most vulnerable to shifting sources of humanitarian aid of the four cases in 
the study, which could be mitigated by influxes of funding from other sources.  
Trends of Extreme Reliance 
 Of all the networks explored in this study, the case of Venezuelan migration response is 
by far the most reliant on U.S. humanitarian contributions. The sheer volume of funding the U.S. 




the network. The next nine largest donors, when combined, do not even provide half of what the 
United States has contributed since the onset of the refugee and migrant influx in 2015 (Figure 
4). Though this is likely related to the United States’ strategic goals in the region, it still plays an 
important part in the network structure, and has adverse implications in the unlikely scenario the 
U.S. cannot or will not continue to provide funding.5 And while the real-world expression of raw 
contributions tells this story well, the network expression of these relationships enforces it, and 
provides a deeper insight into the potential pitfalls of this kind of structure in the wake of a 
global crisis.   
 
 
Figure 4 Top Ten Donors to the Venezuelan Refugee Situation 
 
 
5 A recent report by the Atlantic Council (2019), outlines the importance of providing humanitarian aid to 
Colombia- the largest receiver of Venezuelan refugees and U.S. humanitarian aid- to maintain the United States’ 
regional security and economic interests.  
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Network Analysis  
 The network statistics of the Venezuelan humanitarian aid network—the full set is 
available in Appendix A—paint a similar picture to that of the funding statistics: The U.S. is the 
singular most important node in the network (eigenvector = 1), and has, by far, the largest 
network presence (weighted out-degree = 547). For network robustness this is a shortfall. As 
discussed in the literature review, while scale-free distributions provide a stability in some 
aspects, in this scenario, the distribution has eliminated other strong clusters from forming in the 
network, thereby reducing network robustness and making the network more vulnerable to 
failure with the removal of a single influential node. The following network measurements and 
their corresponding analysis will support this argument and the importance of diversifying major 
network donors.  
Measures of Centrality 
 The measures of centrality for the humanitarian aid network surrounding the Venezuelan 
refugee and migrant situation clearly show the significance of the U.S., and assert its role as a 
major hub in the network. Essentially, the role of the U.S. as a hub is indisputable, which reflects 
the literature that the US has historical (Fajardo, 2003) and contemporary interests (The Atlantic 
Council, 2019) in the region, even beyond humanitarian response.  
 The eigenvector centrality scoring of the top ten nodes in the network shows how 
significant the United States is compared to other network actors. With the highest score possible 
(1), the U.S. extends its influence over virtually the entire network. In descending order of 
eigenvector centrality, the following three actors (IOM, UNHCR, and UNICEF) are each 
organizations that accept aid to redistribute to implementing actors on the ground (Table 4). In a 
scenario where the U.S. dramatically reduced or withdrew its presence from this aid network, 




especially because the U.S. provides them with a significant portion of their funding. Here, the 
eigenvector results show that reliance on the United States, while necessary, would likely be 
harmful in the case of their withdrawal.  
 
Table 4 Top Ten Nodes Based on Eigenvector Centrality, Original Network 
 
Actor Eigenvector Centrality 
United States of America, Government of 1 
International Organization for Migration 0.7835 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 0.5851 
United Nations Children's Fund 0.2854 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department 0.0884 
Canada, Government of 0.0694 
World Vision International 0.0676 
World Food Programme 0.0633 
Norwegian Refugee Council 0.0605 
Central Emergency Response Fund 0.0598 
 
 
 The results for the page rank scoring uphold the same findings of the eigenvector 
centrality scores. Again, the influence of the United States across the network, this time 
accounting for edge direction and weight, is significant, even compared to other prominent nodes 
(Table 5). The same nodes—the UNHCR, IOM, and UNICEF—follow the U.S. in network 
influence, but again, these actors are unlikely to replace the U.S. as a major network hub in the 
occurrence of its departure from the network, especially because they are really a broker of 





Table 5 Top Ten Nodes Based on Page Rank, Original Network 
 
Actor Page Rank 
United States of America, Government of 0.1669 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 0.0897 
International Organization for Migration 0.0792 
United Nations Children's Fund 0.0554 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department 0.0336 
Norwegian Refugee Council 0.0276 
Canada, Government of 0.0182 
Sweden, Government of 0.0160 
Central Emergency Response Fund 0.0159 
Caritas Switzerland 0.0159 
 
 
Overall, the centrality scoring of the United States shows, first, that it is the most 
influential node in the network, and second, that it leaves very little room for other nodes to 
match its scale in significance. In the case of a major shock to the U.S., maintaining network 
structure would be impossible, especially in an already underfunded situation with stretched 
resources, and would likely cause instances of cascading failure across the rest of the network, 
especially as other nodes would be unable to manage the strain caused by the removal of the 
network’s only major donor hub. 
Degree Distribution 
While measures of centrality do not show the extent to which the absence of the United 
States in the Venezuelan network would cause disruption, measures of degree distribution can 
afford greater depth in this regard. By showing the number of transactions the nodes in the 
network share with other nodes in the network, I can determine which nodes create clustering 
and how present instances of clustering are in the Venezuelan network. These results also show 




From this, we can draw conclusions on the vulnerability of the network to the removal of a hub 
like the U.S.  
The weighted out-degree of both the original and theoretical network show not only how 
expansive the role of the United States is, but also how small the roles of other nodes are by 
comparison. As the U.S. hub has the most widely distributed connections across the network 
(Table 6), there are few other clusters which are strong enough to maintain the structure of the 
network if the presence of the U.S. node were to be removed. Because the distribution of the 
network is so skewed, it leaves the network vulnerable to collapse if an “attack” were made on a 
major node, such as the United States (Motter & Lai, 2002).  
 




United States of America, Government of 547 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department 97 
Central Emergency Response Fund 47 
Canada, Government of 44 
Private (individuals & organizations) 37 
Sweden, Government of 36 
Germany, Government of 34 
Switzerland, Government of 21 
United Nations Children's Fund 21 
Netherlands, Government of 17 
 
 
 To illustrate this point, when the US is removed from the network, there is a dramatic 
shift in the degree distribution of the network (Table 7). First, almost half of the volume of 
financial transactions is removed from the network, or 547 transactions, amounting to almost 




aid transactions they were receiving. Second, while the network is more evenly distributed 
amongst the top donors, and there are more instances of clustering, there is no node which 
compares to the volume of funding that was distributed by the United States, with the second 
most influential node—the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Department—making up only 97 transactions, amounting to less than $50 million. Likely, the 
nodes represented in the theoretical out-degree distribution would not be able to compensate for 
this unhinging of structure. Based on the results of the measures of centrality, if the hub of this 
network were to fail, the reverberations of its failure would be felt—at least to some degree—by 
every other node in the network. This is evidence of overreliance on a singular hub, which the 
literature points to as is indicative of networks susceptible to cascading failures (Albert, Jeong, & 
Barabási, 2000). Not only would the network lose a significant portion of its connections and the 
humanitarian funding which corresponds to them, but the burden of aid held by a single actor 
shows the inability of another actor in the node to regenerate lost connections by increasing their 
portion of donations to meet the needs of displaced Venezuelans.  
 
Table 7 Top Ten Recipients Based on Weighted In-Degree, Original and Theoretical Network 
Comparison 
Actor, Original Network 
Weighted In-Degree 
Original Theoretical Change 
International Organization for Migration 279 82 -197 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 264 123 -147 
United Nations Children's Fund 168 106 -62 
Norwegian Refugee Council 76 68 -8 
Caritas Switzerland 46 46 0 
World Vision International 34 17 -17 
International Rescue Committee 31 31 0 
Caritas Germany (DCV) 25 25 0 
World Food Programme 24 11 -13 




 For instance, a failure in the major hub in this network would also be detrimental to 
recipients of aid—not just donors and those who would have to compensate for its failure—
especially those which receive a majority of their funding from the U.S. When comparing the 
original and theoretical distributions, the top three recipients of aid—IOM, UNHCR, and 
UNICEF—all have their in-degree reduced by about half when the United States is removed 
from the network, meaning they lose half of all incoming transactions, and the humanitarian 
funding that corresponds to them. There are, however, remaining communities surrounding the 
mid-sized hubs in the network that fall behind the U.S. in the scale-free distribution, such as the 
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (97 outgoing 
connections) and the Central Emergency Response Fund (47 outgoing connections). While these 
organizations and their surrounding communities uphold the structure of the theoretical network 
to an extent, it is significantly changed from that of the original network. These clusters cannot 
commit the same volume of connections and aid as the United States, however, leaving the 
network and humanitarian response open to additional failures due to increased strain.   
In addition to contributing to the network failures, this would also cause a reduction in 
resources and services available on the ground to refugees and migrants in need of emergency 
assistance, as these implementing organizations would experience significant losses of funding. 
From this, we can observe the true extended hold the United States has across the network. Top 
aid recipients are not only that, but are significant brokers of humanitarian aid for other smaller 
organizations. What the network analysis does not show is the how the collapse of the U.S. node 
would subsequently cause the failure of these major brokers because they can no longer afford to 
provide their services to the Venezuelan response. This is the importance and main contribution 




network that is heavily reliant on one governmental donor that also has a heavily vested strategic 
interest in the region (The Atlantic Council, 2019). This investment is emblematic of the tenets 
of new humanitarianism, which is characterized by a lack of regard for recipients of aid 
(Kuehlhorn Friedman, 2019), or, in this case, the brokers that are responsible for coordinating aid 
to the organizations conducting the humanitarian response.  
Its removal not only halves the connections to most of the brokers and alters the 
importance of other nodes in the remaining network, it cuts off 10 smaller organizations from the 
network entirely through direct funding and likely cuts even more out of the network that we 
cannot observe without knowing specifically how each U.S. dollar to the brokers is allocated to 
NGOs on the ground. While cascading failures could happen at other nodes as well, the 
significance of the U.S. node also points to the amount of power that it can wield in this context, 
where the other actors likely sense the significance of the U.S. in the response’s subsistence. Not 
only that, if an economic crisis causes the U.S. to reduce or withdraw funds, its connectivity in a 
larger global market likely means that the other donor countries in the network would have to 
reduce or withdraw their support because of the same economic situation.  
 Overall, the comparison of the original and theoretical networks show that the United 
States plays an integral part in the Venezuelan humanitarian aid network, as one might expect 
given the historical (Fajardo, 2003) and contemporary interests in the area (The Atlantic Council, 
2019). However, the reliance on this hub to maintain the network’s structure in the face of a 
large systemic shock could result in major failures across the network. These results have not 
only negative network implications, but also indicate a poor outlook for real-world humanitarian 
operations. In the event of the withdrawal of the United States’ contributions in the Venezuelan 




structure, and likely, a series of cascading failures would take place across the network making 
the entire humanitarian response unsustainable.  
The Implications of the U.S. Role in the Humanitarian Response 
 As the analysis of the Venezuelan case shows, the network is particularly prone to 
cascading failure in the rare event that the U.S. node withdraws or collapses. While there are 
other well-connected nodes in the network, for example, the European Commission 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department, the impact of this node’s failure would not 
be nearly as detrimental to the network’s structure as the failure of the United States. Even other 
well-connected nodes in the Venezuelan network only share a small fraction of the overall 
network transactions compared to the U.S node. In this case, it is unlikely that the United States 
will withdraw from the network, primarily due to its stability as a country and strategic goals in 
South America. However, with the pending threat of a financial crisis in the wake of the 
coronavirus pandemic, is this type of network failure inching closer towards reality? Will the 
reliance on one governmental source of aid for almost three quarters of financial assistance prove 
to be detrimental?  
 Generally, scale-free networks, such as the one demonstrated in this network, are 
considered to be relatively robust to failures of large numbers of nodes, so long as they are less 
influential. Because most of the actors in the network display low levels of connectivity (Table 
A.1), a failure in one node will not necessarily result in the failure of nodes across the network. 
In fact, the Venezuelan network is resilient in the sense that even if most of the smaller nodes, or 
smaller implementing organizations, were removed, the network would retain the majority of its 
structure. A majority of these nodes and the humanitarian services they provide could be 
replaced through the continuation of U.S. contributions. Most of the time, these failures will stay 




of robustness against a large number of small node failures. However, in the case where the main 
cluster fails- in this case, the cluster surrounding the U.S.- there are typically widespread, 
cascading failures across the network (Albert et al., 2000). In this case, especially taking into 
consideration the observed measures of centrality and the volume of the degree distribution of 
the U.S. hub, the network would completely fall apart. The benefit the U.S. gains from this is 
being able to earmark funds and drive the direction of the humanitarian response in a way that 
aligns with their regional interests. The other organizations in the network are, by default, 
beholden to U.S. interests because of its absolute centrality in the network. This has, in turn, 
negative implications for not only the stability of the network’s structure, but humanitarian 
action, in general (Kuehlhorn Friedman, 2019). 
 From the insights of this case, I can draw three conclusions which contribute to the 
overall argument of this study. The first pertains to network structure. While relying on a 
singular hub is often necessary in some networks, in this case, it could prove to be a major 
weakness of ongoing response to Venezuelan migration, particularly in the long-term when 
donor fatigue could set in. As sources of humanitarian aid begin to shift, the Venezuelan network 
may not prove to be as resilient to change as some other scenarios, such as those discussed in the 
following chapters. Overall, this case conforms to the literature regarding cascading failures in 
that while typically scale-free networks are stable in that they are resistant to collapse when 
multiple small nodes fail (Albert et al., 2000), they can prove to be prone to collapse in the 
unlikely event that a major hub is impacted.  
The second conclusion is regarding the importance of incorporating a more diversified 
donor pool into humanitarian aid networks. As discussed by Motter and Lai (2002), especially in 




singular significant node. However, to combat this, recommendations from Ash and Newth 
(2007) regarding the importance of clustering in promoting network robustness to cascading 
failures come into play. In the case of the Venezuelan situation, major network problems could 
be avoided if there were other nodes that could sustain higher levels of strain—in this case, 
donor nodes with a higher out-degree, with the ability to contribute great amounts of aid to a 
humanitarian response—given the removal of the significant U.S node from the network. This, in 
turn, would create more clustering and longer path lengths, hence decreasing the likelihood of a 
failure expanding over the entirety of a network, as it would in the current Venezuelan network 
structure.  
The third conclusion relates to the implications of the United States’ role has for both 
network and real-world power, and the impact this has on acts of humanitarianism. Based on 
other studies of fungible network power of actors in international networks (Hafner-Burton, 
Kahler, & Montgomery, 2009) and the country’s strategic role in the region (The Atlantic 
Council, 2019), we can assume that the United States prefers to be the primary contributor of aid, 
and hence, maintain the largest network presence. With this power, the U.S. is able to use its 
integral network position to control the flow of aid around the network (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass, 
& Labianca, 2009), primarily through earmarking where donors specify the ways in which those 
funds can be used, and hence, the course of the humanitarian response in a manner that serves to 
support the U.S.’s interests in the region. The implications of the United States’ network 
presence and the role it plays as a governing body of aid is extremely emblematic of the major 
tenets of new humanitarianism, especially the disregard of recipient needs in favor of donor self-




Though the entire removal of the US from the Venezuelan case is unlikely, it is not 
entirely impossible. As will be illustrated in the following three cases, donor diversification 
creates more resilient networks in the face of shifting sources of humanitarian aid by the major 
hubs. Rather than relying on a singular governmental node for a bulk of the assistance, it is 
preferable to rely on a wider variety of donors to reduce dependency on any singular node and 
increase resiliency of the network structure to significant shocks such as economic withdrawal of 
any given node.   
In this case, if humanitarian contributions decrease as the U.S. economy begins to 
decline, the results show there would likely be little that could be done to maintain the structure 
of the network surrounding the Venezuelan humanitarian response. The network is too reliant on 
one hub and has few other clusters that could handle the volume of aid that would be necessary 
to maintain the humanitarian response. A potential, but unlikely because of global donor fatigue 
and the challenges of collective action, solution to this major pitfall would be diversification of 
the donor pool, especially in favor of donors which have less strategically-driven motivations for 
giving (Büthe, Major, & de Mello e Souza, 2012; Smith, 1990). In the following chapters, this 
possibility will be explored through the cases of the Syrian and Rohingya refugee situations 
(Chapter 5), and the European migration situation (Chapter 6), all of which rely on U.S. aid to a 
degree, but not as heavily as the Venezuelan refugee situation. These cases allow us to consider 





CLUSTERING THROUGH EXPANDED DONORSHIP, THE SYRIAN AND 
ROHINGYA REFUGEE SITUATIONS 
 This chapter will focus on two refugee situations: the Syrian refugee situation and the 
Rohingya refugee situation. The Syrian refugee and migrant situation is the largest instance of 
forced migration in the world, beginning in 2010 with the start of the Syrian Civil War, peaking 
in 2015, and continuing today with over 5.5 million persons of concern (UNHCR, 2020d). Like 
the Venezuelan case, the Syrian situation is underfunded (over 25% of required funding is unmet 
each year) and has required immense amounts of funding from international sources, though the 
United States is not the only major contributor of funding (UNHCR, 2020d). The Rohingya 
refugee situation is much smaller in scale, peaking in 2017 with about 900 thousand persons of 
concern today fleeing Myanmar and seeking refuge in Bangladesh (UNHCR, 2020c). Similarly 
to the other cases, the situation is severely underfunded, with only 53% of funding requirements 
being met (UNHCR, 2020c).  
While these situations are entirely unique in their emergence, continuance, geography, 
and scale, their network structures are relatively similar in that they show a higher degree of 
clustering compared to the Venezuelan network, and they have a more diversified donor pool. In 
both cases, the United States is the largest donor. However, the significance of the U.S. in these 
two cases as compared to other nodes in the network is not as skewed as it is in the Venezuelan 
case. In these two cases, we see a greater degree of international involvement from other 
countries as major network donors, especially from European countries and institutions and, 
increasingly, private donors. As discussed in the literature, private aid is much less driven by 
self-interest than governmental aid, and therefore, may bode well for humanitarian responses in 




Venezuelan network, there are stark differences which make the two cases in this chapter 
potentially much more resilient to shifting sources of humanitarian aid.  
 In a similar fashion as the previous chapter, network analysis affords greater depth for 
understanding the implications of the relationships shared amongst donors and recipients of aid 
in the two networks. The two cases in this chapter will make a major departure from the results 
presented in the previous chapter. First, the Syrian and the Rohingya cases display much less 
vulnerable network structures when compared to the Venezuelan case. While the United States 
remains a major hub, other major hubs exist which would provide support in the absence of the 
U.S. Second, the cases show that when a higher degree of clustering is present in a network, the 
removal of the U.S. is not as significant as in the Venezuelan network. And, third, the higher 
resistance to cascading failure based on the additional presence of other hubs and reduced 
reliance on a single node implies that there is a greater presence of unearmarked, humanitarian 
driven aid that more directly serves the interests of those in need, rather than the self-interests of 
donors. This, in turn, limits the presence of the tenets of new humanitarianism (Kuehlhorn 
Friedman, 2019) and shows, at least to a degree, that the presence of private donors affords a 
higher degree of unearmarked, need-driven aid. Overall, these networks are more robust to both 
the failure of multiple minor node disturbances and the failure of a single major hub, such as the 
U.S., because of the stability the scale-free distribution offers against small node failures, and the 
reduced vulnerability the presence of many major hubs provides against an attack on another. 
The analysis will show that while the United States is a significant part of the networks’ 





 In the following sections, the two cases will be analyzed in conjunction with one another 
to demonstrate and bolster the inferences made regarding the importance of clustering and donor 
diversification in the previous chapter. First, the analysis will show that there are multiple nodes 
acting as hubs in each network, even though the U.S. provides the most funding in each scenario, 
with more than $500 million being provided to the Syrian situation and more than $550 million 
to the Rohingya situation. Second, in the case of the failure of the U.S. node, the network would 
likely retain most of its structure; though significant reverberations would be felt across the 
network, these would not necessarily affect all other nodes in the network as directly as in the 
Venezuelan case. In regards to cascading failure, the two cases in this chapter provide additional 
support for the original argument of utilizing donor diversification to provide a more robust 
network structure, in that they show that more instances of clustering in a network do provide a 
higher degree of robustness in the face of node failures. While these networks are still vulnerable 
to shifting sources of aid, they are more resilient to change because of the higher degree of donor 
diversification in the networks. Overall, the networks are far more resistant to the failure of 
major hubs—in addition to the implied resistance to multiple failures of minor nodes based on 
the scale-free distribution—making it far more robust than that of the Venezuelan case, and 
provide support for the case of diversification of donorship to prevent cascading failure. 
Resiliency in Clustering 
 Both the Syrian and Rohingya refugee situations’ network statistics—the full sets can be 
referenced in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively—display a much different picture of 
donor relationships when compared to those of the Venezuelan case. In both cases, the United 
States contributes the most funding, but rather than providing the absolute majority, there are 
other countries which also provide a significant contribution to the humanitarian response. The 




provide about 50% of what the U.S. contributes, and the other donors provide a relatively 
significant amount of funding as well. In the Venezuelan case, the second largest donor—the 
European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department—did not even 
provide 25% of what the U.S. contributed.  
 In the Syrian case, the donor trends, as reported by the FTS, show the presence of two 
major nodes that contribute the most significant levels of funding, and are the most significant 
hubs in the network: The United States and Germany (Figure 5). They are followed by other 
European governments and departments, which also contribute relatively large amounts of 
money. This provides the first piece of evidence that points to more instances of clustering in the 
network. In observing the presence of multiple significant nodes, there is in turn a more robust 
network, with a bigger presence of significant nodes with the ability to handle higher loads in the 
absence of one of the hubs, such as the U.S. In other words, the other major contributors, such as 
Germany, the European Commission, and the United Kingdom, would be able to form additional 
connections to make up for some of those lost in the collapse of the U.S., hence maintaining both 
the network’s structure and the humanitarian response. While the removal of the U.S. node 
would prove to be a major loss, there is still the possibility of retaining and revitalizing funding 
levels though the other major donors in the network, thereby minimizing the disturbances and 










 In the Rohingya case, FTS donor statistics display trends which are relatively similar to 
those of the Syrian case. The United States provides the most funding, but the United Kingdom 
also provides a significant proportion of humanitarian aid to the response (Figure 6). Again, this 
helps to create another major hub within the network, rather than the presence of a singular 
uncontested hub, as in the Venezuelan case. While the donors that are smaller than the U.S. and 
the U.K. do not provide as much as some of the larger donors in the Syrian case, they do provide 
more opportunity to create clustering. As with the Syrian case, this supports the theory of a more 
resilient network that shows a higher degree of robustness against multiple failures of smaller 
nodes and the failure of a major hub. Again, if the U.S. node were to be excluded from the 
network, some of its structure would be retained due to the presence of other smaller hubs with 
the potential to support some of the losses felt in the absence of the U.S. In this case, major 
contributors such as the United Kingdom and Japan would likely generate additional connections 
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to make up for the connections lost in with the collapse of the United States node. Despite this 
being, yet again, a major loss in funding, it would not be as detrimental as the departure of U.S. 
involvement from the Venezuelan network, which would entirely collapse when losing the 
absolute majority of its funding.  
 
 




 While donor contribution data is an important part of understanding the presence of 
certain actors in terms of raw funding of these two humanitarian aid complexes, the network 
statics provide another method of analyzing how impactful these funding relationships are. As 
the following sections will show, the role of the United States, though important, is far less 
impactful in the Syrian case and the Rohingya case than in the Venezuelan case. This changes 
the resiliency of the network in the face of major shocks causing potential cascading failures, 
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while maintaining some of the resilience benefits of scale-free networks that are robust to 
changes to many smaller nodes. 
Network Analysis  
 The network analysis of the Syrian and Rohingya refugee situations help provide more 
context about which relationships in the two cases are the most important and how the removal 
of the United States from these two scenarios would impact network structure. In these cases, the 
networks are much more stable because the most central nodes and degree distributions are much 
less reliant on a single node, such as the United States. Instead, there is a better distribution of 
influence and significance across the network, with a greater presence of clusters around multiple 
prominent nodes to help support a more resilient network structure. The following network 
measurements and their corresponding analysis will uphold the argument brought about by the 
analysis of the Venezuelan situation. First, it will show that the United States, while a major 
network hub, will not completely deconstruct the network if removed because the network is not 
overly reliant on a single node, and, second, it will show that this is due majorly to the higher 
degree of clustering and distribution of influence across the two networks.  
Measures of Centrality  
 The measures of centrality for the Syrian and Rohingya cases are much less deterministic 
than those of the Venezuelan case. In the Venezuelan case, the results showed that in addition to 
being the largest donor, the United States had influence over essentially the entire network. In 
the following cases, despite the U.S. being the largest donor of humanitarian aid, it does not exert 
the most control over the networks. This is likely because the connections it shares with other 
recipients in the network are more limited than they were in the Venezuelan case. This does, 
however, point to a more limited impact on the entire network if the node were to fail, because 




determined by the measures of centrality, show the probability of a much less daunting outcome 
if the U.S. were to leave the network.  
 In the Syrian network, the eigenvector centrality scoring shows that, while the United 
States plays a significant role across the network, UNICEF is the most influential node, sharing 
the most connections with the most nodes across the network. Despite not being a major donor, 
this is important because this node is a kay actor in receiving and dispersing aid to other nodes in 
the network. While the U.S. follows closely behind UNICEF, other major donors also show 
significance across the network, such as Germany and private donors (Table 8). In the scenario 
where the U.S. hub is removed from the network, there are a variety of other significant nodes 
that could share the strain of its departure, hence creating robustness against the removal of a 
single hub and the possibility of cascading failures outside of the U.S. cluster.  
 




United Nations Children's Fund 1 
United States of America, Government of 0.9781 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 0.9727 
World Food Programme 0.8912 
Germany, Government of 0.6030 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0.5252 
Japan, Government of 0.4425 
Canada, Government of 0.4346 
Norway, Government of 0.4131 
United Kingdom, Government of 0.3844 
 
 
 The results of the page rank scores are like that of the eigenvector centrality s. Again, the 




weight and directionality, and is outranked by many major recipients of aid (Table 9). The U.S. 
node is closely rivaled by private donors. Here, the results show that if the U.S. node were to fail, 
there are other nodes that could uphold the network by generating new connections and 
additional funding—though likely not as much as the United States—to maintain both the 
network’s structure and the corresponding humanitarian response.  
 
Table 9 Top Ten Nodes Based on Page Rank, Syrian Original Network 
 
Actor Page Rank 
United Nations Children's Fund 0.0859 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 0.0752 
World Food Programme 0.0549 
United States of America, Government of 0.0442 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0.0432 
Germany, Government of 0.0250 
Japan, Government of 0.0239 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department 0.0211 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near 
East 
0.0211 
United Kingdom, Government of 0.0206 
 
 
 In the Rohingya network, we see a similar pattern of the United States being surpassed in 
significance based on measures of centrality, despite donating the most aid. Again, this is likely 
because the hub, while giving out a significant amount in its loads, is not connected to many 
other nodes in the network. Based on the eigenvector centrality scoring, the most prominent node 
across the entire network is private donors, with a score of 1, while the United States is much 
further removed with a scoring of 0.21 (Table 10). While private donors do not contribute nearly 
as much as the U.S. in humanitarian aid—about $50 million compared to about $575 million 




turn, helps directly support the operations of smaller actors that implement services on the 
ground. These private contributions, while more limited, are essential in creating a significant 
portion of the network’s structure, as well as supporting a more effective and rapid humanitarian 
response (Desai & Kharas, 2008) to Rohingya refugees in need. 
 




Private (individuals & organizations) 1 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 0.9244 
World Food Programme 0.4058 
United Nations Children's Fund 0.4044 
United Kingdom, Government of 0.2408 
United States of America, Government of 0.2127 
Japan, Government of 0.1331 
International Organization for Migration 0.1185 
US Fund for UNICEF 0.0951 




 The limited network role of the U.S. is also upheld in the page rank scoring, where the 
U.S. is ranked seventh among the top ten highest ranked nodes (Table 11). It is surpassed again 
by private donors, as well as other major recipients of aid. This is likely because the cluster of 
recipient nodes receiving aid from the U.S. is small compared to others, much like the Syrian 
case. While the Rohingya network would lose a massive amount of funding, the network would 
maintain its structure because of the strong presence of clustering around other prominent nodes 
in the network. This type of diversification in donorship helps to create a more resilient network 
in the face of the failure of a single hub in addition to the robustness against multiple failures of 




Table 11 Top Ten Nodes Based on Page Rank, Rohingya Original Network 
 
Actor Page Rank 
United Nations Children's Fund 0.1299 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 0.0772 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0.0690 
World Food Programme 0.0689 
International Organization for Migration 0.0389 
United Kingdom, Government of 0.0348 
United States of America, Government of 0.0347 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department 0.0240 
Japan, Government of 0.0212 
Canada, Government of 0.0208 
 
 
 Overall, the analysis of the measures of centrality for both networks show that despite 
being the largest donor in both cases, the U.S. can be displaced as the most significant node. 
Because these measures are based on a node’s connections, it can be inferred that in the Syrian 
and Rohingya cases, the United States has a more limited set of connections than it did in the 
Venezuelan network. In the unlikely event that the U.S. was removed from either of these 
networks, other significant nodes with a wider expanse over the network would play a major role 
in maintaining the network structure through the creation of new connections and expanded 
contributions, though they would likely be unable to make up such a massive loss of funding. 
Despite this, the centrality analysis of the two cases shows that, in regard to cascading failure, 
there is a much better change in maintaining resiliency against shifting humanitarian 
contributions when there are multiple nodes playing a significant role in the network.  
Degree Distribution  
 The more isolated role of the United States in the Syrian and Rohingya network structure 
displayed in the measures of centrality is also upheld in the analysis of the degree distributions of 




which nodes- both donors and receivers- are responsible for creating community clusters. In 
contrast to the Venezuelan case, these distributions show that first, the two networks have many 
more nodes with a significant out-degree, and hence more clustering, and second, the impact of 
the U.S. leaving the network is much less significant, comparatively. In these two cases, the 
presence of a more diversified donorship with a large number of connections to a wider variety 
of recipients is critical to the resilience of the network’s structure to the collapse of a hub.  
 The weighted in-degree of the Syrian network shows that the United States represents the 
most sending transactions in the whole network, but, unlike the Venezuelan network, it does not 
constitute the absolute majority of them. In this case, there are other influential nodes which also 
have a significant out-degree. The distribution is much less skewed towards the United States, 
and in this network, there are a variety of other hubs that contribute to a more robust network 
structure characterized by a higher presence of clustering around significant nodes (Table 12). 
The more equal gradient of degree distribution in scale-free distribution, at least in the case of 
the Syrian network, provides robustness against the failure of a single hub in addition to the 
















United States of America, Government of 625 
Private (individuals & organizations) 491 
Germany, Government of 324 
United Kingdom, Government of 303 
Japan, Government of 298 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department 294 
Canada, Government of 288 
Norway, Government of 254 
European Commission 182 




 In this case, the theoretical network that excludes the role of the United States as a 
primary donor would be much more able to support the network’s structure. Rather than failures 
emanating from the collapse of the U.S. node, the failure would likely be isolated to the node’s 
direct connections in its cluster, while the other major donors—private donors, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom—would still be able to support their clusters and their direct connections, with 
the potential to regenerate new connections to replace the failed ones. The failure of the U.S. 
node, in turn, would not lead to cascading failure across the network, but would remain localized 
to a singular community.  
 The difference between the original and theoretical in-degree distributions support this, as 
well. When the U.S. is removed from the Syrian network, many major recipients of aid- 
UNICEF, UNHCR, and WFP- all maintain a majority of their receiving connections with other 
nodes in the network (Table 13), and no nodes are disconnected from the network. This is likely 
because there are other major donors that are providing funding to the same nodes, which, in 




removed. So, even if funding is lost, the major recipients of aid are still able to maintain, at least 
to a degree, their response on the ground, rather than being disconnected from the network and 
losing all funding entirely. In this case, the major aid recipients, which are responsible for 
dispersing aid to other smaller nodes in the network and to humanitarian response operations on 
the ground, also maintain their structure in the network. This is also much different from the 
Venezuelan network, in which the major recipients lost a large majority of their connections 
when the U.S. node was removed from the network.  
 
Table 13 Top Ten Recipients Based on Weighted In-Degree, Syrian Original and Theoretical 
Network Comparison 
 
Actor, Original Network 
Weighted In-Degree 
Original Theoretical Change 
United Nations Children's Fund 1110 1004 -6 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 971 851 -120 
World Food Programme 783 696 -87 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East 
282 236 
-46 
Norwegian Refugee Council 179 167 -12 
International Organization for Migration 171 121 -50 
United Nations Population Fund 133 99 -34 
Danish Refugee Council 122 113 -9 
Save the Children 117 109 -8 




 While the recipients in the theoretical network (Table 5.6) would experience a significant 
loss of resources as a result of the withdrawal of the U.S., they would still retain major structural 
aspects of the network. Because other nodes also maintain a high out-degree, no smaller actors 
are cut off from the network, as other network hubs retain their connections to them, even in the 




and a better resistance to cascading failure in the wake of the loss of a major hub. This is also 
positive for the humanitarian response, because both major brokers of aid still retain their 
position in the network, and ground services provided by recipients of aid—typically the smaller 
node in the network—are not halted entirely when the U.S. is removed from the network. While 
there would be strain on the network, the distributions show that, likely, the other major donors 
and recipients in the network would be able to maintain the network’s structure and, in turn, the 
humanitarian response for Syrians in need.  
 The weighted in and out-degree distributions of the Rohingya network parallel those of 
the Syrian case. However, there is a departure between the two cases in that the United States 
does not have the highest out-degree in the original network; it is surpassed by private donors 
(Table 14). While private donors do not contribute the most money, they do play a relatively 
large role in maintaining the structure of the Rohingya network. Largely, this is due to the fact 
that while they do not contribute the most money, they do have the most connections with a 
significant portion of the network’s smaller nodes. This is important to not only the network 
structure, but also to the actual flexibility of the humanitarian response (Desai & Kharas, 2008) 
to meet the emergent needs of the Rohingya refugees and migrants Despite this, the United 
States is still a hub with a large out-degree, and there are other hubs (the United Kingdom) which 













Private (individuals & organizations) 315 
United States of America, Government of 140 
United Kingdom, Government of 136 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department 77 
Japan, Government of 76 
Canada, Government of 72 
Australia, Government of 66 
Central Emergency Response Fund 56 
Switzerland, Government of 49 




 The out-degree distributions between the original and theoretical network also show the 
much more limited role of the U.S. node in the Rohingya network. Much like the Syrian 
network, and much differently than the Venezuelan network, the major recipients in the 
Rohingya case lose very few connections with the removal of the U.S. (Table 15), and only two 
nodes are cut off from the network entirely. Largely, this is because few recipients in the 
Rohingya network rely solely on the U.S. for funding, such as some of the nodes in the 
Venezuelan network. Because the connections from other major hubs are not lost with the 
collapse of the U.S. node, other major actors are still able to maintain connections with these 
recipients, hence holding together the structure of the network, rather than causing it to break 
apart. Again, though this would result in a major loss of resources for the recipient actors, they 
would still be able to maintain their structure and role in the network because first, other major 
donors maintain their network position, and second, major brokers of aid—UNICEF, UNHCR, 




be strain, but the instance of network failure would be isolated to the U.S. cluster, rather than 
spread across the network.  
 
Table 15 Top Ten Recipients Based on Weighted-In Degree, Rohingya Original and Theoretical 
Network Comparison 
 
Actor, Original Network 
Weighted In-Degree 
Original Theoretical Change 
United Nations Children's Fund 488 454 -34 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 333 323 -10 
World Food Programme 268 236 -32 
International Organization for Migration 152 105 -47 
Save the Children 55 55 0 
United Nations Population Fund 42 42 0 
BRAC 23 23 0 
CARE International 22 17 -5 
Action Contre la Faim 19 19 0 




 In the analysis of the two cases, the results show that while the United States is extremely 
important to the network, the presence of other hubs in the helps to create some form of 
resilience against the removal of the largest source of humanitarian funds. Between the measures 
of centrality and the degree distributions, it is clear that even the largest hub can have a more 
isolated impact on the network’s structure in the event of its failure if there are other significant 
hubs present in the network, as well. In these two cases, the possibility of cascading failure 
across the network is much more unlikely, as there are more clusters which would prevent failure 
from spreading too far from the affected node. These cases show that while scale-free 
distributions inherently carry a high degree of robustness against multiple failures across small 




hub through increased clustering and the presence of other major network actors to continue to 
support structure in the absence of a significant node (Ash & Newth, 2007). 
A More Isolated Impact 
 In the cases of the Syrian and the Rohingya refugee crises, the humanitarian aid 
networks, while dependent on United States’ funding to a degree, are much less vulnerable to 
cascading failure than the Venezuelan case. In these instances, we see how the presence of other 
hubs prevents total network collapse, even in the event of the largest source of funding being 
removed entirely from the network. Based on these two cases, it can be inferred that donor 
diversification, and especially the inclusion of private donors, may be preferable to an extreme 
reliance on a single source of aid, such as the United States. Not only does this help create 
resilience in the network, but it also may help combat some of the negative implications highly 
politicized, earmarked funding has on aid effectiveness (Bearce & Tirone, 2010) and 
humanitarianism, in general (Kuehlhorn Friedman, 2019) by providing more flexible aid driven 
by need rather than governmental interests. 
 These cases are much more stable, in that they have a more evenly dispersed gradient of 
significance and linkages driving their scale-free distributions, especially when compared to the 
Venezuelan case. There are also more hubs and more clustering surrounding them, which helps 
to support a higher degree of network robustness against the failure of a single significant node, 
as in the case of the United States. In this way, these two cases uphold the findings of Ash and 
Netwth (2007) in that the assert the importance of degree distribution as it relates to increased 
clustering and network flows:  
Local failures could be propagated locally and resolved, thus affecting only a small 
part of the network. Clustering also appears to be an important factor. High 
clustering provides a series of alternative pathways through which flows can pass, 
thus avoiding the failed component. The results here show that the degree 




the way links are allocated to nodes drives the modular and clustered nature of the 
resulting network. (p. 681) 
 
As networks, such as the two explored in this chapter, express more clustering around multiple 
significant nodes, they increase their changes of avoiding cascading failures as a result of the 
collapse of a single node in addition to being resilient against multiple failure of smaller nodes 
(Albert et al., 2000). Other hubs—other European governments and private donors—contribute 
to these networks by providing alternative pathways for aid to flow from node to node in the 
network, rather than relying significantly on the United States to provide these paths. This, in 
turn, also has major implications for the role of the United States in the humanitarian response, 
and the extent to which the country is able to extend its influence outside of its network role into 
fungible power (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009).  
Because there are other major actors involved in these networks that provide alternative 
pathways for flows of humanitarian aid, the United States cannot as easily exploit its network 
position to achieve its own self-interest (Borgatti et al., 2009). In the Venezuelan situation, the 
absolute authority and position of the U.S. node is what allows it to transfer its network power 
into fungible power than can be used to alter outcomes in order to serve a strategic purpose 
(Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). However, the presence of other prominent interests in both cases—
those of the EU and private donors—reduce the absolute authority of the United States in the 
network and make it harder for any one actor to dominate and drive the course of the 
humanitarian response. While the political connotation surrounding humanitarian aid investment 
has negative implications for the extent to which this assistance can serve the refugee and 
migrants in need (Kuehlhorn Friedman, 2019), the growing presence of private donors in these 
networks may combat this, as aid from private individuals and organizations is much more 




combatting the politicization of humanitarian action as asserted by new humanitarianism 
(Kuehlhorn Friedman, 2019), privately sourced aid also allowed for a wider availability of 
flexible, rapidly deployable aid that can serve the needs of the vulnerable population because it is 
less subject to bureaucratic processes and earmarking (Desai & Kharas, 2008). 
 The insights from these two cases further the argument from the Venezuela chapter. First, 
the Syrian and Rohingya cases illustrate that when there are multiple hubs in a network, the 
structure will be maintained to a degree, even in the case of the removal of another major hub. In 
these cases, the networks are much more resilient to change in the face of shifting sources of 
humanitarian aid. Second, these cases provide support for the inferences made about the 
importance of donor diversification. As there are a higher presence of other large donors outside 
of the U.S. node, the node’s removal was not as significant because other donors provide support 
to the community structure. This helps to create resilience against cascading failure and provides 
an opportunity for the network to isolate the node’s failure to its cluster, rather than impacting 
the whole network, as it did in the Venezuelan case. Thirdly, the shift in the structure away from 
the absolute prominence of the United States in its network and real-world presence speaks to a 
larger conversation about the role of highly political, self-interest driven governmental aid, the 
negative impact this can have on humanitarian outcomes, and, from this, presents a case for the 
preferability of private funded humanitarian operations (Desai & Kharas, 2008).  
 In the two cases of this chapter, if the United States were to divert funding away from the 
crises, there would be a major loss of resources, but there would be other hubs that could 
maintain the humanitarian aid networks, at least to a degree. This provides support for the 
arguments made in the previous chapter, as well as provides evidence of the importance of donor 




be more favorable than relying primarily on United States’ contributions and also had more 
positive implications for ensuring aid is fulfilling a humanitarian purpose, rather than a political 
one (Kuehlhorn Friedman, 2019). In the following chapter, this idea will be expanded upon in 
the case of the European refugee situation to see if it applies to other types of donorship. This 
situation is the least reliant on U.S. aid, but still relies heavily on other sources of aid, such as 




THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE SITUATION 
 This chapter will focus on, arguably, the most unique of the four humanitarian aid cases 
discussed in this study: the European refugee situation. The European situation is focused 
primarily in the Mediterranean region, where most refugees and migrants are arriving, and hence, 
where most of the aid contributions are being sent (UNHCR, 2020a). While refugee flows began 
before 2015, the largest influx of over one million refugees and migrants was in 2015, with the 
following years presenting more limited flows, but still amounting to over 100,000 per year 
(UNHCR, 2020a). Of the four cases, the Europe situation exemplifies a still chronically 
underfunded response (UNHCR, 2020a), but more diverse donor profile.  
The United States is not the largest donor in this case; it is surpassed significantly by 
European donors. While the aid network is the smallest of the four cases, it brings to light not 
only the importance of clustering and donor diversification in creating network resilience against 
the failure of hubs, such as in the Syrian and Rohingya networks, but the importance of NGOs, 
IGOs, and private donors, or, more generally, actors which are collectives of individuals, 
organizations, and states that contribute aid. In regards to the collapse of the U.S. node, this 
network is the least vulnerable, first because the U.S. plays a relatively small role, and second, 
because there are other hubs present that, in their real-world expressions, are much less prone to 
significant failure because they are collective organizations. Hence, the failure of one actor 
which falls under the collective node, compromised of multiple actors, will not necessarily lead 
to the failure of the entire node itself, whereas in the case of the United States, it is one single 
actor whose failure would lead to the collapse of an entire node. When compared to the previous 
cases, the case of the European refugee situation is far more robust to shifting sources of aid than 




structure, this resiliency is slightly different than that of the Syrian and Rohingya cases (Chapter 
5). In this case, the network is able to maintain structure in the face of the collapse of a hub due 
to the nature of the actors which make up its composition in addition to other important 
components such as clustering. Lastly, the composition of network actors—specifically, the large 
presence of private donors and NGO activity—adds to the conversation regarding new 
humanitarianism and the effectiveness of highly earmarked aid by providing a basis to compare a 
network that is much less reliant on a governmental source to one that receives a majority of its 
funding from a single state government. Overall, this chapter will provide support for the 
argument regarding donor diversification to achieve network resilience and for the argument 
addressing the faults of new humanitarianism and the negative impact this has on aid 
effectiveness in the humanitarian response. 
 Like the previous chapters, the network analysis helps to provide a more computational 
depth to the funding relationships in the humanitarian response. This case, while similar to the 
Syrian case and Rohingya case to a degree, provides a slightly different argument for creating 
resiliency against the failure of large nodes than the other three cases have afforded. First, the 
European situation, while not as clustered at the Syrian and Rohingya cases, still displays a 
higher degree of robustness to the collapse of major nodes than the Venezuelan case, due to the 
nature of the major actors working in combination with the network clustering. Second, the 
removal of the U.S. node, while still a relatively important donor in the network, goes almost 
unnoticed. The same could likely be said for other major state donors, because there is a more 
significant presence of collective actors—the European Commission and its associated 
departments or private donors—that can maintain without the presence of other states. Overall, 




state actor for a majority of humanitarian aid and possibly relying more on collectives of actors 
provides a much more stable network structure that is more robust to the failure of a major node. 
 In this chapter, I will use the analysis of the network statistics in conjunction with the 
discussion to show how a wider variety of donorship may be favorable in maintaining a higher 
degree of resilience in a network’s structure against the departure of major international donors 
like the United States. I will also use this to provide support for the previous arguments made 
about the impact of the increasingly interest-driven context of humanitarian investment and the 
impact this has on aid effectiveness. First, the analysis will show that there are multiple hubs in 
the network, and the U.S. is not one of them despite providing a relatively large amount of 
funding to the humanitarian response. Second, in the case of the removal of the U.S. node, the 
network is able to maintain its structure almost entirely. In this network, a case can be made for 
the potentially declining role of the U.S. in international relations in some cases, such as 
humanitarian intervention. And, lastly, as it relates to cascading failure, this chapter will show 
that while clustering is important in a network, the actual composition of actors—in this case, 
their collectiveness in nature—also plays a role in preventing major node collapses and failures 
across a network. This, in turn, provides strong support for the argument regarding the 
importance of donor diversification in creating robustness against the failure of large network 
actors. Overall, the European humanitarian aid network supports the findings of the previous 
three cases by showing the importance of clustering and diversification to maintain structure, 
but, in addition, shows how other, less traditional donors may come to play an increasingly 
important role in networks of humanitarian donorship. 
Collective Actors and Crisis Aversion 
 In the case of the European refugee situation, the contribution data from the FTS shows 




Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department—are to the humanitarian response. The 
Commission provides a majority of the funding, but in contrast to the Venezuelan case, the hub 
in the network is a collective of states, rather than a single state, such as the United States. In this 
way, the Commission is much less prone to collapse, because a decrease in finding from one 
state in the IGO will not necessarily mean a decreasing in funding from the other states. As this 
chapter will show, other collective actor groups—private donors—also contribute a large amount 
of funding to a wide variety of recipients (about $85 million, which closely rivals the United 
States’ $92 million).  
 Figure 7 shows that after the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection Department and the European Commission itself, the United States—typically the 
largest donor—donates a small fraction of what the first two largest donors do, or about $95 
million, compared to about $715 million from the Commission. It also shows that private donors, 
in the case of the European refugee situation, are on par with the U.S. in terms of raw 
contributions, with the U.S. only contributing about $7 million more than private donors. 
However, in the actual network expression, private donors play a much more significant role in 
terms of community clustering than the United States does. While the funding seems to be 
skewed towards the European Commission, the network analysis will show that there is still a 
strong presence of clustering in the European case that this network would experience a very 










The contributions show clearly that the United States plays a much more limited role in 
comparison to the other three cases in this study. In the following sections, the network analysis 
will uphold these findings, and will show that in addition to the importance of increasing 
clustering to create resiliency, other, collective actors may also be beneficial in maintaining 
network structure in the face of a shock. Overall, the case will provide support to arguments 
made in the two previous chapters regarding the importance of clustering to create network 
resilience against cascading failures, and also provides support for the negative implications for 
networks of aid and aid effectiveness of the reliance on a singular government for humanitarian 
contributions and the corresponding response.  
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Network Analysis  
 The following analysis of the European refugee humanitarian aid network provides a 
more computational understanding of the relationships shared by the prominent donors and their 
respective recipients. It will show that, while the United States could still be considered a major 
donor in terms of raw funding, its network presence is far less impressionable that in the past 
three cases. Despite the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Department providing a disproportionate amount of funding, this network is much more stable 
than the Venezuelan case because of the distribution of connections across the network, and 
because of the nature of the European Commission as an IGO itself. The following network 
measurements—the full set of which is available for reference in Appendix D—and their 
corresponding analysis will uphold the arguments presented in the previous chapters. First, it will 
show that the reliance on the European Commission as a major donor is not as catastrophic as the 
reliance on the United States. Secondly, it will show that clustering, in addition to the different 
actors involved in this case, help to uphold the network’s structure in the case of a major network 
disruptions, and hence, helps to prevent against cascading failures emanating from the collapse 
of a significant node. Lastly, these results will contribute to arguments against the politicization 
of aid and the negative impact interest-driven governmental funding has on aid effectiveness and 
humanitarian response. 
Measures of Centrality 
 The measures of centrality of the European refugee situation are similar to those of the 
Syrian and the Rohingya cases. These cases showed that, while the United States was the largest 
donor, it did not have the most influence over the entire network. Similarly, while the European 
Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department is the largest donor, it is not 




largest donor in the network, it does not appear in the top ten influential nodes based on 
eigenvector centrality or page rank scorings in the original network. This is likely because these 
nodes share fewer connections with fewer nodes than the more influential nodes in the network; 
however, the U.S. shares very, very few connections making its impact on network structure 
almost nonexistent in the case of its removal. In the situation of the United States’ failure as a 
node, the network would only be slightly impacted, as many nodes in the network are influential 
enough to maintain the structure in its absence.  
 The eigenvector centrality scoring shows that, while the European Commission’s 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department is the largest donor, the node with the most 
influence over essentially the entirety of the network is the collective actor of private donors 
(Table 16). It is followed by other major recipients of aid—UNHCR, IRC, and Caritas—which 
are responsible for the dispersion of aid to other nodes in the network from larger donors, or 
directly to humanitarian response operations on the ground. Likely, the massive network 
presence of private donors is due to the volume of donations emanating from this node to a large 
sum of other nodes in the network. In the case of the United States’ collapse, the network would 
maintain essentially its entire structure, because the top ten nodes which maintain the structure of 









Private (individuals & organizations) 1 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 0.7440 
International Rescue Committee 0.3216 
Caritas Hellas - Caritas Greece 0.3193 
HSA Humanitarian Support Agency 0.2444 
Medecins du Monde 0.2138 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency 0.1963 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department 0.1834 
ACT Alliance / Norwegian Church Aid 0.1697 




 The page rank scoring of the top ten nodes in the European network parallel the findings 
of the eigenvector centrality scoring. When accounting for the weight and direction of the 
connections in the network, private individuals still hold the most influence over the network 
(page rank= 0.1811), followed by the UNHCR, UNICEF, the Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection Department, as well as other major European states and humanitarian organizations 
(Table 17). Again, this is likely because private donors share the most connections with the most 
nodes in the network, therefore limiting the role of other major donors by reducing the number of 
actors they contribute to directly. Similarly, the U.S. is not displayed in the top ten ranking 
because, despite giving out more aid than private donors, it shares very few connections with 





Table 17 Top Ten Nodes Based on Page Rank, Original Network 
 
Actor Page Rank 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0.1812 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 0.0669 
United Nations Children's Fund 0.0639 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department 0.0506 
Germany, Government of 0.0262 
United Kingdom, Government of 0.0261 
International Organization for Migration 0.0242 
Medecins du Monde 0.0208 
European Commission 0.0205 




 Overall, the measures of centrality show that despite the real-world expression of 
humanitarian contributions being made up of European and U.S. funding, private donorship is 
essential in upholding this network’s structure. Although it is the third largest donor, the role of 
the U.S. is much more limited in terms of connections across the network. Similar, to the Syrian 
and Rohingya cases, other significant nodes in the network would play a primary role in 
maintaining network structure if the U.S. ceased involvement. And, unlike previous cases, other 
nodes in the network would be more able to make up for losses in funding and resources, 
because the U.S. is not as significant of a donor as it is in the other three cases. In terms of 
cascading failure, there is a much better chance of maintaining network structure in the case of a 
major node failing. This is due, in part, to the more resilient nature of the major nodes in that 
they are collectives of states, organizations, and individuals, rather than a singular entity, and 
also because of the more even spread of influence across the network, in contrast to the 





 As in the Syrian and Rohingya cases, the more limited role of the United States despite 
its humanitarian contributions is displayed well in the degree distribution of the European 
refugee situation. The following statistics show which nodes form hubs and the clusters which 
surround them in the network. Because this network is the smallest of the four cases, the degree 
distribution for the nodes that would be considered significant enough to create a large cluster is 
lower than in the previous three cases. Despite this, we see instances of clustering around major 
nodes in the network, especially private donors, the Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Department, and other European governments, but with a much more isolated presence of the 
U.S., which plays an extremely small role in the distributions. 
 The weighted-out degree of the top ten donors shows how small the role of the United 
States is in comparison to other donors in the network (weighted out-degree= 8). In this case, the 
actors which constitute the largest volume of sending transactions are private donors, followed 
by the European Commission and other European countries (Table 18). While the presence of 
the other donors following the private donors seems to be small, in relation to the size of the 
network, they are still large enough to be considered hubs with an important role in creating 
clustering and the different pathways for aid in the network’s structure. The United States, 
however, barely contributes to this structure, as the results of the weighted in-degree distribution 









Private (individuals & organizations) 207 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department 48 
United Kingdom, Government of 30 
Germany, Government of 24 
European Commission 23 
Switzerland, Government of 12 
Japan, Government of 9 
Norway, Government of 9 
Spain, Government of 9 




 In the European refugee situation, the removal of the U.S. from the network structure 
goes almost unnoticed when comparing the original network to the theoretical network. Major 
recipients of aid lose very few connections, and they maintain their standing in the degree 
distribution (Table 19). In this case, the network is able to uphold the network structure 
essentially perfectly in the face of losing the U.S. as a substantial donor, due to the actor’s more 
contained role compared to the other three cases. In this case, no nodes are disconnected from the 
network when the U.S. is removed. There are a substantial amount of alternative pathways for 
aid to flow through—most of which are provided via the connections of private donors and the 






Table 19 Top Ten Recipients Based on Weighted In-Degree, Original and Theoretical Network 
Comparison 
 
Actor, Original Network 
Weighted In-Degree 
Original Theoretical Change 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 77 75 -2 
United Nations Children's Fund 60 57 -3 
International Organization for Migration 27 26 -1 
International Rescue Committee 25 25 0 
Medecins du Monde 23 22 -1 
Caritas Hellas - Caritas Greece 17 17 0 
Danish Refugee Council 17 17 0 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency 16 16 0 
HSA Humanitarian Support Agency 14 14 0 




 Because of an increased presence of clustering compared to a situation like the one 
identified in the Venezuelan case, the failure of the U.S. node would have very limited 
implications for the rest of the network. All the major actors identified by the weighted out-
degree distribution would be able to handle the extra strain resulting from the collapse of the 
United States. Likely, the other major donors would be able to generate new connections and 
additional funding and resources to make up for those lost in the absence of the U.S. node’s 
contributions. The failure, at least in the case of the European network, would be localized to the 
United States’ very small cluster. All other major clusters would feel a much narrower impact, 
and the possibility of cascading failures in this scenario of a major donor collapsing would be 
very unlikely. Overall, this network and the donors and recipients within it are much less 
vulnerable to a shift in the United States’ trends of humanitarian giving.  
 The network analysis of the European case has illuminated important insights regarding 




from the United States. First, it shows that, while the United States may be a significant donor, 
this position can be displaced in the network when other actors have a large out-degree and 
higher instances of clustering. In this way, the collapse of the U.S. would be limited to the few 
nodes it disperses aid to, rather than to a significant proportion of nodes in the network. 
Secondly, this case shows that collective organizations—IGOs and NGOs—as well as collectives 
of private donors, can make up a significant portion of network structure, and, because they are 
comprised of more than one state, organization, or individual, they are much less prone to 
collapse than a single entity is. Thirdly, these results and their implications provide support for 
the importance of integrating a more diverse donor pool into networks of humanitarian aid. 
Because there is a more limited reliance on a single state for most of the funding, the interest-
driven nature of governmental sources of aid is also limited. This scenario, above all, provides 
support for the significance of private donors and NGOs and the positive implications they have 
for aid effectiveness (Desai & Kharas, 2008) and humanitarianism, in general (Kuehlhorn 
Friedman, 2019). Overall, the European case presents a form of network resiliency that is like 
that in the Syrian and Rohingya cases in some regards, but unique in others. The implications of 
this case, especially as it relates to donor typology, are discussed in the following sections.  
Donor Typologies and the Impact on Networks of Aid 
 The case of the European refugee situation and its corresponding humanitarian aid 
network has upheld many of the conclusions drawn from the other three cases. First, it asserts the 
importance of clustering in networks, and shows how this can create resiliency against the 
collapse of a major state donor, such as the United States. It supports the major ideas presented 
in the case of the Venezuelan refugee situation: that the reliance on a single, governmental 
source of aid may prove to be harmful to a network’s structure if a rare, but large systemic shock 




cases have supported the main argument that lies in the importance of clustering and donor 
diversification to limit failures to certain communities (Ash & Newth, 2007), but the European 
refugee situation also introduces a more contemporary understanding of humanitarian assistance. 
While governmental donorship is still common in this network, the nature in which it is 
contributed is much more stable than the case of the Venezuelan situation. In this case, the 
potential importance of collective donorship—as it relates to both governmental and private 
actors—and the way it helps to diversify a donor pool without causing a significant loss of 
resources is brought to the forefront.  
 While the European network is resilient because of its structure, the real-world 
expression of the major donors in the network is also important in understanding the network’s 
resilience to the failure of large nodes. Because the largest donors and the most influential 
network actors are actually collectives of actors—both in the case of the European Commission, 
an IGO that is collective of states and in the case of private donors that is a collective of private 
organizations and individuals—they are less prone to a situation which would cause them to 
remove all humanitarian contributions from the network. For example, if the United States were 
to face a full-blown economic crisis in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic,6 the Venezuela 
humanitarian response is much more prone to collapse because it relies on a singular hub: the 
United States. In this case, there are no other states, organizations, or individuals that would 
uphold the node in the absence of contributions from the U.S., which would lead to the collapse 
of the entire node. In contrast, nodes representing the European Commission and private donors 
are made up of a multitude of actors. If a state in the European Commission were to face an 
economic crisis, this would not necessarily lead to the collapse of the entirety of the IGO. For 
 
6 A report by the New York Times on July 30, 2020 (Casselman) details the impact coronavirus has taken on the 




example, the Commission was able to retain its expansive donorship in the European network 
despite the Greek financial crisis because the other members of the Commission were able to 
sustain their economic standing. Similarly, the economic downfall of one private individual or 
organization would not necessarily lead to the downfall of another. Essentially, in the instances 
of collective donorship, an attack on one is not necessarily an attack on all, and they are able to 
retain their contributions. In regard to creating resilience in humanitarian aid networks, this helps 
to create nodes which are prone to collapse and hence more resistant to situations which would 
cause cascading failure emanating from the collapse of a single hub.  
 And finally, the implications this case presents for the effects of limiting the impact of a 
single state actor as a major network presence are essential in understanding how important 
donor diversification is in driving more effective aid allocation and humanitarian response. In 
limiting the presence of the U.S. and its power over aid in a network, aid is likely going to be 
less earmarked, more flexible, and more readily available to meet the emergent needs of refugees 
and migrants. Private donorship, in this light, is very important in avoiding the interest-driven 
direction of humanitarian aid from governmental sources. These types of contributions start to 
counter the interest-driven ideas of new humanitarianism outlined by Kuehlhorn Friedman 
(2019), as they are driven largely by humanitarian need, not state goals (Büthe et al., 2012). 
From this, the response to the refugee and migrant situation in Europe is not only more robust to 
the failure of major nodes, but more able to meet the constantly changing demands presented by 
retaining increased levels of funding from private sources, which are more readily deployable 
than other sources of funding (Desai & Kharas, 2008). 
 The European case presents important implications for the future of humanitarian 




preventing cascading failure, as the cases addressed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 have shown. 
However, creating nodes which are resilient to real-world stressors that would lead to their 
collapse is equally important. If nodes which are collectives of actors became more common in 
networks of humanitarian aid, other preventative network constitutions would become less of a 
concern. Overall, the argument can be made that creating node resilience in addition to creating 
network resilience is the optimal way to prevent cascading failures that could lead to the collapse 
of an entire network, at least in the case of networking relationships between the recipients and 
donors of humanitarian aid contributions. This argument will be addressed further in the 
following chapter, as well as the general implications of this study as they relate to network 
studies, international policy making, humanitarian assistance, and its effectiveness.  






 While the collapse of the U.S. as a network actor is unlikely, in the future, there may be 
increasing pressure for the country to significantly reduce foreign assistance, especially in the 
wake of the coronavirus pandemic and the Trump Administration nationalist agenda. This study, 
through the four refugee situations, has made two important contributions. First, through the four 
case studies, this study has illustrated an overreliance on particular donors in the networks.  
Second, the study has used this insight to extend the theory of cascading failure to include social 
and financial networks to show that, though they follow power law distributions and have 
resilience to small-order shocks, a big shock could literally collapse the entire humanitarian 
initiative. Together, these findings support new insights on how international actors could 
support more resilient networks of aid that are better equipped to provide an effective 
humanitarian response, especially in the face of shifting sources of aid.  
 This chapter will, first, summarize the findings of the four cases in the previous chapters, 
and discuss their implications, how they depart from one another, and how they relate to each 
other. Then, it will address how the findings have contributed to network science, and how they 
have contributed to international studies, at least as it related to humanitarian aid. Finally, the 
chapter will bring together these findings into one, final discussion, which will address policy 
implications, as well as future research endeavors that could bring additional depth to the results 
of this study. Overall, the research presented in this study has made a case for the integration of a 
more diverse donor pool in international networks of humanitarian aid. While humanitarian aid 
networks that follow a scale-free distribution have some resilience to small changes in minor 
actors, they are vulnerable to cascading failures due to changes in major nodes. Though instances 




network distribution—are already robust to these small shocks, which typically impact response 
efforts on the ground, rather than massive funding efforts. This study focuses on larger shocks to 
a limited number of significant nodes, and the vulnerability these networks have to these types of 
shocks. The prominent nodes in this study—state actors—experience shocks as a result of 
changes in foreign policy or economic downturns that force them to reconsider assistance levels. 
Due to their prominent network position, these shocks have a major impact on the structure of 
the network which cascade down to lower level nodes, and in turn, impact humanitarian response 
on the ground. Largely, this reliance on certain donors in networks of humanitarian aid is where 
major state actors derive their power and ability to assert an interest-drive aid agenda over a 
humanitarian one, as theorized in the tenets of new humanitarianism (Kuehlhorn Friedman, 
2019). These changes in major donors, in a globalized world with many humanitarian and 
development situations that span over many years, cause this situation to be foreseeable in the 
future as donor fatigue sets in and global financial changes take place. Though the process of 
putting these suggestions into action in the real-world expression of these networks may prove to 
be difficult, there is evidence to support that, to a degree, change in the proportions of 
international donors of humanitarian aid is taking place, and, in turn, may be creating a more 
effective, resilient typology of international donorship that is less reliant on powerful, interest-
driven governmental financing.  
Variations of Need  
 Each of the four cases has demonstrated a different degree of reliance on the United 
States’ humanitarian contributions, and from this, I showed how variations in network structure 
can create or diminish resilience to shocks in the major donor nodes. The chapters proceeded 
from most reliant on U.S. assistance (the Venezuela situation) to the least reliant on a single actor 




network behaviors and characteristics that underscored the dependency of the network on certain 
major nodes that serve as hubs and the types of shocks the aid network might be vulnerable to. 
By illustrating a hypothetical scenario in each case study in which the U.S. “leaves” the aid 
network (an extreme case of total withdrawal), I showed the reliance of other actors that may 
seem to have no direct relationship with the U.S., which illustrates the possibility of the network 
succumbing to cascading failures much like a power grid or the internet might. This was most 
dramatic in the network most reliant on the U.S. as the sole hub (the Venezuela case), and much 
less apparent in the case where private donors play an increasingly large role (the European 
case). Though different in their donor typologies and reliance on certain actors, each case also 
provided support for the argument in this study addressing the interest-driven context that state 
actors typically impose in their aid contributions, as outlined in the theory of new 
humanitarianism (Kuehlhorn Friedman, 2019). In cases where the typology of donors was more 
diverse—governmental, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and private—there were a greater 
number of prominent nodes which limited the ability of any single state actor from expressing 
their self-interest over the entirety of the network, thus reducing the presence of the major tenets 
of new humanitarianism. This gradient of reliance on a single donor, and in turn, a gradient of 
power based on the donor’s position in the network, is discussed in the following sections.  
The Venezuelan Situation 
 The Venezuelan refugee and migration situation illustrated a case for the potential 
shortcomings of taking in an absolute majority of humanitarian contributions from a single state 
source. The humanitarian aid network for the Venezuelan case followed a power law 
distribution, where a few hubs are connected to many nodes, but most are smaller actors (such as 
local service organizations) with very few connections. In this case, the U.S. was singularly 




resilient to multiple failures across many small nodes—in this case, small NGOs implementing 
services on the ground—it is extremely vulnerable to a shock to the United States, which is the 
most prominent node in the network. This network, in addition to lacking robustness to the 
failure of the major hub, is also vulnerable to the ideals of new humanitarianism in that the U.S. 
has an uncontested presence with the ability to assert its self-interest over the entirety of the 
network and translate this power into real-world outcomes (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009).  
This chapter highlighted the vulnerabilities of aid networks that are scale-free and follow 
a power law distribution in that the structure generates extreme dependency on one central actor. 
As preferential attachment characterized network growth over the years, the U.S. only became 
increasingly centralized, leaving no strong clusters or communities that could compensate for a 
hypothetical decline or withdrawal of the U.S. This network structure translates to a reliance on 
the U.S. to maintain both the network structure and the real-world humanitarian response efforts.  
The analysis between the original (with U.S.) and theoretical (without U.S.) network 
showed that the removal of the U.S. node left the entirety of the network vulnerable to collapse. 
This was demonstrated in the differences in degree distribution when the U.S. node was removed 
for the major recipients of aid, which lost about half of their network connections in the 
theoretical network results. Overall, there were few other nodes which had strong enough 
clusters to support the network in the absence of the U.S. The U.S. has influence over the 
entirety of the network (eigenvector = 1.0) that is unmatched by another major donor and, 
because of this, the network lost a majority of its structure when the node was removed. While it 
can be argued that networks of social science can restructure themselves to accommodate shocks 
in a way that infrastructure and physical networks cannot, restructuring in a humanitarian aid 




underfunded (Financial Tracking Service, 2020a) is unlikely. Since funding affects not only 
those organizations that receive money, but also the burden on other donors attempting to keep 
services functioning, there would likely be a series of cascading failures across the network, as 
donors and mediating funding agencies (such as IOM and UNHCR) fail to compensate for the 
strain on the network left in the absence of the United States.   
The Syria and Rohingya Situations  
While the Venezuelan situation presented the most vulnerable scenario of the four 
explored in this study, it did not offer an alternative or more desirable network structure. The 
Syria and Rohingya cases, however, provide examples of a more stable network of humanitarian 
aid, despite receiving a significant portion of funding from the United States. While in these two 
cases, the removal of the U.S. as a major donor would have a significant impact on both real-
world and network operations, there were other actors that could, to a degree, uphold response 
and network structure in the absence of the United States. This was largely due to the more 
frequent instances of clustering in the network, especially amongst European governments and 
some private donors. Because node influence was more evenly dispersed across multiple hubs in 
the network, there was less of a risk of cascading failures, and therefore a more isolated impact 
of the U.S. node’s withdrawal. This, in turn, contributed to a more limited influence of the 
United States both as a network presence and as an international force contributing aid to achieve 
its strategic self-interests. Because the power of the U.S. is more contested by other nodes, its 
presence is limited, and so then is its ability to exploit its network position to alter real-world 
humanitarian responses (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). 
This chapter contributed to the argument around preventing cascading network failures in 
two ways. It provided additional evidence to support some of the ideas presented in the previous 




can help prevent failure from spreading across the entirety of a network. In other words, a higher 
degree of clustering in a network helps keep the failure of a hub—such as the United States—
isolated to its direct cluster. This chapter also contributed to the argument about the importance 
of donor diversification in creating more resilient networks of aid and a more effective response 
that is rooted in humanitarian need rather than state interests abroad. These two cases embodied 
these ideas well. They both illustrated a more diverse donor pool that contributed significant 
amounts of aid to the humanitarian response. Though the absence of U.S. funds and network 
presence would have a notable impact, it would not be as catastrophic as in the Venezuelan case, 
as other major network actors would be able to provide some additional compensatory support. 
Overall, instances of failure cascading across the entirety of the network because of the U.S. 
removal are much less likely in the Syrian and Rohingya situations.  
The European Situation 
 The European situation, while supporting the findings of the previous three cases, also 
brings to light other important findings on potential solutions to instability in networks of 
humanitarian aid. In this case, the United States played a far less significant role than in the other 
three cases, though still being the third largest donor. Both in the contribution amounts and in the 
network statistics, the U.S. was less influential. When comparing the original and the theoretical 
situations, the network structure barely changed with the removal of the U.S. node. Instead, the 
most significant donor was the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
Department, and the most influential node, with by far the most connections to the largest sum of 
recipients was private donors. And while this may have been expected because the refugee and 
migrant situation is unfolding in Europe, a location where the U.S. has more limited political 
interests and influence, this case a different network typology with fewer vulnerabilities to 




 This chapter supported previous arguments regarding the importance of clustering to 
create more resilient networks of humanitarian aid. However, the European case contributes to 
the argument about donor diversification in a different manner than the Syrian and Rohingya 
cases. In the European refugee situation, the major donors, excluding the United States, are 
collective bodies of either states, organizations, or individuals. And while the overall network 
representing contributions to the European situation is resilient because it presents more 
instances of clustering and more than one prominent node, the nature of the nodes—the donors, 
at least—may help to reduce vulnerability, as well. Because collectives are more resistant to 
outside pressures—an attack on one is not necessarily an attack on all—the European situation, 
despite an absolute majority of funding coming from a single source, is more resilient because of 
the nature of the source—an IGO, an organizations of governments, rather than a single 
government. This case also furthered the arguments regarding new humanitarianism, and how 
the interest-driven context of this theory can be limited via the inclusion of a more diverse donor 
typology, such as private donors, that are driven more by humanitarian goals than self-interests. 
These arguments, as well as the ones brought to light in the previous cases, are discussed further 
in the following sections.  
Differing Measures of Analysis 
 This study—though focusing on humanitarian aid—relied on the frequency of 
transactions between donors and recipients to assess the influence of certain actors within a 
network, rather than the actual dollar amount of each transaction. This was done to assess how 
many actors would be cut off entirely from a network in the absence of the United States, and 
what other actors, regardless of their monetary contribution, would help support what recipients 
remained and their humanitarian responses. This offers its own limitations, but, overall, was 




recipients, from international organizations to small, on-the-ground NGOs. It is important to note 
that, largely, even when accounting for the monetary weight of each transaction rather than just 
accounting for the number of transactions, the results of the overall network analysis and each 
individual case are largely consistent, except for the case of private donors in the Rohingya and 
Syrian networks, and to a lesser degree, in the European network. However, the originally 
discussed implications and role of large state donors is persists in both the transactional and 
monetary analysis. To demonstrate this, a sample of the top five nodes from the transactional 
networks (based on page rank scoring) are compared to their page rank scoring in the monetary 
networks.  
 In the Venezuelan network, the network remains largely unchanged when the monetary 
data is used to conduct the analysis. Largely, the top five actors maintain their ranking, though 
their page rank scorings vary (Table 20). Overall, this is to be expected. The United States 
contributed by far the most money and shared the most transactions with the most recipients in 
this network. Therefore, in both methods of analysis, the United States is the most prominent 
donor, both in the actual amount of funding it contributes, and in the number of relationships it 









Table 20 Top Five Actors in the Venezuelan Network Based on Page Rank, Transactional and 
Monetary Comparison  
Actor, Venezuelan Network 
  




United States of America, Government of 0.1669 0.2433 1 1 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 0.0897 0.0928 2 2 
International Organization for Migration 0.0792 0.0479 3 4 
United Nations Children's Fund 0.0554 0.0363 4 5 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection Department 




 The Syrian and Rohingya cases remain largely the same, as well. However, in both of 
these cases, private donors presented themselves as major network donors based on the 
transactional data; when the monetary weight of each transaction is included, they fall down in 
the ranking. In the Syrian network, private donors fall from the fifth largest donor to the ninth 
(Table 21), while in the Rohingya case, they fall from the third to the thirteenth (Table 22). In 
both cases, they are displaced by other major state donors, specifically the United States. This 
points to the conclusion that private donors are influential in the amount of transactions they 
share with smaller implementing organizations, but because they donate smaller sums of money, 











Table 21 Top Five Actors in the Syrian Network Based on Page Rank, Transactional and 
Monetary Comparison 
Actor, Syrian Network 
  
Transactional Monetary Old Ranking 
New 
Ranking 
United Nations Children's Fund 0.0859 0.0785 1 4 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 0.0752 0.1173 2 1 
World Food Programme 0.0549 0.1086 3 2 
United States of America, Government of 0.0442 0.1003 4 3 




 This is also to be expected. While private donors share a significant amount of 
transactions with recipients of aid, when the weight of the monetary value of each transaction is 
accounted for, they lose a majority of their network influence. While these cases support the 
findings about state power, they do show the difficulty that private donors have in exerting real 
influence over both a network and the real-world humanitarian responses corresponding to each 
refugee and migrant situation. Largely, private donors do not meet the sheer volume of funding 
contributed by major state donors like the United States, and therefore—even though they 
contribute to the most recipients more frequently—their presence in the network is reduced. It is 
important to note, however, that private donors do still sit among the moderately influential 
donors in the network, even when accounting for monetary weight. This, in itself, supports that 
private donors are a growing presence in international trends of humanitarian giving, particularly 
in terms of influence. In addition to this, they support a wide variety of smaller implementing 
organizations that are important to meeting the emergent needs in the humanitarian response. 
While they don’t send the most money, these relationships are significant because of their real-
world connotation, which is contributing money to smaller organizations and giving them the 





Table 22 Top Five Actors in the Rohingya Network Based on Page Rank, Transactional and 
Monetary Comparison 
Actor, Rohingya Network 
  
Transactional Monetary Old Ranking 
New 
Ranking 
United Nations Children's Fund 0.1299 0.0857 1 3 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
0.0772 0.0832 2 4 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0.0690 0.0130 3 13 
World Food Programme 0.0689 0.1199 4 2 




 The European network, similar to the Venezuelan network, only shows minor changes in 
node influence when the monetary weight of each transaction is included in the analysis. Most 
notably, private donors are displaced by the European Commission, but this is to be expected 
because of how much the EC contributes to the situation. Private donors are only displaced to the 
third ranked node in the network, largely because they contribute a significant amount of money 
in addition to sharing, by far, the most transactions with the most recipients of aid. Overall, this 
shows that private donors in the European case can, to a degree, maintain their network 
influence, even when accounting for the monetary amount of each transaction.  
 
 
Table 23 Top Five Actors in the European Network Based on Page Rank, Transactional and 
Monetary Comparison 
Actor, European Network 
  
Transactional Monetary Old Ranking 
New 
Ranking 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0.1812 0.0776 1 3 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 0.0669 0.1762 2 2 
United Nations Children's Fund 0.0639 0.0414 3 5 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and 
Civil Protection Department 
0.0506 0.1947 4 1 





 While a monetary analysis supports the findings regarding the role of large state donors, 
it does show the limitations of power that collectives of private donors have. Though private 
donors have a large network presence based on the number of transactions they share with 
recipients of aid, when the actual dollar amount of aid is accounted for, they are often displaced 
by state donors. This, overall, shows that private donors are still easily contested by major state 
donors, though their role in international humanitarian aid networks is growing. Even before 
accounting for the monetary amount of each transaction, the difference between private donors 
transforming network influence into fungible power was starkly different from the way a major 
state donor like the United States can exert influence. Because private donors face the issue of 
collective action, there are major barriers to their ability to act in the same manner as a state, and 
this is highlighted by the differences between the two in the monetary network analysis.  
Building Network and Node Resilience 
 The four cases examined in this study have utilized theories of social network analysis to 
infer greater depth into ways to create resiliency against changing structures of humanitarian aid. 
First, the cases have shown that more clustering leads to a greater resilience against cascading 
network failure because it allows other nodes and their connections to support the network in the 
case of a hub’s collapse. Second, the European case has brought about the importance of 
nodes—not just the overall network structure—exemplifying resilient characteristics, such as 
collectivism, to support the overall resilience of the network by having nodes that are more 
resistant to collapse by nature. This research showed how resilience and cascading failure 
observations from the physical sciences could be applied to understand the network vulnerability 
of humanitarian assistance in the condition of 'new humanitarianism' where funding can shift in 





Clustering for Resilience 
 This study has utilized two different areas of network science—cascading failure and 
creating more robust network structures—to provide a more computational understanding of the 
international relationships between donors and recipients of aid, and the vulnerability these 
networks face based on the composition and reliance of their primary donors. First, it has shown 
that power-law distributions and scale-free networks, while generally stable against multiple 
shocks to small nodes, can also create a situation where, if the most prominent node with the 
most connections comes under attack, the network is left extremely vulnerable to cascading 
failures. In the case of humanitarian aid networks, these “attacks” may not necessarily be an 
action taken against the node itself, but a decision made by the actor the node is represented by 
to reduce their presence or leave the network entirely. Despite the idea of the withdrawal of a  
actor like the United States potentially being an intentional foreign policy decision by the 
administration, the results of this study still apply.  
 As shown in the case of the Venezuelan refugee situation, the removal of the U.S. —the 
absolute most prominent actor in the network based on both measures of centrality and degree 
distribution—caused a complete breakdown of network structure and connectivity. While the 
network is relatively stable to small disruptions because it is scale-free, the removal of this 
specific node was catastrophic to the network. These results are similar to those presented in 
other network studies, though they specifically relate to power grids or Internet networks, not to 
networks of social science (Albert, Jeong, & Barabási, 2000; Crucitti, Latora, & Marchiori, 
2004; Motter & Lai, 2002).  
Especially in the Venezuelan network, there was an immense presence of clustering 
around a single node (the U.S.), rather than having multiple clusters across a variety of nodes, 




damage when it was removed when compared to less clustered networks (Motter & Lai, 2002). 
The other three cases showed that when there were more nodes and a more even share of 
influence between actors across the network, the removal or collapse of the United States was 
much less detrimental, despite it still being a major donor. This was because other actors in the 
other networks upheld the scale-free degree distribution, even in the absence of the U.S.  
The second topic of network robustness this study contributes to is the importance of 
clustering in building more resilient networks, specifically as it relates to social science 
networks. By drawing on studies of physical sciences and complex network attacks and the way 
these networks develop resilience, I am able to understand how social science networks have the 
potential to rearrange themselves to reflect these forms of robustness displayed in other types of 
networks to prevent instances of cascading failures (Albert et al., 2000). As it relates to 
humanitarian aid networks, this ties in with the discussion above regarding the importance of a 
more even distribution of connections. Because creating more even degree distributions—such as 
those in the Syrian and Rohingya networks—creates more instances of clustering, and hence, 
more hubs, networks are less vulnerable to cascading failures with the removal of a single 
prominent node, such as the U.S. This was upheld when comparing the original and theoretical 
networks and the differences in their degree distributions when the U.S. node was removed. 
However, network resilience itself may not be enough in the case of humanitarian aid networks 
that are so reliant on single state actors that are subject to constantly changing global conditions. 
As discussed in the case of Venezuela, it may prove to be nearly impossible to restructure 
networks in a way that reflects a more diverse donor typology that is less reliant on a single 




Node Vulnerability and Network Impact 
 As the European case has shown, not all nodes are equally resistant to instances that may 
lead to failure or collapse. Even when considering the network of nodes, some actors are not as 
stable as others in the real-world, and hence may not be stable sources of funding to be at the 
center of a humanitarian aid network. In this light, it is important to take into consideration the 
construction of network actors and donor typologies, and how this plays a role in generating 
node resilience as well as network resilience more generally. For example, networks which rely 
heavily on a single actor cause the brokers of the humanitarian response—typically, the UNHCR 
or IOM—to be much more beholden to the wishes of that donor, and more vulnerable to shocks 
to that single donor. Whereas, in a more diverse network with a wider variety of donors—
governmental, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and private—there is a more limited 
influence of any single actor, and hence, a more limited influence of shocks to a major donor. 
While these insights apply specifically to the actors involved in humanitarian aid networks, they 
may also have implications for other networks that involve an exchange of some other type of 
resource.  
 The European case was much different from the other networks not because of its 
structure—which did support the findings discussed above—but because of the types of nodes 
that drove the presence of the scale-free distribution. The two most influential nodes in the 
network—private donors and the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection Department—were not single state entities, such as the United States, but were 
collectives of states, organizations, or individuals. As discussed in the previous chapter, this may 
be preferable to sourcing funding from a single government because a failure of the node is much 
harder to realize in the real-world. In the case of the United States, the withdrawal of the node 




changes in policy, economic environment, or interstate relationships. In the case of the European 
Commission or private donors nodes, a shock to cause the node to collapse would be much more 
complex because multiple actors would need to fail—politically or economically—in order to 
cause a shock large enough to result in the failure of the entire node.  
While there is a high degree of clustering around these two nodes in the European 
network, shock to one of the entities involved would not constitute the loss of all of the edges to 
all of the recipient nodes in the cluster. In this case, the vulnerability of hubs to cascading 
failures are much more limited than those in the Venezuelan case, making it much more robust to 
a major shock that could lead to total collapse of the node. When taking this into account and 
considering the implications this may have for networks of humanitarian aid, it also becomes 
important to recognize the real-world implications that collective actors have on humanitarian 
assistance and humanitarian response. Overall, these predictions, both as they are related to 
network structure and robustness against cascading failure, as well as the usage of aid in the 
humanitarian  response, may be much more positive than the traditional aid network that is 
centric to a singular governmental source.  
Implications for International Networks of Humanitarian Aid 
 The analysis of state relations in IR has centered around the state as the primary actor. 
This “traditional” system reflects in the humanitarian aid network of the Venezuelan case, where 
the US, with its primary foreign policy-related interests, features as the singular primary actor. 
As illustrated in the final case, however, the European refugee and migration response illustrates 
the rise of another actor in the realm of global humanitarian affairs: that of private donors. This 
network, while still remaining largely dependent on traditional state actors, represents a network 
with increased diversity. Clusters of actors in the network form communities that insulate the 




instability of networks of humanitarian aid that are heavily reliant on a single government for 
financing humanitarian response operations. Additionally, my findings illustrate the growing 
influence of private donors and the potential network resiliency these actors have to offer. Not 
only do these clusters insulate against shocks, but they also tend to donate funds with little to no 
earmarking, allowing humanitarian donations to flow more directly to organizations addressing 
emergent needs on the ground. Rather than funding that is beholden to foreign policies of other 
states and their priorities, private donors may offer a solution for direct, fully humanitarian aid 
more efficiently reaching needs when and how they arise on the ground.  
Aid Effectiveness 
 Each chapter in this study discusses the implications of politicized humanitarian aid and 
the negative impacts it has on aid effectiveness, especially in regard to aid being sent from the 
United States. Largely, U.S. aid often comes with a political intent or foreign interest motivation 
(Drury, Olson, & Van Belle, 2005; Lebovic, 1988). This type of politicized aid is less effective 
than those with fewer strings attached by the donor state (Bearce & Tirone, 2010). In each of the 
cases I presented, the U.S. is a primary donor, but it also “earmarks” its funds based on its own 
foreign policy goal. This, I argued, may result in aid that is not meeting the emergent needs of 
the host government and refugee and migrant population because it is tied to specific initiatives 
or humanitarian sectors. Earmarking of politicized funds is thus another vulnerability of a 
humanitarian network structured around preferential attachment to a singular influential donor. 
This is the case with the U.S. in three of the four cases studied here; the Venezuela, Syria, and 
Rohingya humanitarian aid networks may fall victim to less effective forms of aid because of 
their heavy reliance on a single government for the financing of a humanitarian response. 




in some cases, may be reduced as other sources of humanitarian aid begin to expand their 
presence. 
 While IGOs such as the European Union maintain an important role in international 
humanitarian aid operations, private donorship is also on the rise. The presence of private donors 
has increased significantly in recent years, and also provides an important source of largely un-
earmarked aid that is more effective in responding to the changing needs of an ongoing refugee 
and migrant situation (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Program, 2018). 
Büthe, Major, & de Mello e Souza (2012) suggest that private aid is far less politicized and 
serves a much more direct, efficient humanitarian purpose than most government earmarked 
funding. Furthermore, the allocation of private aid is much more efficient because it does not 
need to go through the administrative procedures and approvals government funding is subject 
to. In addition, is it much less susceptible to corruption, and more readily available for use in on-
the-ground humanitarian response operations (Desai & Kharas, 2008). Overall, this heightened 
presence of private donors in the European refugee and migrant situation not only helps provide 
a greater degree of network stability, but also shows that donor diversification and the inclusion 
of private donors may be preferable, especially in the case of ensuring an efficient response.  
Stronger Networks of Humanitarian Aid  
 My findings show the damage that can be caused by an over reliance on a single source 
of aid in funding a humanitarian response to a refugee and migrant situation. I argued that 
improving donor diversification could lead to a more resilient network structure and an on-
demand humanitarian response. In diversifying the donor pool, there are greater instances of 
clustering in the case networks, and hence, more direct connectivity and the ability of funding to 
flow to recipient nodes through other hubs in the network, rather than emanating from a single 




needs as they emerge, rather than reflecting the foreign policy interests of donor states or even 
mediating organizations such as UNHCR and IOM.  
 As displayed in the European situation, IGOs, NGOs, and other private donors play a 
large role in diversifying the sources of humanitarian aid, and shift reliance away from the U.S. 
As more actors come to play larger roles in the network, the entire provision of humanitarian aid 
becomes more robust to the shock of a major actor, such as the U.S. reducing or eliminating 
funding to the situation. This not only prevents against instances of cascading failures in the 
event of a single hub’s failure, but also resolves some of the issues of foreign and humanitarian 
aid more generally. The rise of NGOs and private donors in these networks results in a greater 
presence of unearmarked aid, which is less subject to the bureaucratic, interest-driven processes 
of governmental aid, hence making it more rapidly deployable to meet the needs of vulnerable 
populations (Desai & Kharas, 2008). Shifting away from a reliance on primarily United States’ 
funding would not only help improve network resilience, but could also improve the 
effectiveness of humanitarian aid response by making it more flexible and less bound to 
governmental interests (Desai & Kharas, 2008).  
Final Thoughts 
 Overall, this study and the four cases included within it have addressed the importance of 
creating critical resiliency measures in networks of humanitarian aid. Through donor 
diversification and the inclusion of nodes that are more robust to failure because they are more 
resistant to collapse by nature, more resilient networks of humanitarian aid that are resistant to 
cascading failures can be achieved. While the composition of aid donors and recipients is 
difficult to control, the rise of private donorship—at least in the case of the European refugee 
situation—shows that it is possible, and perhaps even preferable to scenarios where aid is 




donor diversification is not a conscious choice or effort, it is important to be mindful of the 
impact that the over reliance on certain types of donors may have compared to others, especially 
as it relates to humanitarian giving and aid effectiveness.  
Though this study only addresses humanitarian aid as it relates to refugee crises, there 
may be other instances where the logic derived from these cases can apply. First, similar 
inferences could be drawn for many other international resource networks, or even domestic 
networks, where a single source dominates the distribution of money or goods. This monopoly of 
giving, while stable to a degree, could cause immense damage to network recipients in the 
unlikely case that the primary hub alters flows of humanitarian aid or defunds humanitarian 
investment altogether. This was an idea that would likely be replicated in other complex resource 
networks.  
Though major state actors such as the United States provide critical international support 
to humanitarian issues around the world, the reliance recipients have on the country’s role may 
prove to be catastrophic. As sources of humanitarian aid shift—especially in the wake of a global 
financial crisis—the inclusion of a more diverse typology of humanitarian donors may prove to 
be absolutely necessary in maintaining the humanitarian response. This study, overall, has shown 
the potential fragility of international networks of humanitarian aid, and has brought to light 
some of the issues regarding the presence of a single state actor as an absolute, prominent hub. 
While it would be difficult and harmful to humanitarian responses around the world to conform 
to a specific donor typology, it is important to be mindful of the impact it can have, especially if 
this donor were to rapidly repeal vast amounts of aid. In an already unstable economic and public 
health environment, a catastrophic breakdown of a critical humanitarian aid network would only 




many long-lasting crises increasingly characterize our global landscape—from migration and 
climate to environmental and human-made disasters—we must be vigilant in understanding the 
vulnerabilities and risks present in humanitarian aid networks that arise in response to crisis. 
And, above all, we should aim to understand the impact of these vulnerabilities and risks on 
creating an effective humanitarian response that is fit to the needs of the populations they intend 
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UNICEF National Committee/Spain 0 1 0.00141 0.00114 
UNICEF National Committee/Uruguay 0 2 0.00171 0.00228 
United Arab Emirates, Government of 0 2 0.00740 0.00008 
United Kingdom, Government of 0 1 0.00145 0.00016 
United Nations 0 1 0.00142 0.00028 
United Nations Children's Fund 168 21 0.05536 0.28544 
United Nations Development Programme 0 1 0.00135 0.00295 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
264 15 0.08966 0.58509 
United Nations Humanitarian Response 
Depot 
0 0 0.00111 0.00000 
United Nations Population Fund 12 6 0.00354 0.00316 
United States of America, Government of 0 547 0.16699 1.00000 
US Fund for UNICEF 0 10 0.00413 0.01141 
WHAM Foundation 0 1 0.00570 0.00004 
World Bank 0 1 0.00141 0.00114 
World Food Programme 24 4 0.01011 0.06332 
World Health Organization 7 0 0.00352 0.00145 
World Vision Canada 0 4 0.00258 0.00118 
World Vision International 34 1 0.01423 0.06763 











World Vision Korea 0 1 0.00148 0.00030 
World Vision USA 0 3 0.00221 0.00089 
ZOA 3 0 0.00351 0.00045 













ACT Alliance / Church of Sweden 1 0 0.00176 0.00516 
Action Against Hunger 7 0 0.00495 0.07098 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency 0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
Agricultural Cooperative Development 
International and Volunteers in Overseas 
Cooperative Assistance 
0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
Aktion Deutschland Hilft 0 2 0.00344 0.00086 
American Red Cross 0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
American Refugee Committee (Alight) 0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
Americares 0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
Associazione Volontari per il Servizio 
Internazionale 
0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
Australia, Government of 0 1 0.00309 0.00029 
Austria, Government of 0 7 0.00506 0.08999 
Ayuda en Accion 1 0 0.00166 0.01720 
Bloomberg 0 6 0.00426 0.01447 
Brazil, Government of 0 8 0.00637 0.08670 
Canada, Government of 0 44 0.03176 0.32498 
Canadian Food Grains Bank 0 1 0.00240 0.00043 
CARE International 5 0 0.00659 0.01254 
CARITAS 0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
Caritas Brazil 1 0 0.00301 0.00047 
Caritas Germany (DCV) 25 0 0.01350 0.17411 
Caritas Peru 3 0 0.00258 0.05159 
Caritas Switzerland 46 0 0.02468 0.34754 
Central Emergency Response Fund 0 47 0.02687 0.45333 
Colombia, Government of 0 15 0.00864 0.18927 
Colombian Red Cross Society 8 0 0.00913 0.01526 
Comitato Internationale per lo Sviluppo dei 
Popoli 
2 0 0.00245 0.00491 
Danish Refugee Council 9 0 0.01004 0.03390 
Denmark, Government of 0 7 0.00551 0.05292 
Diologo Diverso 2 0 0.00444 0.00614 
Dubai Cares (UAE) 0 5 0.00360 0.05117 
Dutch Relief Alliance 0 2 0.00308 0.00063 
Education Cannot Wait Fund 0 3 0.00333 0.02077 










European Commission EuropeAid 
Development and Cooperation 
0 15 0.00853 0.18771 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid 
and Civil Protection Department 
0 97 0.05230 1.00000 
Fondation Caritas Luxembourg 1 0 0.00214 0.00032 
Fondation Chanel 0 1 0.00170 0.01703 
Food & Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations 
5 1 0.00437 0.06437 
Ford Foundation 0 6 0.00408 0.06140 
France, Government of 0 2 0.00426 0.01722 
Frantz Hoffman Foundation 0 1 0.00215 0.00082 
Fundacion Ayuda en Accion Colombia 1 0 0.00241 0.00051 
German Red Cross 6 0 0.00410 0.05804 
Germany, Government of 0 34 0.02032 0.10010 
Gilead Sciences Inc 0 1 0.00250 0.00032 
GOAL 1 0 0.00258 0.00080 
HALO Trust 1 0 0.00258 0.00080 
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society 4 0 0.00521 0.00942 
Iceland, Government of 0 1 0.00170 0.01703 
iMMAP 0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
International Committee of the Red Cross 3 0 0.00288 0.00902 
International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies 
1 1 0.00279 0.00648 
International Labour Organization 8 8 0.00120 0.00245 
International Organization for Migration 82 0 0.04625 0.46949 
International Planned Parenthood 
Federation 
1 0 0.00182 0.00595 
International Rescue Committee 31 0 0.01856 0.11252 
Ireland, Government of 0 6 0.00969 0.03513 
Islamic Relief Worldwide 0 2 0.00342 0.00077 
Italy, Government of 0 2 0.00220 0.03406 
Japan Agency for Development and 
Emergency 
2 0 0.00235 0.00618 
Japan, Government of 0 14 0.00945 0.17217 
Jersey Overseas Aid 0 1 0.00801 0.00019 
Jesuit Refugee Service 0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
Johanniter Unfallhilfe e.V. 3 0 0.00273 0.00645 
Korea, Republic of, Government of 0 4 0.00320 0.06811 
Latter-Day Saint Charities 0 3 0.00435 0.00120 










Malteser International Order of Malta 
World Relief 
3 0 0.00273 0.00645 
Medecins du Monde Canada 1 0 0.00182 0.00595 
Medicor Foundation 0 12 0.00764 0.06309 
Mercy Corps 4 0 0.00477 0.00945 
Netherlands, Government of 0 17 0.00935 0.14560 
New Zealand, Government of 0 2 0.00220 0.03406 
Norway, Government of 0 13 0.00865 0.13438 
Norwegian Refugee Council 68 0 0.03832 0.59102 
Novo Nordisk 0 1 0.00215 0.00082 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs 
1 0 0.00182 0.00595 
Ole Kirk‚Äôs Foundation 0 1 0.00215 0.00082 
OXFAM GB 1 0 0.00176 0.00516 
Oxfam Intermon 1 1 0.00259 0.01768 
OXFAM International 8 3 0.00546 0.01416 
Pan American Development Foundation 5 2 0.00457 0.00574 
Pan-American Health Organization (World 
Health Organization) 
1 0 0.00182 0.00595 
Pastoral Social 0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
Plan International 5 0 0.00386 0.01470 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0 37 0.02124 0.41447 
Pro Familia Switzerland 0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
Queen Silvia Foundation 0 1 0.00617 0.00023 
Red Crescent Society of the United Arab 
Emirates 
2 0 0.00801 0.00040 
RET International (Former The Foundation 
for the Refugee Education Trust till 2014) 
2 0 0.00276 0.00648 
Save the Children 14 0 0.01017 0.04989 
Servico Pastoral dos Migrantes 1 0 0.00188 0.00166 
Solidarity Response Fund 0 1 0.00173 0.01518 
Spain, Government of 0 4 0.00569 0.01827 
Spanish Red Cross 0 2 0.00314 0.00105 
Start Fund 0 1 0.00201 0.00104 
Stichting Vluchteling 0 8 0.00527 0.01929 
Stichting War Child 4 2 0.01169 0.00083 
Sweden, Government of 0 36 0.02358 0.28600 
Swedish Red Cross 2 0 0.00232 0.01033 










TEARFUND 1 0 0.00801 0.00019 
Terre des Hommes International 5 0 0.00553 0.00550 
Trinidad and Tobago, Government of 0 1 0.00168 0.00857 
UN Programme on HIV/AIDS 0 5 0.00369 0.08514 
UN Women 9 0 0.00828 0.02585 
Undesignated 6 54 0.03891 0.22413 
UNICEF Brazil 0 9 0.00599 0.13658 
UNICEF National Committee/Canada 0 1 0.00173 0.01518 
UNICEF National Committee/Chile 0 1 0.00173 0.01518 
UNICEF National Committee/Denmark 0 1 0.00173 0.01518 
UNICEF National Committee/Ireland 0 1 0.00173 0.01518 
UNICEF National Committee/Japan 0 4 0.00333 0.06070 
UNICEF National Committee/Spain 0 1 0.00173 0.01518 
UNICEF National Committee/Uruguay 0 2 0.00227 0.03035 
United Arab Emirates, Government of 0 2 0.00801 0.00040 
United Kingdom, Government of 0 1 0.00182 0.00120 
United Nations 0 1 0.00178 0.00166 
United Nations Children's Fund 106 21 0.05882 0.87178 
United Nations Development Programme 0 1 0.00168 0.00857 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
123 15 0.08031 0.97852 
United Nations Humanitarian Response 
Depot 
0 0 0.00120 0.00000 
United Nations Population Fund 12 6 0.00524 0.07271 
US Fund for UNICEF 0 10 0.00652 0.15176 
WHAM Foundation 0 1 0.00617 0.00023 
World Bank 0 1 0.00173 0.01518 
World Food Programme 11 4 0.01020 0.08090 
World Health Organization 7 0 0.00502 0.03763 
World Vision Canada 0 4 0.00443 0.00415 
World Vision International 17 1 0.01520 0.04036 
World Vision Ireland 1 0 0.00258 0.00080 
World Vision Korea 0 1 0.00201 0.00104 
World Vision USA 0 3 0.00362 0.00312 
ZOA 3 0 0.00421 0.01464 








Figure A.1. Venezuelan refugee situation Gephi network visualization, with U.S. involvement included.  
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Figure A.2. Venezuelan refugee situation Gephi network visualization, with U.S. involvement excluded.  
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ACT Alliance / DanChurchAid 1 0 0.00061 0.00042 
ACT Alliance / Finn Church Aid 15 0 0.00163 0.01085 
ACT Alliance / Lutheran World Federation 18 0 0.00193 0.02155 
Action Contre la Faim 37 2 0.00306 0.02291 
ActionAid International 4 0 0.00099 0.00199 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency 9 0 0.00123 0.00968 
Agency for Technical Cooperation and 
Development 
38 0 0.00374 0.03186 
Al Hussein Society Jordan Center for 
Training and Inclusion (AHS) 
1 0 0.00065 0.00011 
AMEL - Lebanese Association for Popular 
Action 
16 0 0.00165 0.01361 
American Friends of UNRWA 0 2 0.00067 0.00206 
American Near East Refugee Aid 19 0 0.00215 0.02928 
Americares 0 2 0.00074 0.00028 
Ana Aqra Association 4 0 0.00080 0.00439 
Andorra, Government of 0 1 0.00061 0.00272 
Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations 
Development Organizations 
0 2 0.00072 0.00024 
Arche Nova E.V. - Initiative for People in 
Need 
1 0 0.00061 0.00165 
ARCS ARCI Cultura e Sviluppo 2 0 0.00072 0.00176 
Argentina, Government of 0 1 0.00061 0.00282 
Association for Aid and Relief Japan 1 0 0.00061 0.00124 
Association for the Advancement of 
Democratic Rights-Legal Aid 
1 0 0.00063 0.00039 
Association pour la Cooperation Technique 
et au Developpement 
5 0 0.00090 0.00346 
Associazione Volontari per il Servizio 
Internazionale 
18 1 0.00173 0.01209 
Australia, Government of 0 114 0.00897 0.16166 
Austria, Government of 0 20 0.00293 0.03214 
Bahrain, Government of 0 1 0.00061 0.00272 
Belgium, Government of 0 41 0.00368 0.05306 
Big Heart Foundation 0 1 0.00061 0.00272 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 0 2 0.00067 0.00564 










Bulgaria, Government of 0 1 0.00060 0.00246 
Canada, Government of 0 288 0.01995 0.43463 
CARE Austria 1 0 0.00067 0.00012 
CARE International 86 0 0.00645 0.08941 
CARITAS 66 0 0.00750 0.03865 
Caritas Austria 1 0 0.00067 0.00012 
Caritas Lebanon Migrants Center 13 0 0.00144 0.01496 
Caritas Switzerland 2 8 0.00154 0.00135 
Catholic Relief Services 12 1 0.00137 0.01811 
Center for Victims of Torture 7 0 0.00159 0.01149 
Central Emergency Response Fund 0 90 0.00645 0.15769 
Chaine du Bonheur 0 2 0.00071 0.00029 
Chile, Government of 0 1 0.00061 0.00272 
China, Government of 0 11 0.00124 0.01281 
COFRA 0 3 0.00081 0.00029 
Comitato di Coordinamento delle 
Organizzazione per il Servizio Volontario 
1 0 0.00061 0.00048 
Comitato Internationale per lo Sviluppo dei 
Popoli 
2 0 0.00070 0.00063 
Concern Worldwide 14 0 0.00156 0.01199 
Cooperazione Internazionale - COOPI 2 0 0.00068 0.00100 
Cyprus, Government of 0 6 0.00092 0.01395 
Czech Republic, Government of 0 18 0.00235 0.02810 
Danish Refugee Council 122 0 0.00849 0.10694 
Denmark, Government of 0 136 0.01015 0.13886 
Deutsche Gesellschaft for Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 
0 2 0.00067 0.00080 
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. (German 
Agro Action) 
2 0 0.00067 0.00330 
Disasters Emergency Committee (UK) 0 12 0.00163 0.00193 
Dorcas Aid International 1 0 0.00061 0.00051 
Ecuador, Government of 0 1 0.00061 0.00032 
Education Above All Foundation 0 8 0.00183 0.00288 
Estonia, Government of 0 39 0.00308 0.09829 
EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the 
Syrian Crisis (Madad Fund) 
0 1 0.00062 0.00019 
European Commission 0 182 0.01454 0.17189 
European Commission - EU Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey 










European Commission Directorate General 
for Development 
0 2 0.00067 0.00324 
European Commission Directorate-General 
External Relations 
0 1 0.00061 0.00272 
European Commission EuropeAid 
Development and Cooperation 
0 22 0.00218 0.04007 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid 
and Civil Protection Department 
0 294 0.02113 0.28836 
Evangelisches Werk for Diakonie und 
Entwicklung e.V. 
1 0 0.00063 0.00019 
Finland, Government of 0 59 0.00462 0.10872 
Food & Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations 
35 7 0.00286 0.02521 
Ford Foundation 0 4 0.00086 0.00085 
France, Government of 0 180 0.01324 0.28606 
Friends of UNFPA 0 1 0.00061 0.00051 
Fundacion Alianza por Los Derechos, la 
Igualdad y  la Solidaridad Internacional 
4 0 0.00084 0.00273 
Fundacion Promocion Social de la Cultura 11 0 0.00141 0.00718 
Germany, Government of 0 324 0.02504 0.60302 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 
0 14 0.00142 0.00958 
Greece, Government of 0 3 0.00074 0.00825 
Gruppo Volontariato Civile 14 0 0.00151 0.01054 
Handicap International / Humanity & 
Inclusion 
73 0 0.00536 0.07556 
Heartland Alliance International 2 0 0.00067 0.00230 
HelpAge International 2 0 0.00067 0.00330 
HelpAge International UK 1 0 0.00065 0.00011 
Hilfswerk Austria International 1 0 0.00062 0.00150 
Hilti Foundation 0 2 0.00074 0.00028 
Himaya Daee Aataa Association 2 0 0.00069 0.00300 
Holy See, Government of 0 3 0.00074 0.00815 
Humedica 3 0 0.00076 0.00369 
Hungary, Government of 0 8 0.00108 0.01378 
Iceland, Government of 0 14 0.00154 0.02119 
IKEA Foundation 0 4 0.00080 0.00377 
India, Government of 0 2 0.00074 0.00022 
Intel 0 1 0.00061 0.00103 
International Catholic Migration 
Commission 
19 0 0.00189 0.02677 










International Medical Corps 63 0 0.00473 0.08564 
International Organization for Migration 171 0 0.01255 0.24417 
International Orthodox Christian Charities 24 0 0.00251 0.02811 
International Relief and Development 7 0 0.00099 0.01654 
International Rescue Committee 86 0 0.00638 0.08844 
International Volunteer Center of 
Yamagata 
2 0 0.00068 0.00247 
INTERSOS Humanitarian Aid 
Organization 
23 2 0.00230 0.00899 
Iraq Humanitarian Fund 0 6 0.00112 0.00416 
Iraq, Government of 0 1 0.00061 0.00272 
Ireland, Government of 0 66 0.00547 0.10627 
Islamic Relief Jordan 1 0 0.00061 0.00040 
Islamic Relief Worldwide 41 0 0.00391 0.05272 
Isle of Man 0 2 0.00067 0.00543 
Italy, Government of 0 118 0.00979 0.16532 
Japan Campaign for Children of Palestine 5 0 0.00088 0.00619 
Japan Emergency NGO 10 0 0.00127 0.01257 
Japan, Government of 0 298 0.02389 0.44252 
Jordan Health Aid Society 7 0 0.00113 0.00745 
Jordan Humanitarian Fund 15 78 0.01217 0.02231 
Jordan paramedic society 6 0 0.00117 0.00204 
JORDAN RIVER FOUNDATION 2 0 0.00077 0.00022 
Jordan Women Union-Un Ponte Per 1 0 0.00065 0.00011 
Jordan, Government of 0 1 0.00061 0.00032 
KAFA Enough Violence and Exploitation 2 0 0.00068 0.00072 
KFW Development 0 12 0.00136 0.00307 
Kokkyo naki Kodomotachi (Children 
without Borders) 
6 0 0.00097 0.00821 
Korea, Republic of, Government of 0 47 0.00356 0.10801 
Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of 
Science 
0 1 0.00061 0.00282 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic 
Development 
0 2 0.00067 0.00305 
Kuwait Red Crescent Society 0 1 0.00060 0.00246 
Kuwait, Government of 0 141 0.00967 0.27364 
Latvia, Government of 0 4 0.00080 0.01061 
Leb Relief 3 0 0.00074 0.00364 
Lebanese Association for Development Al 
Majmoua 










Lebanese Society for Educational and 
Social Development 
2 0 0.00071 0.00132 
Lebanon Humanitarian Fund 45 20 0.00675 0.02718 
Leopold Bachmann Foundation 0 4 0.00093 0.00057 
Les Amis du Liban 0 0 0.00054 0.00000 
Liechtenstein, Government of 0 1 0.00061 0.00272 
Lithuania, Government of 0 5 0.00086 0.01307 
Luxembourg, Government of 0 39 0.00318 0.06718 
Madrasati Initiative 2 0 0.00074 0.00050 
Makassed Philanthropic Islamic 
Association of Beirut 
5 0 0.00093 0.00517 
Malta, Government of 0 10 0.00119 0.02665 
MEDAIR 52 0 0.00508 0.04050 
Medecins du Monde 11 0 0.00125 0.01240 
Medical Aid for Palestinians 3 0 0.00080 0.00228 
Medical Teams International 3 0 0.00075 0.00480 
Mercy Corps 66 1 0.00520 0.07728 
Mercy Without Limits 1 0 0.00062 0.00150 
Mexico, Government of 0 7 0.00097 0.01782 
Middle East Children‚Äôs Institute 2 0 0.00069 0.00300 
Mines Advisory Group 6 0 0.00096 0.00727 
Monaco, Government of 0 10 0.00119 0.02017 
Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la 
Libertad 
7 0 0.00106 0.00396 
Muslim Aid 1 0 0.00063 0.00039 
National Commission for Lebanese Women 0 1 0.00061 0.00051 
Netherlands, Government of 0 105 0.00831 0.17711 
New Zealand, Government of 0 11 0.00178 0.02307 
NGOs (details not yet provided) 0 0 0.00054 0.00000 
Nippon International Cooperation for 
Community Development 
7 0 0.00103 0.00918 
Norway, Government of 0 254 0.01824 0.41309 
Norwegian Refugee Council 179 1 0.01340 0.17740 
Oak Foundation 0 1 0.00061 0.00035 
Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
11 1 0.00137 0.01505 
OPEC Fund for International Development 0 2 0.00069 0.00050 
Operation Mercy 1 0 0.00063 0.00039 










OXFAM GB 24 0 0.00266 0.01399 
Partners Turkey 46 0 0.00356 0.05674 
Pathfinder International 1 0 0.00060 0.00269 
PCPM - Polish Center for International Aid 8 0 0.00135 0.00354 
Peace Winds Japan 4 0 0.00082 0.00521 
People in Need 2 0 0.00080 0.00018 
Philippines, Government of 0 2 0.00067 0.00543 
Plan International 12 0 0.00136 0.00651 
Poland, Government of 0 17 0.00220 0.02253 
Portugal, Government of 0 4 0.00080 0.01071 
Premiere Urgence - Aide Medicale 
Internationale (from 2011 to 2015) 
28 0 0.00234 0.03388 
Premiere Urgence Internationale 10 0 0.00123 0.00970 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0 491 0.04323 0.52517 
Qatar Charity 0 2 0.00070 0.00311 
Qatar Red Crescent Society 21 1 0.00231 0.01008 
Qatar, Government of 0 30 0.00288 0.03593 
Questscope 3 0 0.00080 0.00319 
REACH Initiative 1 0 0.00061 0.00165 
Relief International 21 1 0.00196 0.03087 
Restart Center for Rehabilitation of Victims 
of Violence and Torture 
4 0 0.00082 0.00285 
RET International (Former The 
Foundation for the Refugee Education 
Trust till 2014) 
1 0 0.00060 0.00269 
Right to Play 1 0 0.00060 0.00115 
Romania, Government of 0 4 0.00079 0.01035 
Royal Health Awareness Society 1 0 0.00065 0.00011 
Rural Initiatives in Sustainability and 
Empowerment 
0 1 0.00063 0.00012 
Russian Federation, Government of 0 11 0.00125 0.02921 
Samsung Group 0 1 0.00061 0.00051 
Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government of 0 32 0.00283 0.06496 
Save the Children 117 0 0.00892 0.11615 
Search for Common Ground 4 0 0.00082 0.00469 
Secours Islamique France 6 0 0.00094 0.00620 
Slovakia, Government of 0 8 0.00132 0.01650 
Slovenia, Government of 0 3 0.00073 0.00789 
Social Humanitarian Economical 
Intervention for Local Development 










Solidar Suisse 1 0 0.00062 0.00150 
Solidarites International 16 0 0.00157 0.01293 
Solidarity Response Fund 0 2 0.00067 0.00564 
Sonbola Group for Education and 
Development 
1 0 0.00074 0.00004 
Spain, Government of 0 78 0.00672 0.14095 
Sweden, Government of 0 133 0.01041 0.13112 
Swiss Solidarity 0 3 0.00082 0.00043 
Switzerland, Government of 0 143 0.01071 0.19014 
Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund 22 0 0.00198 0.01668 
Taghyeer 1 0 0.00063 0.00039 
Taiwan International Cooperation and 
Development Fund 
0 4 0.00083 0.00077 
TEAR Fund New Zealand 1 0 0.00068 0.00009 
Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) 2 0 0.00067 0.00330 
Terre des Hommes - Italy 26 0 0.00235 0.01593 
Terre des Hommes - Lausanne 3 0 0.00080 0.00311 
Terre des Hommes International 10 0 0.00130 0.00752 
The Asfari Foundation 0 1 0.00061 0.00103 
Triangle Generation Humanitaire 4 0 0.00082 0.00431 
Turkey, Government of 0 4 0.00078 0.00983 
UN Action Against Sexual Violence in 
Conflict 
0 1 0.00061 0.00272 
UN Agencies 2 0 0.00068 0.00315 
UN Foundation 0 1 0.00063 0.00011 
UN Human Security Trust Fund 0 1 0.00061 0.00282 
Un Ponte Per 9 0 0.00152 0.00317 
UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Technical 
Cooperation 
0 1 0.00074 0.00006 
UN Women 21 6 0.00241 0.01943 
Undesignated 19 124 0.01467 0.12691 
UNICEF National Committee/Andorra 0 2 0.00067 0.00564 
UNICEF National Committee/Australia 0 10 0.00120 0.02818 
UNICEF National Committee/Austria 0 7 0.00100 0.01972 
UNICEF National Committee/Belgium 0 2 0.00067 0.00564 
UNICEF National Committee/Canada 0 8 0.00107 0.02254 
UNICEF National Committee/Denmark 0 17 0.00166 0.04790 
UNICEF National Committee/Finland 0 1 0.00061 0.00282 










UNICEF National Committee/Germany 0 54 0.00408 0.15215 
UNICEF National Committee/Hong Kong 0 2 0.00067 0.00564 
UNICEF National Committee/Iceland 0 5 0.00087 0.01409 
UNICEF National Committee/Indonesia 0 1 0.00061 0.00282 
UNICEF National Committee/Israel 0 1 0.00061 0.00282 
UNICEF National Committee/Italy 0 14 0.00146 0.03945 
UNICEF National Committee/Japan 0 19 0.00179 0.05354 
UNICEF National Committee/Korea 
(Republic of) 
0 8 0.00107 0.02254 
UNICEF National Committee/Luxembourg 0 3 0.00074 0.00845 
UNICEF National Committee/Netherlands 0 30 0.00251 0.08453 
UNICEF National Committee/New Zealand 0 8 0.00107 0.02254 
UNICEF National Committee/Norway 0 17 0.00166 0.04790 
UNICEF National Committee/Portugal 0 2 0.00067 0.00564 
UNICEF National Committee/Spain 0 16 0.00159 0.04508 
UNICEF National Committee/Sweden 0 18 0.00172 0.05072 
UNICEF National Committee/Switzerland 0 3 0.00074 0.00845 
UNICEF National Committee/Turkey 0 4 0.00081 0.01127 
UNICEF National Committee/United 
Kingdom 
0 26 0.00224 0.07326 
Union of Relief and Development 
Association 
1 0 0.00062 0.00150 
United Arab Emirates, Government of 0 25 0.00213 0.05644 
United Kingdom, Government of 0 303 0.02059 0.38436 
United Nations Children's Fund 1110 41 0.08592 1.00000 
United Nations Development Programme 105 5 0.00853 0.10653 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization 
21 3 0.00229 0.00848 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
971 13 0.07523 0.97269 
United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme (UN-HABITAT) 
11 0 0.00127 0.00825 
United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization 
2 0 0.00068 0.00247 
United Nations Joint Programme on 
HIV/AIDS 
0 2 0.00067 0.00543 
United Nations Office for Project Services 9 0 0.00116 0.01114 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2 0 0.00068 0.00175 
United Nations Population Fund 133 18 0.00974 0.17908 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 










United States of America, Government of 0 625 0.04419 0.97805 
Uruguay, Government of 0 1 0.00061 0.00069 
US Fund for UNICEF 0 70 0.00512 0.19724 
Vento di Terra 2 0 0.00069 0.00198 
War Child Canada 3 0 0.00075 0.00569 
War Child Holland 6 0 0.00096 0.00460 
War Child UK 6 0 0.00097 0.00916 
World Bank 0 1 0.00061 0.00052 
World Food Programme 783 17 0.05495 0.89122 
World Health Organization 73 0 0.00546 0.07599 
World Rehabilitation Fund 1 0 0.00063 0.00011 
World Relief 4 0 0.00082 0.00469 
World Relief Deutschland e.V. 4 0 0.00086 0.00296 














ACT Alliance / DanChurchAid 1 0 0.00062 0.00061 
ACT Alliance / Finn Church Aid 15 0 0.00175 0.01558 
ACT Alliance / Lutheran World Federation 18 0 0.00208 0.03102 
Action Contre la Faim 37 2 0.00333 0.03262 
ActionAid International 4 0 0.00103 0.00286 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency 9 0 0.00131 0.01368 
Agency for Technical Cooperation and 
Development 
36 0 0.00391 0.03784 
Al Hussein Society Jordan Center for Training 
and Inclusion (AHS) 
1 0 0.00067 0.00016 
AMEL - Lebanese Association for Popular 
Action 
16 0 0.00177 0.01959 
American Friends of UNRWA 0 2 0.00069 0.00225 
American Near East Refugee Aid 16 0 0.00211 0.03056 
Americares 0 2 0.00076 0.00038 
Ana Aqra Association 3 0 0.00077 0.00243 
Andorra, Government of 0 1 0.00062 0.00310 
Arab Gulf Programme for United Nations 
Development Organizations 
0 2 0.00074 0.00037 
Arche Nova E.V. - Initiative for People in 
Need 
1 0 0.00062 0.00239 
ARCS ARCI Cultura e Sviluppo 2 0 0.00074 0.00254 
Argentina, Government of 0 1 0.00062 0.00340 
Association for Aid and Relief Japan 1 0 0.00062 0.00173 
Association for the Advancement of 
Democratic Rights-Legal Aid 
1 0 0.00065 0.00056 
Association pour la Cooperation Technique et 
au Developpement 
5 0 0.00094 0.00494 
Associazione Volontari per il Servizio 
Internazionale 
18 1 0.00186 0.01717 
Australia, Government of 0 114 0.01002 0.19383 
Austria, Government of 0 20 0.00314 0.03730 
Bahrain, Government of 0 1 0.00062 0.00310 
Belgium, Government of 0 41 0.00401 0.06229 
Big Heart Foundation 0 1 0.00062 0.00310 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 0 2 0.00069 0.00680 
Brazil, Government of 0 2 0.00070 0.00621 











Canada, Government of 0 288 0.02227 0.51948 
CARE Austria 1 0 0.00068 0.00016 
CARE International 80 0 0.00667 0.10507 
CARITAS 63 0 0.00781 0.04380 
Caritas Austria 1 0 0.00068 0.00016 
Caritas Lebanon Migrants Center 11 0 0.00141 0.01374 
Caritas Switzerland 2 8 0.00163 0.00182 
Catholic Relief Services 8 1 0.00120 0.01053 
Center for Victims of Torture 4 0 0.00156 0.00492 
Central Emergency Response Fund 0 90 0.00724 0.18357 
Chaine du Bonheur 0 2 0.00073 0.00046 
Chile, Government of 0 1 0.00062 0.00310 
China, Government of 0 11 0.00134 0.01481 
COFRA 0 3 0.00084 0.00044 
Comitato di Coordinamento delle 
Organizzazione per il Servizio Volontario 
1 0 0.00063 0.00068 
Comitato Internationale per lo Sviluppo dei 
Popoli 
2 0 0.00072 0.00088 
Concern Worldwide 14 0 0.00166 0.01717 
Cooperazione Internazionale - COOPI 2 0 0.00070 0.00139 
Cyprus, Government of 0 6 0.00098 0.01659 
Czech Republic, Government of 0 18 0.00250 0.03257 
Danish Refugee Council 113 0 0.00875 0.11881 
Denmark, Government of 0 136 0.01121 0.17025 
Deutsche Gesellschaft for Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit 
0 2 0.00069 0.00107 
Deutsche Welthungerhilfe e.V. (German Agro 
Action) 
2 0 0.00069 0.00478 
Disasters Emergency Committee (UK) 0 12 0.00172 0.00287 
Dorcas Aid International 1 0 0.00062 0.00072 
Ecuador, Government of 0 1 0.00063 0.00038 
Education Above All Foundation 0 8 0.00191 0.00365 
Estonia, Government of 0 39 0.00343 0.11761 
EU Regional Trust Fund in Response to the 
Syrian Crisis (Madad Fund) 
0 1 0.00064 0.00029 
European Commission 0 182 0.01626 0.20012 
European Commission - EU Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey 











European Commission Directorate General for 
Development 
0 2 0.00069 0.00383 
European Commission Directorate-General 
External Relations 
0 1 0.00062 0.00310 
European Commission EuropeAid 
Development and Cooperation 
0 22 0.00235 0.04769 
European Commission's Humanitarian Aid 
and Civil Protection Department 
0 294 0.02354 0.34094 
Evangelisches Werk for Diakonie und 
Entwicklung e.V. 
1 0 0.00064 0.00026 
Finland, Government of 0 59 0.00507 0.13072 
Food & Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations 
33 7 0.00299 0.02768 
Ford Foundation 0 4 0.00093 0.00082 
France, Government of 0 180 0.01467 0.34780 
Friends of UNFPA 0 1 0.00063 0.00043 
Fundacion Alianza por Los Derechos, la 
Igualdad y  la Solidaridad Internacional 
4 0 0.00087 0.00386 
Fundacion Promocion Social de la Cultura 11 0 0.00149 0.01021 
Germany, Government of 0 324 0.02756 0.73105 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria 
0 14 0.00158 0.00740 
Greece, Government of 0 3 0.00077 0.00961 
Gruppo Volontariato Civile 14 0 0.00163 0.01498 
Handicap International / Humanity & 
Inclusion 
68 0 0.00555 0.08906 
Heartland Alliance International 2 0 0.00068 0.00329 
HelpAge International 2 0 0.00069 0.00478 
HelpAge International UK 1 0 0.00067 0.00016 
Hilfswerk Austria International 1 0 0.00063 0.00216 
Hilti Foundation 0 2 0.00076 0.00038 
Himaya Daee Aataa Association 2 0 0.00071 0.00432 
Holy See, Government of 0 3 0.00077 0.00931 
Humedica 3 0 0.00079 0.00534 
Hungary, Government of 0 8 0.00115 0.01591 
Iceland, Government of 0 14 0.00165 0.02503 
IKEA Foundation 0 4 0.00084 0.00455 
India, Government of 0 2 0.00076 0.00033 
Intel 0 1 0.00062 0.00113 











International Labour Organization 72 6 0.00626 0.06333 
International Medical Corps 49 0 0.00427 0.06882 
International Organization for Migration 121 0 0.01047 0.14903 
International Orthodox Christian Charities 21 0 0.00250 0.02887 
International Relief and Development 1 0 0.00065 0.00056 
International Rescue Committee 77 0 0.00641 0.09220 
International Volunteer Center of Yamagata 2 0 0.00070 0.00346 
INTERSOS Humanitarian Aid Organization 23 2 0.00246 0.01272 
Iraq Humanitarian Fund 0 6 0.00117 0.00483 
Iraq, Government of 0 1 0.00062 0.00310 
Ireland, Government of 0 66 0.00596 0.12848 
Islamic Relief Jordan 1 0 0.00062 0.00057 
Islamic Relief Worldwide 41 0 0.00424 0.07600 
Isle of Man 0 2 0.00070 0.00621 
Italy, Government of 0 118 0.01073 0.19507 
Japan Campaign for Children of Palestine 5 0 0.00092 0.00866 
Japan Emergency NGO 10 0 0.00136 0.01786 
Japan, Government of 0 298 0.02634 0.51558 
Jordan Health Aid Society 7 0 0.00120 0.01068 
Jordan Humanitarian Fund 15 78 0.01313 0.02926 
Jordan paramedic society 6 0 0.00123 0.00294 
JORDAN RIVER FOUNDATION 2 0 0.00079 0.00031 
Jordan Women Union-Un Ponte Per 1 0 0.00067 0.00016 
Jordan, Government of 0 1 0.00063 0.00038 
KAFA Enough Violence and Exploitation 2 0 0.00070 0.00103 
KFW Development 0 12 0.00149 0.00303 
Kokkyo naki Kodomotachi (Children without 
Borders) 
6 0 0.00102 0.01168 
Korea, Republic of, Government of 0 47 0.00394 0.12911 
Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of 
Science 
0 1 0.00062 0.00340 
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development 0 2 0.00069 0.00366 
Kuwait Red Crescent Society 0 1 0.00062 0.00308 
Kuwait, Government of 0 141 0.01084 0.32045 
Latvia, Government of 0 4 0.00084 0.01239 
Leb Relief 2 0 0.00070 0.00135 
Lebanese Association for Development Al 
Majmoua 











Lebanese Society for Educational and Social 
Development 
2 0 0.00073 0.00188 
Lebanon Humanitarian Fund 45 20 0.00723 0.03735 
Leopold Bachmann Foundation 0 4 0.00097 0.00075 
Les Amis du Liban 0 0 0.00055 0.00000 
Liechtenstein, Government of 0 1 0.00062 0.00310 
Lithuania, Government of 0 5 0.00090 0.01547 
Luxembourg, Government of 0 39 0.00350 0.08030 
Madrasati Initiative 2 0 0.00077 0.00072 
Makassed Philanthropic Islamic Association 
of Beirut 
4 0 0.00092 0.00356 
Malta, Government of 0 10 0.00127 0.03100 
MEDAIR 52 0 0.00550 0.05793 
Medecins du Monde 10 0 0.00127 0.01399 
Medical Aid for Palestinians 3 0 0.00083 0.00328 
Medical Teams International 3 0 0.00078 0.00694 
Mercy Corps 57 1 0.00510 0.07600 
Mercy Without Limits 1 0 0.00063 0.00216 
Mexico, Government of 0 7 0.00103 0.02191 
Middle East Children‚Äôs Institute 2 0 0.00071 0.00432 
Mines Advisory Group 6 0 0.00101 0.01044 
Monaco, Government of 0 10 0.00128 0.02356 
Movimiento por la Paz, el Desarme y la 
Libertad 
7 0 0.00111 0.00557 
Muslim Aid 1 0 0.00065 0.00056 
National Commission for Lebanese Women 0 1 0.00063 0.00043 
Netherlands, Government of 0 105 0.00921 0.20965 
New Zealand, Government of 0 11 0.00187 0.02801 
NGOs (details not yet provided) 0 0 0.00055 0.00000 
Nippon International Cooperation for 
Community Development 
7 0 0.00109 0.01298 
Norway, Government of 0 254 0.02029 0.49385 
Norwegian Refugee Council 167 1 0.01388 0.20784 
Oak Foundation 0 1 0.00062 0.00048 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs 
7 1 0.00119 0.00602 
OPEC Fund for International Development 0 2 0.00072 0.00066 
Operation Mercy 1 0 0.00065 0.00056 











OXFAM GB 24 0 0.00283 0.02005 
Partners Turkey 40 0 0.00349 0.05805 
Pathfinder International 0 0 0.00055 0.00000 
PCPM - Polish Center for International Aid 8 0 0.00141 0.00505 
Peace Winds Japan 4 0 0.00086 0.00736 
People in Need 2 0 0.00082 0.00024 
Philippines, Government of 0 2 0.00070 0.00621 
Plan International 12 0 0.00145 0.00928 
Poland, Government of 0 17 0.00233 0.02623 
Portugal, Government of 0 4 0.00084 0.01269 
Premiere Urgence - Aide Medicale 
Internationale (from 2011 to 2015) 
22 0 0.00215 0.02532 
Premiere Urgence Internationale 9 0 0.00124 0.01004 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0 491 0.04784 0.63377 
Qatar Charity 0 2 0.00072 0.00367 
Qatar Red Crescent Society 21 1 0.00247 0.01400 
Qatar, Government of 0 30 0.00310 0.04195 
Questscope 2 0 0.00077 0.00072 
REACH Initiative 1 0 0.00062 0.00239 
Relief International 12 1 0.00152 0.00943 
Restart Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of 
Violence and Torture 
4 0 0.00086 0.00408 
RET International (Former The Foundation 
for the Refugee Education Trust till 2014) 
0 0 0.00055 0.00000 
Right to Play 1 0 0.00062 0.00164 
Romania, Government of 0 4 0.00083 0.01237 
Royal Health Awareness Society 1 0 0.00067 0.00016 
Rural Initiatives in Sustainability and 
Empowerment 
0 1 0.00064 0.00016 
Russian Federation, Government of 0 11 0.00134 0.03437 
Samsung Group 0 1 0.00063 0.00043 
Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government of 0 32 0.00316 0.07665 
Save the Children 109 0 0.00924 0.13567 
Search for Common Ground 3 0 0.00079 0.00286 
Secours Islamique France 6 0 0.00099 0.00895 
Slovakia, Government of 0 8 0.00140 0.01914 
Slovenia, Government of 0 3 0.00076 0.00929 
Social Humanitarian Economical Intervention 
for Local Development 











Solidar Suisse 1 0 0.00063 0.00216 
Solidarites International 16 0 0.00169 0.01839 
Solidarity Response Fund 0 2 0.00069 0.00680 
Sonbola Group for Education and 
Development 
1 0 0.00075 0.00005 
Spain, Government of 0 78 0.00733 0.16303 
Sweden, Government of 0 133 0.01145 0.15950 
Swiss Solidarity 0 3 0.00085 0.00061 
Switzerland, Government of 0 143 0.01190 0.22683 
Syria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund 22 0 0.00214 0.02390 
Taghyeer 1 0 0.00065 0.00056 
Taiwan International Cooperation and 
Development Fund 
0 4 0.00087 0.00102 
TEAR Fund New Zealand 1 0 0.00069 0.00013 
Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) 2 0 0.00069 0.00478 
Terre des Hommes - Italy 26 0 0.00255 0.02256 
Terre des Hommes - Lausanne 3 0 0.00083 0.00448 
Terre des Hommes International 10 0 0.00139 0.01077 
The Asfari Foundation 0 1 0.00062 0.00113 
Triangle Generation Humanitaire 4 0 0.00086 0.00619 
Turkey, Government of 0 4 0.00082 0.01232 
UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict 0 1 0.00062 0.00310 
UN Agencies 2 0 0.00070 0.00455 
UN Foundation 0 1 0.00064 0.00017 
UN Human Security Trust Fund 0 1 0.00062 0.00340 
Un Ponte Per 9 0 0.00160 0.00453 
UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Technical 
Cooperation 
0 1 0.00088 0.00005 
UN Women 21 6 0.00262 0.02681 
Undesignated 18 124 0.01657 0.15503 
UNICEF National Committee/Andorra 0 2 0.00069 0.00680 
UNICEF National Committee/Australia 0 10 0.00128 0.03399 
UNICEF National Committee/Austria 0 7 0.00106 0.02379 
UNICEF National Committee/Belgium 0 2 0.00069 0.00680 
UNICEF National Committee/Canada 0 8 0.00113 0.02719 
UNICEF National Committee/Denmark 0 17 0.00179 0.05778 
UNICEF National Committee/Finland 0 1 0.00062 0.00340 











UNICEF National Committee/Germany 0 54 0.00449 0.18355 
UNICEF National Committee/Hong Kong 0 2 0.00069 0.00680 
UNICEF National Committee/Iceland 0 5 0.00091 0.01700 
UNICEF National Committee/Indonesia 0 1 0.00062 0.00340 
UNICEF National Committee/Israel 0 1 0.00062 0.00340 
UNICEF National Committee/Italy 0 14 0.00157 0.04759 
UNICEF National Committee/Japan 0 19 0.00194 0.06458 
UNICEF National Committee/Korea (Republic 
of) 
0 8 0.00113 0.02719 
UNICEF National Committee/Luxembourg 0 3 0.00077 0.01020 
UNICEF National Committee/Netherlands 0 30 0.00274 0.10197 
UNICEF National Committee/New Zealand 0 8 0.00113 0.02719 
UNICEF National Committee/Norway 0 17 0.00179 0.05778 
UNICEF National Committee/Portugal 0 2 0.00069 0.00680 
UNICEF National Committee/Spain 0 16 0.00172 0.05439 
UNICEF National Committee/Sweden 0 18 0.00186 0.06118 
UNICEF National Committee/Switzerland 0 3 0.00077 0.01020 
UNICEF National Committee/Turkey 0 4 0.00084 0.01360 
UNICEF National Committee/United 
Kingdom 
0 26 0.00245 0.08838 
Union of Relief and Development Association 1 0 0.00063 0.00216 
United Arab Emirates, Government of 0 25 0.00233 0.06670 
United Kingdom, Government of 0 303 0.02311 0.46600 
United Nations Children's Fund 1004 41 0.08675 1.00000 
United Nations Development Programme 93 5 0.00850 0.10332 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization 
21 3 0.00245 0.01158 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
851 13 0.07423 0.91820 
United Nations Human Settlements 
Programme (UN-HABITAT) 
11 0 0.00136 0.01169 
United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization 
2 0 0.00070 0.00346 
United Nations Joint Programme on 
HIV/AIDS 
0 2 0.00070 0.00621 
United Nations Office for Project Services 9 0 0.00123 0.01559 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2 0 0.00070 0.00245 
United Nations Population Fund 99 18 0.00836 0.11809 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
Palestine Refugees in the Near East 











Uruguay, Government of 0 1 0.00062 0.00053 
US Fund for UNICEF 0 70 0.00566 0.23793 
Vento di Terra 2 0 0.00071 0.00284 
War Child Canada 2 0 0.00071 0.00432 
War Child Holland 6 0 0.00102 0.00654 
War Child UK 5 0 0.00096 0.00931 
World Bank 0 1 0.00062 0.00073 
World Food Programme 696 17 0.05471 0.93521 
World Health Organization 63 0 0.00531 0.06961 
World Rehabilitation Fund 1 0 0.00064 0.00017 
World Relief 4 0 0.00086 0.00673 
World Relief Deutschland e.V. 4 0 0.00090 0.00422 









Figure B.1. Syrian refugee situation Gephi network visualization, with U.S. involvement included. 
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Figure B.2. Syrian refugee situation Gephi network visualization, with U.S. involvement excluded.  
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Evangelisches Werk f r Diakonie und Entwicklung e.V.
Finland, Government of




Fundaci n Alian a por Los Derechos, la Igualdad   la Solidaridad Internacional
Fundacion Promocion Social de la Cultura
German , Government of
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
Greece, Government of
Gruppo Volontariato Civile






Hima a Daee Aataa Association
Hol  See, Government of
Humedica





International Catholic Migration Commission
International Labour Organi ation
International Medical Corps
International Organi ation for Migration
International Orthodox Christian Charities
International Relief and Development
International Rescue Committee
International Volunteer Center of Yamagata







Ital , Government of
Japan Campaign for Children of Palestine
Japan Emergenc  NGO
Japan, Government of




Jordan Women Union-Un Ponte Per
Jordan, Government of
KAFA Enough Violence and Exploitation
KFW Development
Kokk o naki Kodomotachi (Children without Borders)
Korea, Republic of, Government of
Kuwait Foundation for the Advancement of Science
Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development




Lebanese Association for Development Al Majmoua
Lebanese Societ  for Educational and Social Development
Lebanon Humanitarian Fund
Leopold Bachmann Foundation





Makassed Philanthropic Islamic Association of Beirut
Malta, Government of
MEDAIR
M decins du Monde
Medical Aid for Palestinians
Medical Teams International
Merc  Corps
Merc  Without Limits
Mexico, Government of
Middle East Children s Institute
Mines Advisor  Group
Monaco, Government of
Movimiento por la Pa , el Desarme  la Libertad
Muslim Aid
National Commission for Lebanese Women
Netherlands, Government of
New Zealand, Government of
NGOs (details not et provided)
Nippon International Cooperation for Communit  Development Norwa , Government of
Norwegian Refugee Council
Oak Foundation
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs













Premi re Urgence - Aide M dicale Internationale (from 2011 to 2015)
Premi re Urgence Internationale
Private (individuals & organi ations)
Qatar Charit





Restart Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence and Torture
RET International (Former The Foundation for the Refugee Education Trust till 2014)
Right to Pla
Romania, Government of
Ro al Health Awareness Societ
Rural Initiatives in Sustainabilit  and Empowerment
Russian Federation, Government of
Samsung Group
Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government of
Save the Children




Social Humanitarian Economical Intervention for Local Development
Solidar Suisse
Solidarit s International
Solidarit  Response Fund




Swit erland, Government of
S ria Cross-border Humanitarian Fund
Tagh eer
Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund
TEAR Fund New Zealand
Technisches Hilfswerk (THW)
Terre des Hommes - Ital
Terre des Hommes - Lausanne
Terre des Hommes International
The Asfari Foundation
Triangle G n ration Humanitaire
Turke , Government of
UN Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict
UN Agencies
UN Foundation
UN Human Securit  Trust Fund
Un Ponte Per












UNICEF National Committee/Hong Kong
UNICEF National Committee/Iceland
UNICEF National Committee/Indonesia UNICEF National Committee/Israel
UNICEF National Committee/Ital
UNICEF National Committee/Japan
UNICEF National Committee/Korea (Republic of)
UNICEF National Committee/Luxembourg
UNICEF National Committee/Netherlands





UNICEF National Committee/Swit erland
UNICEF National Committee/Turke
UNICEF National Committee/United Kingdom
Union of Relief and Development Association
United Arab Emirates, Government of
United Kingdom, Government of
United Nations Children's Fund
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organi ation
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)
United Nations Industrial Development Organi ation
United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS
United Nations Office for Project Services
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
United Nations Population Fund
United Nations Relief and Works Agenc  for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
Urugua , Government of







World Health Organi ation
World Rehabilitation Fund
World Relief















ACT Alliance / Christian Aid 2 0 0.00146 0.00250 
ACT Alliance / DanChurchAid 2 0 0.00160 0.00042 
ACT Alliance / Norwegian Church Aid 1 0 0.00131 0.00026 
Action Against Hunger 14 0 0.00431 0.00851 
Action Contre la Faim 19 0 0.00649 0.01475 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency 1 0 0.00155 0.00010 
Agency for Technical Cooperation and 
Development 
1 0 0.00132 0.00037 
Aktion Deutschland Hilft 0 2 0.00173 0.00045 
Asian Development Bank 0 1 0.00125 0.00216 
Association for Aid and Relief Japan 1 0 0.00126 0.00070 
Australia, Government of 0 66 0.01737 0.09296 
Austria, Government of 0 2 0.00142 0.00824 
Bangladesh Red Crescent Society 1 0 0.00150 0.00009 
Bangladesh, Government of 0 9 0.00299 0.01763 
BBC Media Action 2 0 0.00151 0.00165 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 0 1 0.00149 0.00016 
BRAC 23 0 0.01267 0.02356 
Canada, Government of 0 72 0.02078 0.09380 
CARE Bangladesh 1 0 0.00132 0.00037 
CARE International 22 0 0.00907 0.03911 
CARE Luxembourg 0 1 0.00138 0.00023 
CARE USA 1 0 0.00124 0.00114 
CARITAS 1 0 0.00155 0.00010 
Caritas Bangladesh 3 0 0.00286 0.00021 
CBM International (formerly Christian 
Blind Mission) 
4 0 0.00307 0.00063 
Central Emergency Response Fund 0 56 0.01407 0.09257 
Children on the Edge 0 1 0.00474 0.00005 
COAST Trust 4 0 0.00263 0.00026 
Concern Worldwide 1 0 0.00149 0.00011 
Conrad N. Hilton Foundation 0 1 0.00149 0.00016 
COVID-19 Humanitarian Thematic Fund 0 1 0.00125 0.00216 











Danish Emergency Relief Fund 0 2 0.00173 0.00045 
Danish Refugee Council 8 0 0.00317 0.00293 
Denmark, Government of 0 29 0.00973 0.03133 
Dhaka Ahsania Mission 1 0 0.00171 0.00005 
Disasters Emergency Committee (UK) 0 5 0.00275 0.00069 
Education Above All Foundation 0 6 0.00482 0.00085 
Education Cannot Wait Fund 0 3 0.00165 0.01040 
Estonia, Government of 0 2 0.00142 0.00824 
European Commission 0 22 0.00573 0.06497 
European Commission's Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection Department 
0 77 0.02405 0.06544 
Finland, Government of 0 1 0.00122 0.00412 
Food & Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations 
10 0 0.00327 0.00630 
France, Government of 0 13 0.00581 0.02021 
Friends of UNFPA 0 3 0.00183 0.00054 
Friendship 3 0 0.00236 0.00037 
Friendship Luxembourg 1 0 0.00159 0.00008 
Frontiers Ruwad Association 0 1 0.00132 0.00013 
GAVI Alliance 0 2 0.00148 0.00432 
Germany, Government of 0 33 0.01159 0.06487 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 
0 1 0.00149 0.00016 
Global Partnership for Education 0 1 0.00125 0.00216 
Handicap International / Humanity & 
Inclusion 
8 0 0.00329 0.00405 
HelpAge International UK 3 0 0.00168 0.00375 
Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation 1 0 0.00172 0.00005 
HumaniTerra International 1 0 0.00141 0.00014 
International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies 
1 0 0.00127 0.00052 
International Organization for Migration 152 5 0.03898 0.11854 
International Rescue Committee 5 0 0.00222 0.00393 
Ireland, Government of 0 7 0.00381 0.01297 
Islamic Development Bank 0 6 0.00238 0.01296 
Italy, Government of 0 4 0.00187 0.00875 
Japan Platform 2 3 0.00244 0.00187 
Japan, Government of 0 76 0.02125 0.13308 











Korea, Republic of, Government of 0 17 0.00479 0.03235 
Kuwait Red Crescent Society 2 0 0.00140 0.00897 
Kuwait, Government of 0 7 0.00388 0.00989 
Latter-Day Saint Charities 0 2 0.00165 0.00032 
Luxembourg, Government of 0 9 0.00603 0.00636 
Malteser International Order of Malta 
World Relief 
1 0 0.00132 0.00037 
Mukti Cox's Bazar 3 0 0.01312 0.00014 
Netherlands, Government of 0 7 0.00256 0.01371 
New Zealand, Government of 0 15 0.00924 0.01142 
Norway, Government of 0 27 0.00899 0.04502 
Norwegian Refugee Council 7 4 0.00519 0.00242 
Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
4 0 0.00231 0.00078 
OXFAM 9 0 0.00347 0.00497 
OXFAM GB 3 0 0.00208 0.00090 
Peace Winds Japan 3 0 0.00174 0.00210 
Peace Winds Japan 0 0 0.00103 0.00000 
Plan International 5 0 0.00281 0.00139 
Plan International Bangladesh 2 0 0.00153 0.00110 
Portugal, Government of 0 1 0.00125 0.00216 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0 315 0.06905 1.00000 
Qatar, Government of 0 2 0.00144 0.00608 
Radiohjelpen (Radio Aid Sweden) 0 2 0.00165 0.00032 
Relief International 4 0 0.00203 0.00233 
Russian Federation, Government of 0 2 0.00146 0.00392 
Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government 
of 
0 12 0.00362 0.02096 
Save the Children 55 2 0.01945 0.01604 
Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation 
for Humanitarian Services (RAF) 
0 1 0.00125 0.00216 
Solidaridad Internacional 1 0 0.00124 0.00114 
Solidarites International 10 0 0.00360 0.00476 
Spain, Government of 0 6 0.00249 0.02066 
Street Child Organization 0 1 0.00474 0.00005 
Sweden, Government of 0 30 0.00866 0.03416 
Swiss Solidarity 0 6 0.00493 0.00053 











TEARFUND 1 0 0.00155 0.00010 
Terre des Hommes - Lausanne 9 0 0.00374 0.00338 
Thailand, Government of 0 6 0.00236 0.01081 
Thani Bin Abdullah Bin Thani Al-Thani 
Humanitarian Fund 
0 3 0.00173 0.00840 
Turkey, Government of 0 1 0.00122 0.00412 
UBS 0 1 0.00149 0.00016 
UN Action Against Sexual Violence in 
Conflict 
0 1 0.00124 0.00071 
UN Foundation 0 0 0.00103 0.00000 
UN Women 4 1 0.00220 0.00296 
Undesignated 1 18 0.00625 0.02294 
UNICEF National Committee/Australia 0 12 0.00373 0.02593 
UNICEF National Committee/Austria 0 1 0.00125 0.00216 
UNICEF National Committee/Belgium 0 12 0.00373 0.02593 
UNICEF National Committee/Canada 0 10 0.00328 0.02161 
UNICEF National Committee/Denmark 0 7 0.00261 0.01512 
UNICEF National Committee/France 0 10 0.00328 0.02161 
UNICEF National Committee/Germany 0 19 0.00531 0.04105 
UNICEF National Committee/Hong Kong 0 11 0.00351 0.02377 
UNICEF National Committee/Iceland 0 5 0.00215 0.01080 
UNICEF National Committee/Italy 0 5 0.00215 0.01080 
UNICEF National Committee/Japan 0 14 0.00419 0.03025 
UNICEF National Committee/Korea 
(Republic of) 
0 1 0.00125 0.00216 
UNICEF National 
Committee/Luxembourg 
0 7 0.00261 0.01512 
UNICEF National Committee/Mexico 0 1 0.00125 0.00216 
UNICEF National Committee/Netherlands 0 6 0.00238 0.01296 
UNICEF National Committee/New 
Zealand 
0 7 0.00261 0.01512 
UNICEF National Committee/Portugal 0 5 0.00215 0.01080 
UNICEF National Committee/Spain 0 14 0.00419 0.03025 
UNICEF National Committee/Switzerland 0 4 0.00193 0.00864 
UNICEF National Committee/Turkey 0 1 0.00125 0.00216 
UNICEF National Committee/United 
Kingdom 
0 35 0.00893 0.07562 
United Arab Emirates, Government of 0 8 0.00269 0.02432 











United Nations Children's Fund 488 1 0.12988 0.40438 
United Nations Development Programme 4 0 0.00191 0.00264 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
333 0 0.07720 0.92443 
United Nations Office for Project Services 0 2 0.00149 0.00430 
United Nations Population Fund 42 2 0.01267 0.02305 
United States of America, Government of 0 140 0.03467 0.21274 
US Fund for UNICEF 0 44 0.01096 0.09506 
Viet Nam, Government of 0 1 0.00124 0.00196 
Voluntary Service Overseas 0 1 0.00474 0.00005 
World Bank 0 5 0.00219 0.00874 
World Food Programme 268 2 0.06897 0.40576 
World Health Organization 17 0 0.00531 0.00979 
World Vision Bangladesh 11 0 0.00335 0.02562 
World Vision International 8 0 0.00384 0.00588 














ACT Alliance / Christian Aid 2 0 0.00152 0.00242 
ACT Alliance / DanChurchAid 2 0 0.00165 0.00042 
ACT Alliance / Norwegian Church Aid 1 0 0.00135 0.00026 
Action Against Hunger 12 0 0.00415 0.00606 
Action Contre la Faim 19 0 0.00690 0.01451 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency 1 0 0.00159 0.00011 
Agency for Technical Cooperation and 
Development 
1 0 0.00136 0.00036 
Aktion Deutschland Hilft 0 2 0.00191 0.00040 
Asian Development Bank 0 1 0.00129 0.00200 
Association for Aid and Relief Japan 1 0 0.00130 0.00068 
Australia, Government of 0 66 0.01890 0.08553 
Austria, Government of 0 2 0.00147 0.00841 
Bangladesh Red Crescent Society 1 0 0.00154 0.00009 
Bangladesh, Government of 0 9 0.00322 0.01636 
BBC Media Action 2 0 0.00157 0.00159 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation 0 1 0.00153 0.00017 
BRAC 23 0 0.01322 0.02369 
Canada, Government of 0 72 0.02294 0.08803 
CARE Bangladesh 1 0 0.00136 0.00036 
CARE International 17 0 0.00869 0.03396 
CARE Luxembourg 0 1 0.00148 0.00020 
CARE USA 0 0 0.00105 0.00000 
CARITAS 1 0 0.00159 0.00011 
Caritas Bangladesh 3 0 0.00296 0.00021 
CBM International (formerly Christian 
Blind Mission) 
4 0 0.00317 0.00063 
Central Emergency Response Fund 0 56 0.01535 0.08721 
Children on the Edge 0 1 0.00483 0.00005 
COAST Trust 4 0 0.00272 0.00026 
Concern Worldwide 1 0 0.00153 0.00011 
Conrad N. Hilton Foundation 0 1 0.00153 0.00017 
COVID-19 Humanitarian Thematic Fund 0 1 0.00129 0.00200 
Czech Republic, Government of 0 1 0.00129 0.00043 
Danish Emergency Relief Fund 0 2 0.00191 0.00040 










Denmark, Government of 0 29 0.01032 0.02995 
Dhaka Ahsania Mission 1 0 0.00175 0.00005 
Disasters Emergency Committee (UK) 0 5 0.00286 0.00070 
Education Above All Foundation 0 6 0.00497 0.00087 
Education Cannot Wait Fund 0 3 0.00172 0.01041 
Estonia, Government of 0 2 0.00147 0.00841 
European Commission 0 22 0.00615 0.06362 
European Commission's Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection Department 
0 77 0.02607 0.06030 
Finland, Government of 0 1 0.00126 0.00421 
Food & Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations 
10 0 0.00352 0.00560 
France, Government of 0 13 0.00613 0.01915 
Friends of UNFPA 0 3 0.00191 0.00054 
Friendship 3 0 0.00245 0.00036 
Friendship Luxembourg 1 0 0.00164 0.00008 
Frontiers Ruwad Association 0 1 0.00135 0.00013 
GAVI Alliance 0 2 0.00154 0.00399 
Germany, Government of 0 33 0.01231 0.06164 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 
0 1 0.00153 0.00017 
Global Partnership for Education 0 1 0.00129 0.00200 
Handicap International / Humanity & 
Inclusion 
8 0 0.00349 0.00392 
HelpAge International UK 3 0 0.00175 0.00363 
Helvetas Swiss Intercooperation 1 0 0.00177 0.00005 
HumaniTerra International 1 0 0.00145 0.00014 
International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies 
1 0 0.00132 0.00050 
International Organization for Migration 105 5 0.03143 0.06285 
International Rescue Committee 5 0 0.00235 0.00380 
Ireland, Government of 0 7 0.00400 0.01258 
Islamic Development Bank 0 6 0.00252 0.01197 
Italy, Government of 0 4 0.00198 0.00827 
Japan Platform 2 3 0.00255 0.00185 
Japan, Government of 0 76 0.02325 0.12663 
King Abdullah Foundation 0 1 0.00129 0.00200 
Korea, Republic of, Government of 0 17 0.00520 0.03020 










Kuwait, Government of 0 7 0.00407 0.00919 
Latter-Day Saint Charities 0 2 0.00170 0.00032 
Luxembourg, Government of 0 9 0.00634 0.00592 
Malteser International Order of Malta 
World Relief 
1 0 0.00136 0.00036 
Mukti Cox's Bazar 3 0 0.01336 0.00014 
Netherlands, Government of 0 7 0.00273 0.01273 
New Zealand, Government of 0 15 0.00959 0.01147 
Norway, Government of 0 27 0.00960 0.04406 
Norwegian Refugee Council 7 4 0.00543 0.00237 
Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs 
4 0 0.00241 0.00077 
OXFAM 9 0 0.00367 0.00480 
OXFAM GB 3 0 0.00216 0.00087 
Peace Winds Japan 3 0 0.00182 0.00205 
Peace Winds Japan 0 0 0.00105 0.00000 
Plan International 5 0 0.00293 0.00136 
Plan International Bangladesh 2 0 0.00159 0.00107 
Portugal, Government of 0 1 0.00129 0.00200 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0 315 0.07527 1.00000 
Qatar, Government of 0 2 0.00150 0.00602 
Radiohjslpen (Radio Aid Sweden) 0 2 0.00170 0.00032 
Relief International 3 0 0.00191 0.00115 
Russian Federation, Government of 0 2 0.00153 0.00364 
Saudi Arabia (Kingdom of), Government 
of 
0 12 0.00395 0.01929 
Save the Children 55 2 0.02057 0.01560 
Sheikh Thani bin Abdullah Foundation 
for Humanitarian Services (RAF) 
0 1 0.00129 0.00200 
Solidaridad Internacional 0 0 0.00105 0.00000 
Solidarites International 10 0 0.00382 0.00462 
Spain, Government of 0 6 0.00261 0.02109 
Street Child Organization 0 1 0.00483 0.00005 
Sweden, Government of 0 30 0.00938 0.03185 
Swiss Solidarity 0 6 0.00509 0.00054 
Switzerland, Government of 0 49 0.01429 0.07749 
TEARFUND 1 0 0.00159 0.00011 
Terre des Hommes - Lausanne 9 0 0.00395 0.00327 










Thani Bin Abdullah Bin Thani Al-Thani 
Humanitarian Fund 
0 3 0.00180 0.00857 
Turkey, Government of 0 1 0.00126 0.00421 
UBS 0 1 0.00153 0.00017 
UN Action Against Sexual Violence in 
Conflict 
0 1 0.00129 0.00043 
UN Foundation 0 0 0.00105 0.00000 
UN Women 4 1 0.00232 0.00286 
Undesignated 1 18 0.00673 0.02138 
UNICEF National Committee/Australia 0 12 0.00399 0.02395 
UNICEF National Committee/Austria 0 1 0.00129 0.00200 
UNICEF National Committee/Belgium 0 12 0.00399 0.02395 
UNICEF National Committee/Canada 0 10 0.00350 0.01996 
UNICEF National Committee/Denmark 0 7 0.00276 0.01397 
UNICEF National Committee/France 0 10 0.00350 0.01996 
UNICEF National Committee/Germany 0 19 0.00571 0.03792 
UNICEF National Committee/Hong Kong 0 11 0.00375 0.02195 
UNICEF National Committee/Iceland 0 5 0.00227 0.00998 
UNICEF National Committee/Italy 0 5 0.00227 0.00998 
UNICEF National Committee/Japan 0 14 0.00448 0.02794 
UNICEF National Committee/Korea 
(Republic of) 
0 1 0.00129 0.00200 
UNICEF National 
Committee/Luxembourg 
0 7 0.00276 0.01397 
UNICEF National Committee/Mexico 0 1 0.00129 0.00200 
UNICEF National Committee/Netherlands 0 6 0.00252 0.01197 
UNICEF National Committee/New 
Zealand 
0 7 0.00276 0.01397 
UNICEF National Committee/Portugal 0 5 0.00227 0.00998 
UNICEF National Committee/Spain 0 14 0.00448 0.02794 
UNICEF National Committee/Switzerland 0 4 0.00203 0.00798 
UNICEF National Committee/Turkey 0 1 0.00129 0.00200 
UNICEF National Committee/United 
Kingdom 
0 35 0.00964 0.06984 
United Arab Emirates, Government of 0 8 0.00286 0.02410 
United Kingdom, Government of 0 136 0.03778 0.22648 
United Nations Children's Fund 454 1 0.13134 0.36317 
United Nations Development Programme 4 0 0.00201 0.00256 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 










United Nations Office for Project Services 0 2 0.00155 0.00439 
United Nations Population Fund 42 2 0.01351 0.02259 
US Fund for UNICEF 0 44 0.01184 0.08780 
Viet Nam, Government of 0 1 0.00129 0.00182 
Voluntary Service Overseas 0 1 0.00483 0.00005 
World Bank 0 5 0.00233 0.00807 
World Food Programme 236 2 0.06693 0.37225 
World Health Organization 14 0 0.00500 0.00619 
World Vision Bangladesh 10 0 0.00335 0.02442 
World Vision International 5 0 0.00350 0.00241 








Figure C.1. Rohingya refugee situation Gephi network visualization, with U.S. involvement included.  
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Figure C.2. Rohingya refugee situation Gephi network visualization, with U.S. involvement excluded.  
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ACT Alliance / Diakonie 
Katastrophenhilfe 
0 1 0.00234 0.00127 
ACT Alliance / Finn Church Aid 1 0 0.00207 0.01878 
ACT Alliance / Norwegian Church Aid 10 0 0.00910 0.16975 
ActionAid International 9 0 0.00824 0.10154 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency 16 0 0.01416 0.19632 
Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland e.V 5 1 0.00501 0.00826 
ArmandoAid 1 0 0.00207 0.01878 
ARSIS Association for the Social Support 
of Youth 
4 0 0.00489 0.04066 
Austria, Government of 0 3 0.00464 0.01592 
Canada, Government of 0 2 0.00297 0.01683 
Care Germany 1 0 0.00222 0.00382 
CARE International 13 0 0.01621 0.08726 
CARE Luxembourg 1 0 0.00303 0.00029 
CARITAS 2 0 0.00315 0.00517 
Caritas Athens 2 0 0.00281 0.03756 
Caritas Germany (DCV) 1 0 0.00226 0.00135 
Caritas Hellas - Caritas Greece 17 0 0.01396 0.31928 
Council of Europe Development Bank 0 5 0.00514 0.00816 
Danish Refugee Council 17 3 0.01313 0.10480 
Denmark, Government of 0 3 0.00372 0.00656 
DIOTIMA Centre of research on Women's 
Issues 
5 1 0.00430 0.07669 
Dorcas Aid International 2 0 0.00281 0.03756 
Emergency Response Centre International 2 0 0.00281 0.03756 
Estonia, Government of 0 1 0.00207 0.01384 
European Commission 0 23 0.02048 0.13862 
European Commission - EU Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey 
0 3 0.00598 0.01437 
European Commission Directorate-
General External Relations 
0 1 0.00229 0.00097 
European Commission's Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection Department 
0 48 0.05058 0.18340 
Faros Organizaton 1 0 0.00207 0.01878 










France, Government of 0 5 0.00699 0.00758 
Friends of UNFPA 0 2 0.00402 0.00065 
German Red Cross 1 0 0.00226 0.00135 
Germany, Government of 0 24 0.02627 0.05179 
Greece, Government of 0 2 0.00311 0.00548 
Help - Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V. 6 0 0.00672 0.02553 
HSA Humanitarian Support Agency 14 0 0.01231 0.24445 
Human Appeal International (UAE) 3 0 0.00356 0.05634 
Initiative for Development and 
Cooperation 
1 0 0.00219 0.00197 
International Aid Network 2 0 0.00554 0.00092 
International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies 
3 0 0.00439 0.00810 
International Medical Corps 3 0 0.00355 0.04010 
International Organization for Migration 27 0 0.02424 0.06574 
International Rescue Committee 25 3 0.01813 0.32156 
Internews 1 0 0.00207 0.01878 
Japan, Government of 0 9 0.00974 0.04039 
Jesuit Refugee Service 2 0 0.00357 0.00183 
Korea, Republic of, Government of 0 2 0.00280 0.02768 
KSPM-ERP Integration Centre for 
Migrant Workers ‚Äì Ecumenical Refugee 
Program 
6 0 0.00712 0.05898 
La Strada International / Open Gate 9 0 0.00895 0.11556 
Latter-Day Saint Charities 0 1 0.00239 0.00184 
LEGIS 6 0 0.00579 0.11269 
Libraries without Borders 2 0 0.00326 0.01915 
Luxembourg, Government of 0 3 0.00603 0.00388 
Macedonia Centre for International 
Cooperation 
1 0 0.00207 0.01878 
Macedonian Red Cross 6 0 0.00579 0.11269 
Macedonian Young Lawyers Association 
(MYLA) 
3 0 0.00426 0.03788 
Medecins du Monde 23 0 0.02079 0.21376 
Medecins du Monde Belgium 1 0 0.00222 0.00382 
Mercy Corps 5 0 0.00534 0.04773 
METAdrasi ‚Äì Action for Migration and 
Development 
3 0 0.00415 0.02296 
Netherlands, Government of 0 4 0.00679 0.00520 










Network on Humanitarian Assistance 1 0 0.00222 0.00382 
NGO Atina - Citizens Association for 
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings 
and all Forms of Gender-based Violence 
3 0 0.00355 0.04010 
Norway, Government of 0 9 0.01149 0.02554 
Norwegian Refugee Council 8 0 0.00909 0.03960 
NOSTOS - Organisation for Social 
Integration 
3 0 0.00532 0.00176 
Nun Kultura 8 0 0.00727 0.15025 
Nurture Project International 1 0 0.00207 0.01878 
Operation Mercy 1 0 0.00277 0.00032 
OXFAM 2 0 0.00341 0.00338 
Oxfam Italia 1 0 0.00222 0.00382 
OXFAM Netherlands (NOVIB) 1 0 0.00222 0.00382 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0 207 0.18118 1.00000 
Salvation Army 2 0 0.00281 0.03756 
Samaritan's Purse 1 0 0.00266 0.00059 
Save the Children 9 0 0.00831 0.12286 
Secours Islamique France 1 0 0.00207 0.01878 
Slovakia, Government of 0 0 0.00133 0.00000 
Slovenia, Government of 0 2 0.00283 0.01547 
Solidarites-France 1 2 0.00450 0.01457 
Solidarity Now 4 0 0.00489 0.05693 
SOS Children's Villages 2 0 0.00300 0.02013 
Spain, Government of 0 9 0.00913 0.10122 
Spanish Red Cross 1 1 0.00313 0.00680 
Sweden, Government of 0 1 0.00210 0.00412 
Swiss Solidarity 0 1 0.00266 0.00059 
Switzerland, Government of 0 12 0.01117 0.05279 
Terre des Hommes International 4 1 0.00371 0.04234 
Translators without Borders 2 0 0.00281 0.02132 
UN Women 2 0 0.00340 0.01937 
Undesignated 3 10 0.02035 0.01394 
UNICEF National Committee/Denmark 0 2 0.00314 0.00598 
UNICEF National Committee/France 0 1 0.00223 0.00299 
UNICEF National Committee/Germany 0 5 0.00586 0.01494 
UNICEF National Committee/Hellenic 0 2 0.00314 0.00598 










UNICEF National Committee/Netherlands 0 3 0.00405 0.00896 
UNICEF National Committee/Spain 0 6 0.00677 0.01793 
UNICEF National Committee/Sweden 0 1 0.00223 0.00299 
UNICEF National Committee/Switzerland 0 1 0.00223 0.00299 
UNICEF National Committee/United 
Kingdom 
0 1 0.00223 0.00299 
United Kingdom, Government of 0 30 0.02605 0.11875 
United Nations Children's Fund 60 0 0.06397 0.12275 
United Nations Development Programme 2 0 0.00317 0.00200 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
77 0 0.06688 0.74403 
United Nations Population Fund 7 1 0.00949 0.00369 
United Nations Voluntary Fund for 
Victims of Torture 
0 1 0.00368 0.00023 
United States of America, Government of 0 8 0.00840 0.04272 
US Fund for UNICEF 0 4 0.00495 0.01195 
World Health Organization 1 0 0.00266 0.00059 
World Vision  Netherlands 1 0 0.00302 0.00046 
Zaporizhzhia Region Charity Fund "Child 
Smile" 













ACT Alliance / Diakonie 
Katastrophenhilfe 
0 1 0.00236 0.00127 
ACT Alliance / Finn Church Aid 1 0 0.00209 0.01880 
ACT Alliance / Norwegian Church Aid 10 0 0.00926 0.16995 
ActionAid International 9 0 0.00835 0.10163 
Adventist Development and Relief Agency 16 0 0.01439 0.19652 
Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Deutschland e.V 5 1 0.00508 0.00823 
ArmandoAid 1 0 0.00209 0.01880 
ARSIS Association for the Social Support 
of Youth 
4 0 0.00495 0.04069 
Austria, Government of 0 3 0.00470 0.01590 
Canada, Government of 0 2 0.00302 0.01672 
Care Germany 1 0 0.00225 0.00381 
CARE International 13 0 0.01640 0.08733 
CARE Luxembourg 1 0 0.00306 0.00029 
CARITAS 2 0 0.00319 0.00515 
Caritas Athens 2 0 0.00284 0.03761 
Caritas Germany (DCV) 1 0 0.00228 0.00134 
Caritas Hellas - Caritas Greece 17 0 0.01414 0.31966 
Council of Europe Development Bank 0 5 0.00523 0.00802 
Danish Refugee Council 17 3 0.01331 0.10484 
Denmark, Government of 0 3 0.00376 0.00657 
DIOTIMA Centre of research on Women's 
Issues 
5 1 0.00435 0.07678 
Dorcas Aid International 2 0 0.00284 0.03761 
Emergency Response Centre International 2 0 0.00284 0.03761 
Estonia, Government of 0 1 0.00209 0.01382 
European Commission 0 23 0.02081 0.13802 
European Commission - EU Facility for 
Refugees in Turkey 
0 3 0.00631 0.01432 
European Commission Directorate-
General External Relations 
0 1 0.00232 0.00097 
European Commission's Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection Department 
0 48 0.05130 0.18277 
Faros Organizaton 1 0 0.00209 0.01880 
Filoxenia International 1 0 0.00209 0.01880 
France, Government of 0 5 0.00707 0.00757 










German Red Cross 1 0 0.00228 0.00134 
Germany, Government of 0 24 0.02665 0.05146 
Greece, Government of 0 2 0.00315 0.00550 
Help - Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe e.V. 6 0 0.00681 0.02552 
HSA Humanitarian Support Agency 14 0 0.01246 0.24474 
Human Appeal International (UAE) 3 0 0.00360 0.05641 
Initiative for Development and 
Cooperation 
1 0 0.00221 0.00196 
International Aid Network 2 0 0.00566 0.00092 
International Federation of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies 
3 0 0.00444 0.00808 
International Medical Corps 3 0 0.00359 0.04014 
International Organization for Migration 26 0 0.02378 0.06460 
International Rescue Committee 25 3 0.01837 0.32188 
Internews 1 0 0.00209 0.01880 
Japan, Government of 0 9 0.00992 0.04004 
Jesuit Refugee Service 2 0 0.00361 0.00183 
Korea, Republic of, Government of 0 2 0.00284 0.02763 
KSPM-ERP Integration Centre for 
Migrant Workers ‚Äì Ecumenical Refugee 
Program 
6 0 0.00721 0.05904 
La Strada International / Open Gate 9 0 0.00906 0.11569 
Latter-Day Saint Charities 0 1 0.00241 0.00184 
LEGIS 6 0 0.00586 0.11282 
Libraries without Borders 2 0 0.00329 0.01917 
Luxembourg, Government of 0 3 0.00609 0.00389 
Macedonia Centre for International 
Cooperation 
1 0 0.00209 0.01880 
Macedonian Red Cross 6 0 0.00586 0.11282 
Macedonian Young Lawyers Association 
(MYLA) 
3 0 0.00430 0.03792 
Medecins du Monde 22 0 0.02016 0.21289 
Medecins du Monde Belgium 1 0 0.00225 0.00381 
Mercy Corps 5 0 0.00541 0.04775 
METAdrasi ‚Äì Action for Migration and 
Development 
3 0 0.00420 0.02298 
Netherlands, Government of 0 4 0.00686 0.00521 
Network for Children's Rights 1 0 0.00209 0.01880 










NGO Atina - Citizens Association for 
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings 
and all Forms of Gender-based Violence 
3 0 0.00359 0.04014 
Norway, Government of 0 9 0.01208 0.02543 
Norwegian Refugee Council 8 0 0.00921 0.03956 
NOSTOS - Organisation for Social 
Integration 
3 0 0.00539 0.00175 
Nun Kultura 8 0 0.00736 0.15043 
Nurture Project International 1 0 0.00209 0.01880 
Operation Mercy 1 0 0.00280 0.00032 
OXFAM 2 0 0.00346 0.00337 
Oxfam Italia 1 0 0.00225 0.00381 
OXFAM Netherlands (NOVIB) 1 0 0.00225 0.00381 
Private (individuals & organizations) 0 207 0.18355 1.00000 
Salvation Army 2 0 0.00284 0.03761 
Samaritan's Purse 1 0 0.00269 0.00058 
Save the Children 9 0 0.00842 0.12297 
Secours Islamique France 1 0 0.00209 0.01880 
Slovakia, Government of 0 0 0.00134 0.00000 
Slovenia, Government of 0 2 0.00287 0.01542 
Solidarites-France 1 2 0.00455 0.01455 
Solidarity Now 4 0 0.00495 0.05699 
SOS Children's Villages 2 0 0.00303 0.02015 
Spain, Government of 0 9 0.00924 0.10105 
Spanish Red Cross 1 1 0.00318 0.00671 
Sweden, Government of 0 1 0.00212 0.00411 
Swiss Solidarity 0 1 0.00269 0.00058 
Switzerland, Government of 0 12 0.01134 0.05260 
Terre des Hommes International 4 1 0.00375 0.04238 
Translators without Borders 2 0 0.00284 0.02134 
UN Women 2 0 0.00344 0.01939 
Undesignated 3 10 0.02068 0.01377 
UNICEF National Committee/Denmark 0 2 0.00320 0.00581 
UNICEF National Committee/France 0 1 0.00227 0.00290 
UNICEF National Committee/Germany 0 5 0.00599 0.01452 
UNICEF National Committee/Hellenic 0 2 0.00320 0.00581 
UNICEF National Committee/Italy 0 4 0.00506 0.01162 










UNICEF National Committee/Spain 0 6 0.00693 0.01742 
UNICEF National Committee/Sweden 0 1 0.00227 0.00290 
UNICEF National Committee/Switzerland 0 1 0.00227 0.00290 
UNICEF National Committee/United 
Kingdom 
0 1 0.00227 0.00290 
United Kingdom, Government of 0 30 0.02646 0.11830 
United Nations Children's Fund 57 0 0.06241 0.11938 
United Nations Development Programme 2 0 0.00321 0.00199 
United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees 
75 0 0.06609 0.74254 
United Nations Population Fund 6 1 0.00920 0.00263 
United Nations Voluntary Fund for 
Victims of Torture 
0 1 0.00374 0.00023 
US Fund for UNICEF 0 4 0.00506 0.01162 
World Health Organization 1 0 0.00269 0.00058 
World Vision  Netherlands 1 0 0.00312 0.00046 
Zaporizhzhia Region Charity Fund "Child 
Smile" 








Figure D.1. European refugee situation Gephi network visualization, with U.S. involvement included.  
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Figure D.2. European refugee situation Gephi network visualization, with U.S. involvement excluded.  
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